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INTRODUCTION
The satisfaction of human wants has become increasingly de-
pendent upon the use of the land. With special emphasis on unde-
veloped land, environmentalists advocate preserving land as open
space,' farmers demand tax credits and other incentives to keep land
in agricultural production,2 and families, whose interests often are
represented by developers, argue for more and better housing.3
Because each use may exclude the others, land use decisions are
bitterly fought contests in which the participants expect the end
result to be permanent, or in any event, long lasting.
This Article does not focus on the substance of such contests; it
advocates neither open space nor farming nor housing. Rather, this
Article focuses upon the system through which land use decisions for
undeveloped land are made. It posits that a viable system should be
fair, efficient, flexible, and certain. The existing land use allocation
system founded upon the extensive public control of zoning and
subdivision law meets none of these criteria.
In particular, the existing system is procedurally unfair4 be-
cause it unjustifiably accords substantial weight to self-selected sam-
ples of neighbors to the detriment of the landowner and the consum-
ers he represents; distributionally unfair5 because it arbitrarily
I On techniques for preserving open space, see Eveleth, An Appraisal of Tech-
niques to Preserve Open Space, 9 V=ii. L. REv. 559 (1964); Krasnowiecki & Paul,
The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Area, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179
(1961); Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HIv. L. REv. 1622
(1962). The Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of the police power to preserve
open space. - See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
2 See generally, 5 N. WIL.,Ams, AMEarCAN LAND PLANNwG LAw § 159.10
(1975); Geier, Agricultural Districts and Zoning: A State-Local Approach to a
National Problem, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655 (1980). For a critique of the benefits of
agricultural tax credits, see Roberts, The Big Giveaway Called Differential Assess-
ment: Some Thoughts on the Integration of Tax and Land Use Policy, 2 UnB. L. &
POL'Y 65 (1979).
3 The arguments for more housing often are made by developers in the context
of attempts to refute the need for local growth control. See Ellickson, Suburban
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YAIE L.J. 385 (1977).
Both federal and state courts have applied a fairly liberal standing analysis, allowing
developers to maintain a suit against restrictive zoning ordinances and outcomes.
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 260-64 (1977) (granting developers standing to represent their own interests,
but leaving unresolved the question whether developers have standing to represent
potential tenants); Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, 81 NJ. 127,
131-35, 405 A.2d 381, 383-85 (1979) (granting standing to nonprofit developers
and to public advocate's offce, while rejecting the potentially restrictive view of
Arlington Heights).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 57-66.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 46-56.
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favors some landowners while burdening others; inefficient as a
mechanism for internalizing harmful spillovers6 because it relies
upon a system of specific deterrence; inefficient as a mechanism of
public control7 because it is fractured among numerous agencies
and legislative bodies; inflexible 8 because it is founded upon pre-
determined, crude categories of permitted uses unable to accommo-
date new development techniques, and uncertain g because it is
-subject to changes granted without standards or without adherence
to announced standards and without sufficient or consistent regard
for investments made in reliance thereon.
Thus, this Article contends that zoning and subdivision controls
as presently constituted should be eliminated and replaced by an
alternative free enterprise development system ("alternative system")
which would allow private decisions to determine the desired type,
location, and design of land development. Such an alternative sys-
tem would confine government to the role of preserving order and
fundamental liberties. In the land use context, public- control
would provide a reasonably safe environment for living and work-
ing, but would not impose aesthetic or social preferences.
The alternative system would reduce, but not eliminate, public
control over undeveloped land. After consultation with interested
members of the public, local governing bodies would establish the
overall land use intensity policy for the community.'0 Then, by
private contract with the developer, an administrative Land Use
Control Agency ("LUCA") would define the public-but generally
not the private-improvements required for any given develop-
ment.1 Public improvements would be financed largely through
the recapture of unearned land value at the time of development. 2
Beyond this, affirmative public control would not interfere with the
personal freedom and private decisions of the individual, except to
provide nuisance and other traditional judicial remedies for aber-
rant private decisions and to enforce private covenants respecting
the use of land.
6See infra text accompanying notes 67-77.
T See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 78-101.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 102-34.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 135-40.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
-2 See infra text accompanying notes 304-47.
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I. THE EXISTING LAND USE ALLOCATION SYSTEM-STRUCTURE,
OBJECTIVES, AND SHORTCOMINGS
Land use controls have proliferated within the last fifty years.'
3
Complex land use problems 14 quickly generated a host of equally
complex solutions. Indeed, the progression from the common law
of nuisance to detailed building and housing codes, 5 zoning laws,' 6
subdivision controls,' 7 and environmental impact regulations s has
13 American local municipalities, up until the late nineteenth century, enacted
practically no formal land use controls. LAND USE CONTROLS: PRESENT PROBLEMS
AND FuTURE REFORm 3 (D. Listokin ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as LAND USE
CONTROLS]. Unreasonable uses of land were generally regulated through the
common law of nuisance. 1 R. ANDERSON, AmmrsucAN LAw or ZoNmNr § 1.02 (2d
ed. 1976).
'4 Recognition of the complexity presented by land use issues can be traced to
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), in which Justice
Sutherland stated:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great
increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and
constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require,
additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands
in urban communities. . . . Such regulations are sustained, under the
complex conditions of our day ....
ld. 386-87.
15 Building and housing codes primarily deal with the material makeup and
habitability of a structure; however, they interrelate with other land use controls,
such as height and setback provisions, on the issue of safety. See generally 1
P. RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 1.02[6][c] (1978).
Although building codes can be criticized for excessive specification and in-
flexibility, the policy of establishing a threshold level of safety cannot be faulted.
The alternative system preserves building code regulation, with the general endorse-
ment of the efforts aimed at uniformity and the substitution of performance for
specification standards. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
16Zoning- in America was patterned after the late nineteenth century ex-
perience in Germany, and the first comprehensive ordinance was that adopted by
New York City in 1916. See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 1.02; 1 J. METzEN-
BAUm, LAw or ZoNING 12-15 (1955).
'7 Subdivision control began as an attempt to clarify land titles for assessment
and conveyancing purposes. See ILLINoIs DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL AFFAinS,
CrnzEN's GUIDE TO SUBDMVSION REGULATONS 2 (April 1978). Beginning in 1928
with the promulgation of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act (SPEA), U.S.
DEP'T OF COM2vMiRCE, STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (1928), reprinted
inl MODEL LAND DEV. CODE app. B (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as
SPEA], subdivision control gradually became a substantive land use regulation.
Today, subdivision regulation includes a review of site and lot design, street grades,
materials, layout, the availability and adequacy of public improvements, and
various health matters, such as drainage and waste treatment. See 1 P. RoI AN,
supra note 15, § 1.02[61[a].
The major area of controversy in terms of subdivision regulation has been
defining what kind of conditions, required dedications, fee payments, and improve-
ments can be imposed for subdivision approval. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING
AND LAn DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 138, at 253 & n.37 (1971). For the
alternative system's answer to this thorny problem, see infra text accompanying
notes 304-47.
'5 Environmental consciousness in America is often traced to January 1, 1970,
the date the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. No.
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been a staggeringly rapid one. Not surprisingly, many of these con-
trols duplicate, or worse, contradict each other, thus increasing the
cost of development. 19 While the justification and cost of public
regulation has frequently been challenged,20 land use controls are
primarily local in origin, and hence, the challenges themselves have
been individual or piecemeal in nature. There have been occasional
calls for the total repeal of public controls; 21 more commonly, how-
91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1976)),
became effective. Among other things, NEPA requires the preparation of an
environmental impact statement (EIS) for major federal actions which may have a
significant impact on the environment. Because many major federal actions include
construction activity, NEPA is very much a land use control. Moreover, private
or state action which involves a federal grant, permit, or decision requires an EIS.
See, e.g., Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973) (enjoining HUD and
private developer from beginning a construction project until an EIS was prepared);
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (requiring EIS for award of federal
grant to Virginia).
At last count, 19 states have required environmental impact statements under
NEPA-like provisions; 7 states have more limited EIS requirements. See COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVRONMENTAL QuALrrY-E1GH ANNUAL REPORT
130 (Dec. 1977). While most state statutes are limited to a consideration of
government/public works type projects, some have been given broader judicial
construction. For example, the California Supreme Court has applied the California
Environmental Quality Act to all activities permitted, funded, or regulated by state
and local government. Because virtually all private development requires some type
of government permit, it now also requires an EIS. See Friends of Mammoth v.
Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972)
(en banc).
The effect of environmental quality acts has been criticized as taking away
limited resources from state and local planning efforts. Moreover, many EIS
requirements are viewed as just more "permits" required for development. Thus,
EISs are prepared in boiler plate fashion, often redoing much of the work
previously incorporated into land use regulation itself. Finally, EIS preparation
concentrates on the physical aspects of land development, rather than the social and
economic aspects of development which avant-garde planners now think they can
identify. See Hagman, Nepa's Progeny Inhabit the States-Were the Genes De-
fective? 7 Unn. L. ANN. 3 (1974).
' 9 See generally Dowall, Effects of Environmental Regulation on Housing
Costs, in D. HAGMAN, PUBUC PLANNING AND CONRrOL OF URBAN AND LAND
DEVELOPmENT 464 (2d ed. 1980).
2 0 See, e.g., B. SiECAN, LAND USE WrOUrT ZONING (1972); Ellickson,
Alternaitves to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls,
40 U. Crm L. REv. 681 (1973); Note, Land Use Control in Metropolitan Areas:
The Failure of Zoning and a Proposed Alternaitve, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 335 (1972).
21 Professor Siegan suggests that in the context of undertaking a comprehensive
zoning amendment, the zoning ordinance should be repealed in full. "It is common
sense, if not planning theory, that if zoning has not worked well in the past and
it is not likely to work well in the future, it should be discontinued. Certainly no
one would argue that there should be regulation merely for the sake of regulation."
B. SIEGAN, supra note 20, at 232. Similarly, Professor Ellickson has concluded that,
"[dietailed mandatory zoning standards inevitably impair efficient urban growth
and discriminate against migrants, lower classes, and landowners with little political
influence. The elimination of all mandatory zoning controls on population densities,
land use locations, and building bulks is therefore probably desirable." Ellickson,
supra note 20, at 779.
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ever, efforts have been directed at streamlining or unifying the exist--
ing development control process. 22
Both approaches are inadequate. So long as land use decisions
have spillover or external effects which cannot be internalized
through private bargaining,23 some form of public control is neces-
sary. To the extent that the manifold existing controls invade areas
more properly reserved for private decisionmaking, the streamlining
of control addresses merely the cosmetic, rather than the substantive,
difficulties of the existing system. Thus, land use reforms have often
taken all-or-nothing positions. This Article suggests an alternative
system that is not at the extremes. The proposed alternative system
would retain public control, but only where private decisions-
because of inadequate information, transaction costs, or resources-
would not reach an optimal result in terms of an articulated com-
munity policy and the maximization of economic resources.
A. The Basic Structure of Zoning and Subdivision Law
In order to understand when public control should displace
private decisionmaking, it is first necessary to examine the structure,
objectives, and shortcomings of the existing land use system. Be-
cause it would be impossible to analyze the enormous variety of
regulation that affects land use, this Article focuses primarily upon
the two most important elements of the existing system: zoning and
subdivision law.
22 In 1975, the American Law Institute published its Model Land Development
Code which attempts to integrate conventional zoning and subdivision control into
a unified land development control system. MODEL LAND DEv. CODE (Proposed
Official Draft 1975); see also D. MANDE =X & R. CUNNNrHAuM, PLANNrNG AN
CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 790-91 (1979).
23All land uses cause positive or negative externalities. An externality is
positive when a land use benefits others who do not pay for that benefit; an ex-
ternality is negative when a land use imposes uncompensated damage or injury on
others. Professor Coase has demonstrated that, in the absence of transaction costs,
private parties can be expected to eliminate externalities through private bargaining.
See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). Whenever
private bargaining can occur, the land use that will prevail is determined by the
relative value of the competing uses, and not by the assignment of legal rights.
See R. PosNEP, ECONoMic ANALysis OF LAW § 3.4, at 34-35 (2d ed. 1977). An
efficient result does not occur in many cases, however, because private bargaining
is not costless. Specifically, there are frequently substantial organizational, in-
formational, and administrative costs. In this regard, even if the organizational and
administrative costs could be overcome, private bargaining often is incapable of
reaching an efficient result in respect to resources held in common. See Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScIENCE 1243 (1968); Moore, Why Allow
Planners to Do What- They Do: A Justification from Economic Theory, 44 J. Am.




Despite the proliferation of land use regulation, zoning remains
the primary element of the system. While there are thousands of
local governments exercising the zoning power,2 the format of zon-
ing ordinances remains very similar. Most ordinances are based on
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), first issued by the
Department of Commerce in 1922 and revised in 1926.25 In general,
land uses are geographically separated and placed into categories on
a zoning map. The text of a typical zoning ordinance defines per-
mitted and sometimes conditional uses, as well as building size and
density of population restrictions, for each category or zoning classi-
fication. Usually, zoning ordinances are enforced prospectively by
building officials who review specific development plans. To a very
limited extent, preexisting land uses which do not conform to the
policies stated in the ordinance will be gradually terminated or
amortized.
26
The zoning ordinance is typically drafted by a planning com-
mission, a body of unpaid, unelected, and untrained citizens, which
attorney Richard Babcock -has described as a "dodo-[which is]
neither expert nor responsible." 27 Public hearings on the draft
ordinance are held at the planning stage and again when the local
governing body formally considers the draft. The SZEA provides
legislative 2 and administrative 29 remedies for those disenchanted
with the final product.
24 See A. MANvEL, LOCAL LAND AND BuLDING REGULATiONS 23, 31 (National
Commission on Urban Problems Research Report No. 6, 1968).
25 U.S. DEP'T OF COMmERCE, STANDAD STATE ZONING ENABiNG ACT (rev.
ed. 1926), reprinted in MoDEL LAND DEv. CODE app. A (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968)
[hereinafter cited as SZEA].
26 Frequently, nonconforming uses which predate a zoning ordinance are al-
lowed to continue on restricted terms. See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 13,
§ 6.32-.63. See infra text accompanying notes 103-06.
27BR. BABcocx, Tim ZoNMG GAME 40 (1966).
2 8 Section 5 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act provides for amend-
ment, supplementation, change, modification, or repeal of the regulations, restrictions,
and boundaries in the zoning ordinance. SZEA, supra note 25, § 5; see 1 B.
ANDmSON, supra note 13, §§ 4.25-.37; 1 P. RoHAN, supra note 15, § 1.0215][b][ii].
For a discussion of zone amendments in relation to the flexibility of the existing
system, see infra text following note 88.
29 The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act authorizes a zoning board of adjust-
ment to grant special exceptions (conditional uses) to the zoning ordinance. SZEA,.
supra note 25, § 7; see 3 B. ANDERSON, supra note 13, §§ 17.07-.12; 2 P. RoHAN,
supra note 15, § 13.04[2][e]. For a discussion of the conditional use device in
relation to the flexibility of the existing system, see infra text accompanying notes
91-94.
The zoning board of adjustment is also authorized to grant variances from
the terms of the zoning ordinance in cases where enforcement would result in un-.
1981]
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2. Subdivision Regulation
Subdivision regulations have not been enacted with the same
uniform character as zoning. Originally, subdivision platting laws
were enacted to enhance the accuracy of land descriptions by re-
quiring property to be sold with reference to a recorded plat.30
With the drafting of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act
(SPEA),3 however, subdivision controls began to take on the char-
acter of a substantive land use control. Today, subdivision controls
are used to specify the quality and extent of on-site improvements
such as roads, drainage, and sewage facilities. 2 In addition, subdivi-
sion regulations may require land dedication or equivalent fees for
park and school purposes-sometimes without express legislative
authorization and generally without compensation.33 Off-site dedi-
cations, fees, or improvements also may be required if there is some
nexus between the proposed subdivision and the improvements.34
necessary hardship. SZEA, supra note 25, § 7; see 3 ANDERSON, supra note 13,
§ 18.01-.04. For a discussion of the variance mechanism in relation to the
flexibility provided by the existing system, see infra text accompanying notes 89-90.
30oWithout a plat, property would often be sold informally (and frequently
inaccurately) by metes and bounds. See D. MANDELKER & R. CtNNINGAM, supra
note 22, at 783; see also supra note 17.
s1 SPEA, supra note 17. For a discussion of the SPEA, see D. HAGMAN, supra
note 17, § 21.
2 In part, the SPEA provides:
Such [subdivision] regulations may provide for the proper arrangement
of streets in relation to other existing or planned streets and to the master
plan, for adequate and convenient open spaces for traffic, utilities, access
of fire fighting apparatus, recreation, light and air, and for the avoidance
of congestion of population, including minimum width and areas of lots.
Such regulations may include provisions as to the extent to which
streets and other ways shall be graded and improved and to which water
and sewer and other utility mains, piping, or other facilities shall be
installed as a condition precedent to the approval of the plat.
SPEA, supra note 17, § 14 (footnotes omitted).
33 Subdivision regulation has engendered considerable law review commentary.
See, e.g., Hanna, Subdivisions: Conditions Imposed by Local Government, 6 SANTA
CrA LAw. 172 (1966); Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing
Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision
Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964); Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision
Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871 (1967); Note,
Subdivision Exactions: Where Is the Limit?, 42 NoT=E Dm.m LAW. 400 (1967).
Where statutory authority is inadequate, the municipality may be able to obtain
money for park and school purposes in other ways. For example, a fee may be
placed on annexation, City of Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Dev. Co., 154 Colo.
535, 392 P.2d 467 (1964) (en banc), or upon the construction business itself,
Westfield-Palos Verdes Co. v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 73 Cal. App. 3d 486,
141 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977).
84 Subdivision dedications and fees may be subject to more than statutory
and ordinance limitations. Assuming that one does not accept the fictional notion
that subdividing is a privilege upon which a municipality may place any con-
[Vol. 130:28
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Finally, subdivision regulations may be used as a mechanism for
growth control 3 or for implementation of a community's master or
comprehensive plan.386
Subdivision controls are exercised through a series of plat re-
views by the local planning commission, the local governing body, or
both. Typically, after initial discussions with the planning staff, a
developer submits a preliminary plat to the planning commission.
The planning commission then circulates the plat to various inter-
ested departments for comment. Negotiations between the de-
.veloper and the planning commission staff at this stage result in
approval, disapproval, or conditional approval by the commission.
The developer receiving preliminary plat approval must construct
any required public improvements, or post a bond guaranteeing con-
struction within a specified time.37 When the improvements are
certified by the local governing body's engineer, the developer sub-
mits a final plat, which must be approved if the preliminary plat
requirements have been fulfilled.
dition, see D. HAcMAN, supra note 19, at 904, subdivision control is an exercise of
the police power and, as such, is subject to constitutional limitations.
The courts have considered constitutional limitations on subdivision regulation
most often in the context of municipal requirements pertaining to off-site dedications,
fees, or improvements-that is, exactions which benefit more than the land sub-
divided. The courts have developed three tests. In Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v.
Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), the Supreme
Court of Illinois invalidated a city-required land dedication of 6.7 acres for an
elementary school site and playground because the need for the recreational and
educational facilities was not specifically and uniquely attributable to the sub-
division. Other courts uphold the off-site exaction if there is a "rational nexus"
between the exaction and the "needs created by, and benefits conferred upon, the
subdivision." Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 52 N.J. 348, 350, 245 A.2d
336, 337 (1968) (per curiam). Finally, some courts simply defer to the municipal
decision concerning how and where to spend subdivision exaction revenue. See,
e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d
606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (en banc), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
35 See, e.g., N.H. BRv. STAT. ANN. § 36:21 (Supp. 1979).
N See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66418(9) (West Supp. 1980); see also Nelson,
The Master Plan and Subdivision Control, 16 ME. L. REv. 107 (1964).
3 7 See generally Yearwood, Performance Bonding for Subdivision Improvements,
46 J. Una. L. 67 (1968).
In regard to public improvments, the developer may actually be given
a number of options. First, the developer may complete construction of all
required improvements before submitting a final plat; second, the developer may
post a bond guaranteeing such construction; third, the developer may petition a
municipality to construct the public improvements and levy the cost against certain
lots within the subdivision on a special assessment basis, and fourth, the developer
may offer the municipality a mortgage, which will be released as the improvements
are constructed. Professors Mandelker and Cunningham suggest that the scope
of the range of options made available to the developer will depend upon the
community's attitude toward subdivision activity. If the community adopts a
no-growth attitude, the options will be limited. See D. MANDELXER & R. CUNNING-
HAm, supra note 22, at 794.
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The injection of substantive requirements into subdivision
controls has bifurcated and lengthened the land use allocation pro-
cess. Subdivision approval is independent of, and may be incon-
sistent with, zoning regulation. 8 Various proposals have been made
to integrate the zoning and subdivision process, but to date the trend
has been toward adding levels of approvals, rather than toward
eliminating or consolidating. 9
B. The Objectives of a Land Use Allocation System
Few land use discussions adequately identify the objectives
sought to be achieved by proposed allocation systems. Among those
questions seldom addressed with sufficient clarity are whether an
allocation system should increase public participation at the expense
of increased time and costs for development; whether the allocation
system minimizes the chance of overlapping regulation; whether the
regulation is economically efficient in maximizing the total value of
all resources; whether the system can accommodate creative develop-
ment proposals, and whether the system encourages or at least does
not discourage, participation in the development process. This
Article will examine all of these questions in detail; it first must be
recognized, however, that each of the questions is related to one or
more of four ideal characteristics of any land use allocation system:
fairness, efficiency, flexibility, and certainty.
An overwhelming amount of scholarly attention has been fo-
cused on the fairness issue.40 Everyone agrees that the system should
a8 D. MAN.-ELKER & R. CuNNiNGHA_, supra note 22, at 790.
39 There are now numerous local, regional, and state agencies charged with
the protection of a specialized aspect of the public weal. Consequently, land de-
velopment often requires several permits. Moreover, procuring a given permit may
be contingent on the completion of the requirements for a previous permit. Regret-
tably, when development is subjected to multiple permit requirements, economic
resources are frequently wasted because compliance with one permit does not vest
the right to another. For a particularly dramatic example of wasted resources, see
Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d
785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976) (en banc), in which the California
Coastal Zone Commission denied Avco an exemption from the permit requirement
of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, notwithstanding the fact
that Avco had spent in excess of $2 million in preparatory work, had obtained a
grading permit from the county, and had final plat approval. For discussions of the
developers dilemma, see Delaney & Kominers, He Who Rests Less, Vests Best:
Acquisition of Vested Rights in Land Development, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 219 (1979);
Hagman, The Vesting Issue: The Rights of Fetal Development Vis a Vis the
Abortions of Public Whimsy, 7 Euv-r. L. 519 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hagman,
The Vesting Issue]; Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use
Permits, 11 Sw. U.L. Rlv. 545 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hagman, Estoppel and
Vesting].
4 0 See, e.g., B. ACmErAN, PRIVATE PROaPERTY ANn TH CONSrrvroON (1977);
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
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be fair or equitable. Few agree, however, on what fairness or equity
means in the land use context. Frequently, the issue has been
treated as inseparable from the question whether compensation is
required for land use regulations which rise to the level of a "tak-
ing." 41 While the compensation question is important, it is not the
sole determinant of a fair system. As will be seen later, the compen-
sation question is itself merely one aspect of distributional fair-
ness.42 In this regard, knowing when a wealth transfer loss precipi-
tated by land use regulation requires compensation is no more, and
no less, important than knowing when a wealth transfer gain should
be recouped. In addition, even if a system is distributionally fair, it
may still be perceived as unfair if the distributional result is arrived
at in a procedurally unfair manner.
Efficiency is often considered a desirable end in itself without
regard to the objective that is sought to be efficiently obtained. It
is important to know what the land use allocation system is expected
to do efficiently. As used in this Article, the criteria for efficiency
will determine how well the system internalizes harmful spillovers,
ameliorates conflicts among neighboring land uses, and reviews land
use allocation proposals. In large part, this Article will employ the
analysis suggested by Professor Ellickson's groundbreaking article on
the subject, characterizing a system as efficient when it minimizes
the sum of nuisance, prevention, and administrative costs.43
An analysis of a land use allocation system remains incomplete
if only fairness and efficiency goals are examined. A land use sys-
tem must be flexible in order to incorporate new development ideas
or policy changes. Recognizing flexibility as an objective of a land
use allocation system acknowledges that land development projects
increasingly consist of a mixture of theoretically inconsistent land
uses. 44 The series of energy shortages during the past five years
of "Just Compensatior" Law, 80 HAnv. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ. 149 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sax,
Takings, Private Property]. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALZ L.J. 36
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Sax, Takings and the Police Power].
4 1 E.g., F. BossEizf:AN, D. CAI.rxs & J. BANTA, TnE TA=GXI IssuE (1973);
Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165 (1974);
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, supra note 40.
4 2 See infra text accompanying notes 46-56.
43 Ellickson, supra note 20, at 688-90.
44 The planned unit development concept under the existing system recognizes
this trend. See Babcock, An Introduction to the Model Enabling Act for Planned
Residential Development, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv. 136 (1965). This type of mixed use
development is directly contrary to the rigid districting required by zoning. In a
refreshingly honest look at development in the 1980's, Professor Hagman suggests
that land use policy include, among other things, mixed use developments. In
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convincingly demonstrates the folly of the traditional land use pat-
tern which totally segregates housing and employment centers.
Nonetheless, while mixing business and residential uses may lessen
transportation and other energy-related problems, it may accentuate
others, such as noise and safety. Thus, an allocation system must be
capable of sensitive project-by-project evaluation.
A fourth goal of a land use allocation system should be the pro-
vision of certainty.45 If land use allocations increase the level of un-
certainty, economic resources that ordinarily would be invested in
positive production may instead be diverted to adaptive expendi-
tures or not invested at all. For example, when a farmer or housing
developer is concerned that his land use allocation will be changed,
he may attempt to insure the risk, thereby diverting funds to insur-
ance premiums from farming or housing. Alternatively, because
insurance for public regulation is generally unavailable or inade-
quate, the farmer or housing developer may decide to reduce his
investments or, if he is particularly risk averse, may decide not to
invest at all.
C. The Shortcomings of the Existing System
Having briefly identified the four objectives of the ideal land
use allocation system, our focus now turns to an evaluation of how
well the existing system, as represented by zoning and subdivision
law, accomplishes those objectives.
1. Fairness
The fairness issue can be divided into two subissues: distribu-
tional fairness and procedural fairness. The division is an analytical
one only-if wealth distributions occasioned by the existing system
are inherently unfair, then certainly the unfairness is increased if the
distribution was derived pursuant to an unfair procedure.
a. Distributional Fairness
All land use allocations create or destroy land value.46 Two
properties with similar physical and locational characteristics may
have dramatically different values based solely upon the public
designation of a permitted land use. Indeed, landowners often
this regard, Hagman suggests that "[c]ommercial-industrial-residential (CIR) mix
facilitates enormous energy savings by making work, shopping and living arrange-
ments less dependent on the automobile." D. HAcMAN, supra note 19, at 9.
45 See generally B. AcK-mwAN, supra note 40, at 44-46.
4 6 See infra text accompanying notes 304-47.
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emphasize the existing system's effect on land value to argue for
invalidating a particular regulation or to advance a claim for com-
pensation. 47 Landowner claims of drastic, but not total, diminu-
tions in value, however, have merited neither judicial relief 4 nor
the sympathy of the regulators.
49
Of course, not all land use designations result in decreased
value. More than a few greatly increase land value. This occurs
because of the favorable uses or intensity of development permitted
under a given land use designation and because participants in the
market perceive the scarcity of such designations.80
Does the fact that one may just as easily gain as lose as a result
of a land use allocation under the existing system mean that the
system is distributionally fair? It might, if everyone had an equal
chance of gain or loss or if the losers perceived that the particular
47 The landowner's propensity to cite diminution in value as a basis for relief
can be traced to the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922), where Justice Holmes stated that "Et]he general rule at least is, that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." Id. 415.
4 8 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In
Euclid, a 75% reduction in the value of plaintiff's land caused by a zoning change
did not suffice to require the state to compensate plaintiff under the taking clause.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The Court has maintained its position that diminution in
property value alone cannot justify a taking claim. See Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (citing Euclid); see also HFH, Ltd.
v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975) (en
banc) (sustaining a demurrer to an action founded in inverse condemnation when
the only alleged effect of the zoning regulation was a diminution in the market value
of the property in question), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
49 Primarily, regulators assert that payment of compensation for the diminution
in value caused by police power regulation will have a chilling effect upon the
exercise of that authority. One commentator states: "This threat of unanticipated
financial liability will intimidate legislative bodies and will discourage the imple-
mentation of strict or innovative planning measures in favor of measures which are
less stringent, more traditional, and fiscally safe." Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo
Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law?, 28 HAsncs L.J. 1569, 1597
(1977) (footnote omitted). Regulators also assert that a finding of inverse con-
demnation inappropriately transfers the power of eminent domain from legislatures
to the judiciary. See, e.g., Brief for the California Attorney General as Amicus
Curiae, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
50 See Freeman, Give and Take: Distributing Local Environmental Control
Through Land-Use Regulation, 60 Mnqr. L. REv. 883 (1976). The economic
basis for positive externalities, or as Freeman calls them "givings," is a combination
of value transfer and supply restriction effects. The value transfer effect derives from
the notion that a particular tract of undeveloped land carries with it both a present
use value and a component of value equivalent to the discounted value of future
development for a particular, more intensive use. Each tract having the potential
for more intense development carries a fraction of the total value of one tract already
developed for the more intensive use. Thus, "[a] decision to permit development of
one of the tracts for the more intensive use would have the effect of removing . . *
[that fractional value] from the tracts not granted development permission, while
at the same time conferring the total of the fractional values on the site designated
for development." Id. 965.
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allocation can reasonably be expected to work out in the long run
to the advantage of everyone.51 Few land use allocations under
the existing system, however, can be characterized as possessing
these qualities. Because most land use allocations are legislative
matters, 52 the standard by which they are measured is whether
they rationally promote the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the
community. This general welfare standard is seldom sufficient to
justify why one parcel of land is treated more favorably than
another. Absent an adherence to some strict planning methodology,
which itself may be neither possible nor desirable,53 landowners
under the existing system will likely feel that the decisions are
arbitrary, or merely the "prizes and penalties of a lottery." 54 Thus,
the existing system neither requires beneficial property owners to
relinquish zoning-created value nor compensates those whose prop-
erty interests have been devalued. Because the taking jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court 55 and most state courts 56 ignores the diminu-
tion in value caused by land use allocations, absent a showing of
51 This is the fairness test articulated by Professor Michelman. Michelman,
supra note 40, at 1218-24. The suggested fairness standard has been criticized on
the basis that few people would have the patience and vision of Michelman's
theoretical man. See Berger, supra note 41, at 185.
52 D. HAcMAN, supra note 17, § 33. In order to allow greater judicial scrutiny
of the existing system, however, various courts have characterized some zoning
actions as "quasi-judicial." See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or.
574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973) (en banc).
5 3 Adherence to a planning standard has been required, either judicially or by
statute, in a number of states. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Milwaulde, 271 Or. 500,
533 P.2d 772 (1975) (requiring municipalities to implement state comprehensive
plan through zoning ordinances); CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 65860(a) (ii) (West Supp.
1980) (requiring that "[tihe various land uses authorized by the [local zoning]
ordinance are [to be] compatible with the objectives, policies, general land uses,
and programs specified in [the] plan.").
The wisdom of requiring consistency with planning is questionable in view
of the inconsistent evidence on the efficacy of planning. In this regard, there is
little agreement on the appropriate style of planning, let alone its value. While
planning was originally perceived as a way of curing market imperfections, it has
seldom been shown to have this effect. Rather, planning "is based upon the
assumption that the planner's re-distributive values are superior to those of the
market and will result in a net gain to the aggregate welfare . . . . [P]lanner's
choices ... , however, risk being arbitrary since planners bear little responsibility for
distribution of the costs or benefits of their activity." Tarlock, Consistency with
Adopted Land Use Plans as a Standard of Judicial Review: The Case Against, 9
URB. L. ANN. 69, 76 (1975).
5 4 Hagman, Windfalls for Wipeouts, in WINDFALLS For WIPEouTs 20 (D.
Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978).
55 See supra notes 47-48; infra text accompanying notes 149-65.
56 For a discussion of the taking jurisprudence in state courts, see 1 R.
A DmEsoN, supra note 13, § 3.25; Krasnowiecki & Strong, Compensible Regulations




complete economic nonviability, the distributional unfairness of
the existing system is also ignored.
b. Procedural Fairness
Even though the distributional fairness of land use allocations
under the existing system is generally incapable of measurement,
the system might be more tolerable if the procedures leading to a
"penalty or prize" were fair. Several aspects of the existing system,
however, prevent even this modicum of fairness.
Because land use allocations are characterized as legislative in
nature, the procedural protections that ensure fairness are limited.
While notice is generally provided by statute to affected or inter-
ested parties, it seldom is constitutionally required; the members of
the hearing body need not be impartial in the sense of having to
refrain from ex parte contacts with interested parties or possibly
even from being interested themselves; cross-examination is limited,
if available at all; most hearing bodies operate without even the
loosest set of evidentiary standards, and to compound matters, a
record with adequate findings is seldom made to facilitate the
limited opportunity for judicial review.5 7
Several jurisdictions have pierced the legislative veil of land use
matters, and have found that regulations laying down general poli-
cies can be distinguished from regulations affecting the permissible
use of a specific parcel of property.5 s By characterizing these latter
5 7
See generally Harris, Rezoning-Should it be a Legislative or Judicial
Function?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 409 (1979); Sullivan, Araby Revisited: The Evolving
Concept of Procedural Due Process Before Land Use Regulatory Bodies, 15 SANrA
CLRA LAw. 50 (1974); Developments in the Lau--Zonng, 91 HAnv. L. REV.
1427, 1502-49 (1978); Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial
or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 Omo ST. L.J. 130 (1972).
Neither the SZEA nor the SPEA clearly specifies procedural standards to be
used by local governing bodies in making land use decisions. The SZEA specifies
certain procedural standards to be followed by local zoning boards of adjustment in
the consideration of variances and special exceptions, but the act places virtually no
restrictions on the decisionmaking process of the local legislative body. Similarly,
the SPEA imposes few procedural restrictions on planning commission determinations.
58 See, e.g., Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975)
(en bane); City of Colorado Springs v. District Court, 184 Colo. 177, 519 P.2d 325
(1974); (en bane); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23
(1973) (en bane); Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495, 127 A.2d
190 (1956).
In Fasano, the Board of County Commissioners rezoned property from single
family residential to a planned residential community, which would have allowed
the construction of a mobile home park. When this rezoning was challenged by
neighboring landowners, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected the previously accepted
proposition that judicial review of a zoning amendment was limited to a deter-
mination of whether the amendment was arbitrary or capricious. The court dis-
tinguished between the exercise of legislative authority involving the laying down
of general policies and the judicial determination whether the permissible use of a
19811
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actions as quasi-judicial, these jurisdictions have required some of
the due process protections normally associated with judicial pro-
ceedings. In addition, the quasi-judicial finding has encouraged the
courts to exercise more stringent review of the land use process.5 9
Even if the extension of due process protections to the land-
owner becomes the prevalent rule, procedural fairness may not be
enhanced. As will be discussed later in detail, notions of due pro-
cess have been used to enlarge public participation in land use mat-
ters to include neighbors, policy groups, general taxpayers, and
many others only remotely connected with a given property.60
specific piece of property should be changed. Having determined that rezoning
procedures are judicial in character, the Fasano court concluded that:
Parties at the hearing before the county governing body are entitled to an
opportunity to be heard, to an opportunity to present and rebut evidence,
to a tribunal which is impartial in the matter-i.e., having had no pre-
hearing or ex parte contacts concerning the question at issue-and to a
record made and adequate findings executed.
264 Or. at 588, 507 P.2d at 30; see also Oregon Attorney General's Opinion on
Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners, Washington County, No. 7062 (Mar.
26, 1974). In order to carry out the Fasano/due process requirements, two Oregon
cities, Eugene and Portland, have shifted responsibility for rezoning hearings from
the planning commission to a hearing examiner. The use of a hearing examiner is
believed to be beneficial insofar as it lowers the chance of legislative caprice and it
promotes the preparation of adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. See
Curtin & Shirk, Land Use, Planning and Zoning, 9 UPB. LAW. 724, 740 (1977).
Nevertheless, "[m]ost courts have been unwilling to treat rezoning decisions as
quasi-judicial acts." Sullivan, supra note 57, at 60. There is some indication,
however, that courts in other jurisdictions have created various makeshift devices
for informally controlling legislative power, such as the "change or mistake" rule,
which invalidates any rezoning unless a change in the physical character of the
neighborhood or a mistake in the original zoning can be proved. See 1 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 5.07; Linowes & Delaney, The Maryland Change-
Mistake Rule: A Mistake That Should Be Changed, 1971 LAND UsE ComrmoLs
ANN. 117.
5 In Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973)
(en banc), the court adopted the comprehensive plan as the basic standard for
review of land use regulations. In contrast, the SZEA merely requires that zoning
regulations be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan. SZEA, supra note
25, § 3. The courts have construed that provision "as meaning nothing more than
that zoning ordinances shall be comprehensive-that is to say, uniform and broad
in scope of coverage.... [Clourts have found it difficult to assign any independent
meaning to the term." Haar, "In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan!', 68
HAv. L. REv. 1154, 1157 (1955). Thus, for the Fasano court to require sub-
stantive cor.formance with a planning document was a significant judicial departure
from prior practice. Moreover, the conformity requirement established by the
Fasano court was rigorous:
In proving that the change is in conformance with the comprehensive plan
in this case, the proof, at a minimum, should show (1) there is a public
need for a change of the kind in question, and (2) that need will be best
served by changing the classification of the particular piece of property
in question as compared with other available property.
264 Or. at 583-84, 507 P.2d at 28.
60 See infra text accompanying notes 174-98.
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-Under the existing system, then, remote interests are often given the
.same or more weight as the landowner himself. From the stand-
point of democratic theory, widespread public participation may
.appear salutary, until one realizes that the participating groups are
frequently those who have benefited (as homeowners or business-
men) from the existing system in the past, and they are trying to
.enhance their "prize" by making sure others are "penalized." Often
because the participating groups are residents, and the landowner is
not, the participating groups have a decided political advantage
regardless of the objective merits of the landowner's proposal.6 1
Finally, the distributional unfairness of the existing system
tends to exacerbate the system's procedural unfairness. The effect
-of land use allocations on land is often tremendous. The decision
may determine the success or failure of a particular project and,
perhaps, the economic fate of the landowner himself. Because the
,existing system confers the land value prizes and penalties under a
standardless lottery, predicting the outcome of a land use contro-
versy is frequently a matter for fortune tellers rather than lawyers.
In an effort to reduce the level of investment risk and the chances
.of a disastrous penalty, the landowner may be willing to share his
land value prize with the decisionmakers. In other words, the
,existing system may be corrupt or subject to special influence.
62
A recently completed study sponsored by the National Institute
.,of Law Enforcement and Criminal justice found local government
-corruption in land use and building regulation to be a significant
problem in many areas of the United States.63 The study found
that land use decisions were particularly susceptible to corruption
because of the significant financial losses and gains which are im-
posed as a consequence of zoning.64 Other corruption incentives
cited by the study included the confused treatment of zoning as
both a legislative and administrative matter, the increasing com-
plexity of land use procedures, and the lack of standards guiding
.zoning decisions.65 While the study's recommendation that land
61R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 191 (1977). For a discussion of
legal remedies available to politically disadvantaged outsiders, see Ellickson, supra
:note 3.
62 See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 407-08.
63 
NAT'L INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAw EN-
FORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRUPTION IN
LAND USE AND BUIDING REGULATION (1979).
0
4 NAT'L INSTITUTE OF LAw ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAw EN-
. FORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN_ ANALYSIS OF
-ZONING REFORMS: MNIMZING THE INCENTIVE FOR CORRUPTION 13 (1979).
65 Id. 7.
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use matters be decided pursuant to a defined administrative pro-
cedure and established planning standards may be questioned, little
doubt remains that zoning frequently results in untaxed windfalls
or uncompensated wipeouts, where the "friends of the house" enjoy
a definite advantage on an imperfectly warped roulette wheel.66
2. Efficiency
Strong evidence suggests that the existing system is no more
efficient than it is fair.67  Any successful reduction in nuisance
costs precipitated by the existing system is generally outweighed by
increased prevention and administrative costs. 68  While zoning may
reduce nuisance costs by segregating incompatible land uses, the
available research indicates that the operation of the land market
itself would have accomplished a similar segregation without the
corresponding administrative costs.
69
Several reasons can be cited for the existing system's inefficiency.
First, public regulators frequently address only the nuisance cost
of the efficiency equation. Consequently, public regulation may
attempt to eliminate every conceivable negative aspect of a par-
ticular land use, even though such practice may be undesirable
from the standpoint of overall economic efficiency3 0 To use Pro-
fessor Ellickson's terminology, public regulators seek to minimize
66 Ellickson, supra note 20, at 701.
67 A prevalent justification for the existing system is to correct market failure.
It has been noted that "the existence of market failure is a necessary condition for
government intervention." Moore, supra note 23, at 393. As Moore points out,
however, the existence of market failure is not a sufficient condition for government
intervention, because if the market is operating inefficiently, government inter-
vention may only reduce efficiency. Moreover, even in the presence of market
failure, there is little assurance that government intervention will eliminate in-
efficiency: regulatory intervention may be as flawed as the market.
Economic regulation has been criticized because it is often undertaken without
a clear idea of how regulation works. For example, "[miarket transactions in an
unsafe product will often harm third parties without compensation, but the potential
for uncompensated, unforeseen harm to consumers, workers, stockholders and other
third parties resulting from uninformed economy-wide or industry-wide regulations
may be far greater." Schuck, Regulation: Asking the Right Questions, 11 NAT'L J.
711 (1979), reprinted in D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, at 80, 81. Regulatory failure
or inefficiency may be even greater in the land use context than in other areas of
economic regulation because of the tendency of the existing system to group
different land uses into crude, unrefined categories (zoning districts) and to dis-
courage investment and innovation.
68 Ellickson, supra note 20, at 693-99.
69 Siegan, Regulating the Use of Land, in TnE INTERAcTION OF EcONOMIcs ANm
iH Low 159 (B. Siegan ed. 1977).
70 This is the basic economics notion of diminishing returns. See P. S MUEL-
SON, EcoNomics 21-25 (11th ed. 1980). For a discussion of the concept in the
context of environmental regulation, see R. STwART & J. Kuhma, ENVmONMENTAL
LAw AN Pouicy 556-57 (2d ed. 1978).
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,nuisance costs, ignoring the fact that in order to maximize the
value of land resources, it is necessary to minimize the "sum of
nuisance, prevention, and administrative costs." 71
A second source of the existing system's inefficiency is its re-
liance upon mandatory specification standards.72 For example,
.zoning frequently mandates that each house in a residential dis-
trict be set back a specified distance from the street or that certain
-commercial establishments, such as all-night grocery stores, be ab-
solutely prohibited in residential zones. While this type of highly
-collectivized regulation may keep residents free from bothersome
noise, lights, and traffic, it also makes it impossible for the land-
owner to experiment with more creative, and perhaps efficient,
solutions to the stated problems. In this regard, the clustering of
,dwellings to reduce street noise or the use of hedges or lightscreens
to reduce the grocery's drawbacks are solutions made impossible by
the zoning ordinance. The impossibility of individualized solu-
tions under the existing system is heightened by the system's em-
-phasis upon mandatory compliance orders, rather than fines or
taxes, which at least would afford the landowner the freedom of
paying a penalty rather than adhering to inefficient standards. Be-
,cause the design of the existing system is legislative in nature, the
courts also have been reluctant to permit zoning by contractual
means.3
71 Ellickson, supra note 20, at 694 (emphasis added).
72 Performance standards are superior to specification standards for several rea-
sons. First, performance standards prescribe only desired results, leaving to the
.discretion of the party being regulated how best to achieve that result. In this
regard, the regulator who uses a performance standard recognizes that the regulated
-party is more likely to have knowledge of eicient solutions than the outside
regulator. Second, the use of performance standards prevents regulators from
-becoming enmeshed in technical subjects for which they do not have any particular
expertise. Lastly, performance standards allow for the direct evaluation of both the
regulator and the regulated party. The success of specification standards is often
measured in indirect terms. For example, zoning is touted as necessary for the
-community's "general welfare"; but "general welfare" is too vague to be measured.
,Consequently, the existing system evaluates its success at increasing welfare through
the achievement of specification or process and design requirements-for example,
that certain zoning procedures be undertaken or that a subdivision be designed in
a particular way. In contrast, performance standards measure the success of the
-regulation in terms of the actual underlying purpose of the regulation. Perhaps the
existing system relies upon specification standards to cloud the fact that its actual
-underlying purpose may be economic and racial segregation. In this regard, Pro-
fessor Hagman's personal prescription for land use policy in the 1980's suggests that:
"[I]t will be necessary to purge it from the influence of environmental imposters.
These include the elitists, the excluders, the protectors of the status quo, the pseudo-
pantheists and the open spacists (in our backyard at your expense)." D. HAGMAN,
.supra note 19, at 6.
73 For a discussion of contract and conditional zoning, see infra text accompany-
-ing notes 250-61.
-19813
48 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The efficiency of the existing system is also undercut by the
delays associated with zoning and subdivision administration.74
Zoning officials tend to exhibit a lack of concern for permit
processing delays. Public regulators are often content to postpone
the processing of an application, or debate the merits of a pro-
posed use, or continue discussion from one meeting to the next,
seemingly oblivious to the landowner's ever-increasing carrying
costs and the impact those costs have on the ultimate quantity and
quality of the development.
Theoretically, permit issuance is mandatory if the proposed
development is permitted by the existing zoning classifications;
.however, few developments can proceed today without a zoning
variance, amendment, or conditional use permit.1 5 Especially in
the case of undeveloped land, zoning officials frequently employ
low density holding zones to ensure their ability to exercise dis-
cretion over the project.76 Subdivision regulations directly afford
74 Administrative delay has been cited as a significant factor in the cost of
housing. See L. SAGALYN & G. STEur.NB, ZONING AND HoUsING COSTS (1973).
The response of the existing system to delay has been either to coordinate permit
requirements or specify a time limit for decisionmaking. With the advent of state
and federal land use controls, however, and the multiplication of permit require-
ments, especially in the coastal, wetland, and environmentally sensitive areas,
coordination has become quite difficult. In addition, local governments may re-
frain from the coordination procedure if they view it as an attempt by the state to
intrude upon local prerogatives. Nevertheless, coordinated hearing legislation has
been enacted in Maryland, Alaska, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington. For an
evaluation of such legislation, see F. BossEuAN, D. FEURER & C. SIEMON, TiH
Pnma-TI EXPLoSIoN (1976). The Model Land Development Code also provides for
joint hearings where multiple permits are required. MODEL LAND DEv. CODE, supra
note 22, §§ 2-401 to -403.
-15 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLms, LAND-UsE CONTROLS: ZONING
AND SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS, excerpted in LAND USE CONTROLS, Supra note 13,
at 19, 26. The National Commission calls this the "wait and see" approach:
The community obtains de facto control over land development by zoning
undeveloped areas for very low densities and then waiting for landowners
to seek a map change. The real decisions-perhaps in accordance with an
approved plan or prestated policies but more often not-are then taken by
the local governing body when each application for rezoning is filed.
Id. 26-27.
76 Professor Nelson states:
Communities have very often held large supplies of land idle or in a
relatively low-value use while waiting long periods for high-quality de-
velopment to be proposed in accordance with their ultimate community
design. The cumulative consequence of community zoning in a metro-
politan area is a public rationing system for undeveloped metropolitan
land. ....
Because of community zoning practices, the supply of metropolitan
land made available for high-quality uses has tended far to exceed the
demand for these uses, and the supply of land made available for lower-
quality uses to be far less than the demand for them. These large im-
[Vol. 130:28.
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both the planning commission and the governing body considerable
discretion in the processing of subdivision plats.
Some states have tried to address the delay costs imposed by the
existing system through legislatively defined process times; that is,
an application may be deemed approved if not acted on within a
specified time unless a continuance is granted with the consent of
the landowner.77 As a practical matter, however, it is likely that
landowners are reluctant to withhold their consent to a continuance
for fear that pressing for a reasonable response time may result in
outright rejection of their proposed land use.
The efficiency of the existing system is undermined as well by
high administrative costs. Public administrative costs include the
salaries of zoning and subdivision officials as well as the judiciary
involved in reviewing land use decisions. Private administrative
costs may be even more extensive. The preparation of a zoning or
subdivision application often requires the expensive services of law-
yers who specialize in land use law, civil and traffic engineers, archi-
tects, planners, consultants, and influence peddlers. Moreover, to
the extent that the existing system is subject to special influence,
legal campaign contributions or their illegal equivalents must also
be counted as administrative costs.
3. Flexibility
a. Zoning in Theory-A Self-Administering System
Zoning was not designed as a flexible land use allocation sys-
tem38 The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act originally provided
for a few zone classifications with large quantities of land within
each zone. With the exception of single family zones, zones were
cumulative, and zoning architects believed that virtually any use
could be accommodated within an existing zone map. At most, the
zoning architects thought, extraordinary cases or cases of particular
balances between supplies and demands have caused very serious social
inequities and major inefficiencies in the use of metropolitan land.
R. NELSON, supra note 61, at 187.
77For example, California has legislation mandating decisions on development
projects within time periods ranging from six to eighteen months. CAL. Gov'T
'CODE §§ 65950-65954 (West Supp. 1980).
78 See Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established
Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 63 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Krasnowiecki, PUD]; see also Krasnowiecki, The Basic System
of Land Use Control: Legislative Preregulation v. Administrative Discretion, in
THE Nmw ZONING: LEGAL., ADmINIST.ATIVE, AND ECONOMC CONCEPTS AND TECH-
iQT Es 3 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Krasnowiecki,
The Basic System].
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hardship could be handled with a minimum of legislative or admin--
istrative discretion with a rare zone amendment or variance.
Zoning's inflexibility resulted not only out of a naive optimism
concerning the system's workability, but also from the fear that too.
much discretion would lead to unbridled legislative or administra-
tive interference with the land market. While the advent of zoning
was certainly part of the trend toward increasing government regula-
tion of economic activity,79 its formulation occurred at the begin-
ning of that trend,80 and thus reflects a type of transitional hesitancy
against intruding too greatly into areas previously viewed as matters
of private concern.8'
The desire for a self-administering zoning system coincided well
with the low profile of the judiciary in the post-Lochner v. New
York 82 era. Most courts have no desire to become enmeshed in
land use controversies as a super-zoning body. 3 Thus, courts look
with favor upon a prestated system of regulations which can be
easily assessed as to its minimum rationality; conversely, courts have
invalidated zoning systems which overtly permit discretion that in-
creases or complicates judicial review.8
79 Early zoning can be traced to Los Angeles. In 1909, Los Angeles adopted
an ordinance dividing the city into industrial and residential districts. Another
Los Angeles ordinance was passed in 1910 which excluded brick factories from one
or two of the existing industrial districts. The 1910 ordinance was upheld in
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). As in most land use matters, the
east ultimately caught up with the west, and New York City enacted a zoning
ordinance in 1916, which established three separate classes of districts regulating
the use, height, and percentage of lot occupied. The three use districts were resi-
dential, business, and unrestricted. See S. ToLL, ZONED AMERICAN 74-187 (1969);
supra note 16.
80 See generally J. NowAx, R. ROTuNDA & J. YouN, CoNsrrrToNAL LAw
(1978), in which the authors state: "Beginning in the Spring of 1937 the Court
began to defer to the other branches of government in matters of economics and
social welfare. No longer would substantive due process and equal protection be
used to overturn laws which interfered with traditional views of economic free-
dom." Id. 149 (footnote omitted). Zoning, of course, was upheld as constitutional
in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
81 The traditional hesitancy is reflected by the omission of any reference to
nonconforming uses in the SZEA. The draftsmen of the early enabling statutes
apparently feared that state legislatures would enact zoning provisions which
intruded too greatly upon the rights and practices of existing property owners.
See E. BAss-rr, ZoNING 108 & n.1 (rev. ed. 1940).
82198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner invalidated maximum hour legislation and
is often cited as the high-water mark of the Court's use of substantive due process
analysis to invalidate economic and social regulation.
88 Krasnowiecki, PUD, supra note 78, at 64.
8
4 See Rockhill v. Township of Chesterfield, 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473
(1957), in which the court invalidated a zoning ordinance that provided for
normal agricultural and residential uses and the balance of other uses as special
uses, subject to administrative discretion. The court found the "nondistrict" zoning
ordinance to be ultra vires of the enabling statute and the very antithesis of zoning,
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While trading flexibility for self-administration might have
been acceptable in a world where land use was not the subject of
intense social conflict and pressure, that trade-off is hardly acceptable
today. The energy, environmental, and housing demands placed
upon a land use allocation system today highlight the folly of at-
tempting to reconcile these conflicting and ever-changing demands
with any set of prestated rules.
b. Zoning in Practice-Covert Individual Treatment
Zoning in actual practice has never really been self-administer-
ing. In spite of what courts may believe, most zoning of undevel-
oped land is not a realistic appraisal of what land use is planned,
likely, or even compatible with surrounding existing uses. Rather,
zoning is used as a device for deferring these difficult decisions. Un-
developed land is either underzoned in unintensive, and generally
uneconomic, uses or overzoned in economic, but unrealistic, uses. 5
For example, substantial undeveloped land is zoned agricultural, not
because the land is adequate, or even suitable, for farming, but be-
cause the classification represents a nondecision-a choice less con-
troversial than a classification favoring housing over the environ-
ment or vice versa. Similarly, undeveloped land may be zoned
industrial, which if so developed would enhance the locality's tax
base or employment opportunities, but which will not be developed
industrially because the land is located far from transportation
centers or water resources.
This under/over zoning charade serves to perpetrate the myth
that zoning is self-administering. As noted earlier, so long as the
land use regulations appear to be predefined, courts are less likely
to interfere with the zoning system. Thus, unrealistic classifications
not only keep bothersome constituents at bay, but also ensure that
the courts will not be too quick to lend an ear to issues that have
been "deafly" treated by the zoning body.
notwithstanding the fact that the enabling statute in New Jersey did not require
dividing the municipality into districts. Accord Marshall v. Village of Wap-
pingers Falls, 28 A.D.2d 542, 279 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1967); Eves. v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960); see also Haar & Hering, The
Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning or an Inflexible judiciary?,
74 HAzv. L. REV. 1552 (1961).
85 See generally D. HAGMAN, supra note 17, §§ 57, 64; Comment, Stop-Gap
and Interim Legislation, A Device to Maintain the Status Quo of an Area Pending
the Adoption of a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance or Amendment Thereto, 18
SYRAcusE L. REv. 837 (1967). For a discussion of the economic effects pre-
cipitated by zoning's inconsistency with market forces, see B. SIEGAN, supra note
20, at 121. For a case illustrating overzoning to bar residential development,
see Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953).
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A more charitable explanation of the under/over zoning phe-
nomenon suggests that it is a mechanism by which zoning officials-
"individualize" land use regulations. While individualized land
use allocation is desirable, a sub rosa system of individualized land
use standards is unsatisfactory because it almost certainly leads to,
unfair and inefficient allocation practices; these practices, in turn, are-
immune from judicial review because of the artificial appearance of
a self-administering set of zone classifications.8 6 Under the existing
zoning system, covert individualized standards may also be inade-
quate because zoning officials are fearful of the exercise of individual
control in a covert manner.
c. Zoning in Practice-Incapable of Assimilating Rapid Change
Insofar as the existing system is premised on predesignated
zones, it quickly becomes obsolete and inaccurate as an allocation
basis. Moreover, any planning that is antecedent to zoning also is
likely to form a static constitution incapable of assimilating rapid
changes in design, technology, or community preferences.8 7 Planners
themselves have perceived the inflexibility of comprehensive plans
and zoning maps and have suggested greater reliance upon dynamic
planning ss  While dynamic planning may prove to be more re-
86 See Krasnowiecki, The Basic System, supra note 78, at 5-6.
s Siegan cites the development of the fast food franchise industry as an exam-
ple. Today, these franchises are a major source of demand for strip commercial
property. But "[iun 1946, or 1957, or 1965, when the last comprehensive zoning
amendments were adopted in Los Angeles, Chicago, and Dallas, respectively, the
food franchise operation was either unknown to many or of minor significance."
B. SiEcA, supra note 20, at 124. Siegan concludes that "'[u]nderzoning' or 'over-
zoning' is a normal product of land use regulation, since it is impossible for
the amalgamation of planners, politicians, citizens, and courts to determine for
any one or more periods the 'right' amount of zoning allocations over the large
territories involved." Id.
Professor Freilich has observed that the inability of zoning to remain cur-
rent and flexible has resulted in the widespread use of interim zoning controls.
See Freilich, Interim Development Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing
Flexible Planning and Zoning, excerpted in LAND USE CONROLS, supra note 13, at
213.
88 For example, the Model Land Development Code places greater reliance
upon dynamic rather than end-state planning. Section 2-211 prevents develop-
ment of areas specially planned until a precise plan has been adopted. MODEL
LAND DEV. CODE, supra note 22, § 2-211. Although planners have employed a
great variety of styles over time, from end-state master planners to policy and
advocate planners to technocratic planners, there is considerable emphasis today
on strategic incrementalism-that is, concern with short range strategies and special
purpose plans. See Bowden, Hurdles in the Path of Coastal Plan Implementation,
49 S. CA.. L. BEv. 759 (1976); see also Reps, The Future of American Planning:
Requiem or Renaissance?, I LAND-USE CoNRnoLs 1 (1967).
While planners have changed their methods to reflect their inability to predict
the future, most statutory planning requirements have not made a similar revela-
tion. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65300 (West 1966) (mandating the prepara-
tion of general plans at the local level); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177 (West Supp.
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sponsive to preference changes, it is hard to see how a continuously
updated plan or zoning map will be any more capable of evaluating
new construction techniques or materials or unusual designs that
are particularly well-suited to the specific topographical features of a
given parcel. Moreover, because planning on an individual or
dynamic basis admits that the future is unpredictable, there seems
little reason to prefer it over the individual decisions of the market-
place.
d. Flexibility Devices Under the Existing System
Once zoning classifications are established, they are presumed.
valid. As noted earlier, the presumption of validity accorded zon-
ing classifications frequently shields zoning from any meaningful
judicial review. Thus, a judicial challenge to a zone classification
on the basis of its inflexibility is almost certain to fail.
The traditional method for infusing flexibility into the exist-
ing system is to seek one of the standard forms of zoning relief, such
as a zone amendment, variance, or conditional use. Less traditional
methods, such as the planned unit development or contract zoning
may also exist.
Limited flexibility is provided by the zone amendment device
largely because the preconditions of amendment accept as valid the
prestated nature of the zoning system. Moreover, zone amendments,
like zoning itself, are generalizations: apartments in general de-
tract from the value of single family homes; strip commercial
development in general is ugly and a source of traffic hazards. The
fact that a particular development proposal for an apartment com-
plex may preserve open space and thereby enhance a surrounding
single family neighborhood is ignored by the zoning process. The
fact that a strip commercial development utilizes an attractive
design and may reduce energy consumption cannot be factored into,
a zoning system, either initially, or by subsequent amendment.
Variances also supply limited flexibility to the existing system.
By express design,8 9 however, variances are intended to permit only
1981) (same). The political difficulty in switching from the master plan concept
to a planning process is discussed in Catanese, Plan? or Process?, PLANiNG, June
1974, at 14. The article describes the considerable opposition to proposed.
Hawaiian legislation that would have provided planners with the freedom neces-
sary to undertake the planning process without being constrained by specific legal
descriptions of the plan and its contents. Although consistent with contemporary
planning theory, the Hawaiian legislation was opposed because it would not have
bound the government to a fixed set of policies and rules.
89 The SZEA provides that variances are to be granted only when the overall
purposes of the zoning ordinance can be observed and where exceptional circum-
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minor departures from the building size, and more rarely, the use
requirements of a zoning ordinance. While originally intended for
cases of unreasonable hardship or practical difficulty, variances often
are freely granted by lay administrators without adequate findings
supporting the grant.90 Nevertheless, the variance is incapable of
supplying the flexibility needed for mixed-use projects or other
creative development proposals unanticipated by the zoning
ordinance.
Another mechanism which provides some zoning flexibility is
the conditional use or special exception. Unlike the zone amend-
ment or variance, the conditional use does not provide "relief"
from the zoning ordinance in a technical sense. Rather, particular
types of uses are expressly made conditional on certain standards
contained in the ordinance because they are believed to pose unusual
regulatory problems.91 For example, nursing homes, hospitals,
churches, schools, and other institutional uses are often treated as
conditional uses because they are desirable in or near residential
areas, but may possess features that are believed to be incompatible
with residential use.
The flexibility provided by the conditional use obviously is
limited in a number of ways. First, it only applies to a few selected
uses. Second, even these uses are only permitted if the specific
stances exist. SZEA, supra note 25, § 7. Because the statutory language sug-
gests that variances are only appropriate for "minor departures," some courts re-
fuse to allow use variances or variances for large parcels. See, e.g., Josephson
v. Autrey, 96 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1957) (en bane).
9 0 See, e.g., Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A
Case Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1962); Shapiro, The Zoning Variance
Power-Constructive in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REv. 3 (1969);
Note, The Effect of Statutory Prerequisites on Decisions of Boards of Zoning Ap-
peals, IND. LEGAL F. 398 (1968).
Professor Hagman states that "an attorney should seek [a variance] for a
client if practice dictates it will be approved, regardless of the law." D. HAGMAN,
supra note 17, § 106, at 197.
91 A good explanation of the conditional or special use can be found in the
opinion written by Judge Hall in Tullo v. Township of Millburn:
The theory is that certain uses, considered by the local legislative body
to be essential or desirable for the welfare of the community and its
citizenry or substantial segments of it, are entirely appropriate and not
essentially incompatible with the basic uses in any zone (or in cer-
tain particular zones), but not at every or any location therein or without
restrictions or conditions being imposed by reason of special problems
the use or its particular location in relation to neighboring properties
presents from a zoning standpoint, such as traffic congestion, safety,
health, noise, and the like .... Without intending here to be inclusive
or to prescribe limits, the uses . . . treated [as conditional uses or special
exceptions] are generally those serving considerable numbers of people,
such as private schools, clubs, hospitals and even churches, as distinguished
[Vol. 130:28
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conditions of the zoning ordinance are met. Third, the location
of these uses is frequently limited to a few preconceived zones.
Thus, the conditional use is really nothing more than tentative
zoning.
This limited flexibility is illustrated by the unsuccessful at-
tempts of communities to make the device the centerpiece of a
zoning ordinance.92 In one case, a New Jersey township zoned the
entire township residential or agricultural, with other uses per-
mitted by conditional use or special exception. 9 The court found
this to be an abuse of the special exception device contrary to the
districting requirement of the New Jersey Zoning Enabling Act.
Regrettably, the court overlooked that the enabling act permitted,
but did not require, districting.04 The court was so committed to
normal district zoning that it could not conceive of any other way
in which development could take place.
The amendment, variance, and conditional use are zoning's
traditional mechanisms for providing flexibility. Because these have
failed to provide the flexibility needed to evaluate development
proposals, other devices have been fashioned. Only one, the
planned unit development (PUD), has provided any meaningful de-
parture from zoning's rigid framework. 5 The PUD is a technique
that allows particular consideration of an entire development
project, rather than the application of generalized standards to in-
dividual lots. As a result, traditional notions of lot setback, side
yard, and minimum lot size give way to a more sensitive evaluation
of physical relationships.
from governmental structures or activities on the one hand and strictly
individual residences or businesses on the other.
54 N.J. Super. 483, 490-91, 149 A.2d 620, 624-25 (1959). The alternative system
proposed in this Article retains the conditional or special use mechanism for uses
like those described by Judge Hall.
92 See generally Arnebergh, The Functions and Duties of a Board of Zoning
Adjustment, 1 INsT. ON PL". & ZONING 109 (1960); Craig, Particularized Zoning:
Alterations While You Wait, 1 INsT. O N PLAw. & Zonw c 153 (1960); Mandel-
ker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 60.
93 Rockhill v. Township of Chesterfield, 23 NJ. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957);
see also People v. Perez, 214 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 881, 29 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1963).
94 At the time of the case, the New Jersey Zoning and Enabling Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40:55-30 (West 1967) (repealed 1975), was practically identical
to the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act providing that "the local legislative
body may divide the municipality into districts of such number, shape, and area
as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this act." SZEA,
supra note 25, § 2 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
9 5 Babcock, supra note 44; Craig, Planned Unit Development as Seen From
City Hall, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 127 (1965); see Krasnowiecki, Legal Aspects of
Planned Unit Development in Theory and Practice, in FRoNnans or PLANNwD
Urr Dav LoPzmN? 99 (R. Burchell ed. 1973).
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Developers have been attracted by the PUD's flexibility.90 A
PUD permits a developer to plan and market a development as a
cohesive neighborhood, often resulting in utility and road extension
cost-savings as well as a greater allowance for common open space
and recreational areas. In addition, PUD flexibility may extend
beyond density and design to the type of permitted use, allowing
not only a mixture of housing types, but also a controlled mixture
of residential, commercial, and industrial uses.
Why, then, has not the PUD process become the main road
with traditonal zoning the less encountered by-way? Primarily, this
is because the PUD process in most cases was grafted onto the
incompatible zoning system.97 That the two allocation systems
were incompatible was recognized early by a number of state courts
that found the PUD to be beyond a state's enabling legislation.98
Courts were uncomfortable approving the PUD concept because it
was difficult to characterize the system as a zone amendment, condi-
tional use, or variance. 99 None of these traditional zoning proce-
dures, however, was particularly well-suited to the PUD concept.
Developers found that because several zoning functions were in-
volved, no single body had the authority under the existing system
to approve a given PUD proposal.100 Moreover, because zoning
96 See Lloyd, A Developer Looks at Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 3 (1965); see also Clark, Unified Development Controls, or Greater Flexibility
in Zoning, 16 ZONnGc Dic. 265 (1964).
97 See generally Aloi, Legal Problems in Planned Unit Development: Uniformity,
Comprehensive Planning, Conditions, and the Floating Zone, I REAL EST. L.J. 5
(1972).
98 See D. HAGMAN, supra note 17, § 236 (citing cases). Particularly trouble-
some to the courts that first considered the planned unit development was the tradi-
tional requirement that zoning be uniform within a given zone. A number of
-courts inferred that uniform regulation meant only one type of use within any
given district. Hence, mixed uses seemed inconceivable. See F. So, D. MOSENA
,& F. BANGS, rLANNED UNrr DEVELOPmENT ORDiNANcEs 48 (American Society
-of Planning Officials Report No. 291, 1973). Other courts had little difficulty in
overcoming the uniformity requirement. See, e.g., Orinda Homeowners Comm.
v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
99 See D. MANDELrER & R. CUNn~NGHAm, supra note 22, at 863.
100 By its very nature, PUD is a discretionary, flexible device. Hence, it is
not unusual to find a considerable amount of bargaining in the PUD process. When
more than one local land use control agency superintends PUD approval, however,
the bargaining process can become complicated. For example, the bargain that
appeased the planning commission may not be acceptable to the legislative body
or vice versa. The courts are divided on the respective roles of the local legis-
lature and the planning commission in the PUD process. Compare Millbrae
Ass'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 262 Cal. App. 2d 222, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 251 (1968) (substantial changes in a planned development zone cannot
be made without legislative action) with Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc.,
[Vol. 130:28
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,officials often perceive the PUD as a gift of regulatory freedom, it is
not unusual to find detailed design and improvement standards
imposed.' 10 Thus, PUD flexibility tends to exist in theory, but not
in practice. Futhermore, it should not be forgotten that treating
the PUD within the standard zoning framework infects the PUD
.concept with all the unfairness and inefficiency of the existing
-system.
4. Certainty
The fourth goal of a I-and use allocation system should be cer-
tainty. Certain or stable land use allocations encourage initial
investment as well as the recoupment of that investment. In addi-
tion, certainty may act as an incentive to more extensive planning
,and design by eliminating the fear that the applicable land use
regulations will be altered in an adverse manner. 02
429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968) (the planning commission is the singularly
.appropriate body to make PUD decisions).
Some of the difficulties in handling planned unit developments under conven-
tional enabling legislation prompted the drafting of a Model Planned Unit Devel-
opment statute. See Babcock, Krasnowiecki & McBride, The Model State Statute,
114 U. PA. L. lEv. 140 (1965). The model statute authorized a single approv-
ing agency at the local level to issue a unitary permit for PUDs. The model act
has not received overwhelming acceptance among the states. Professor Mandelker
notes that six states, including Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, have
-enacted legislation based on the model act. D. MAmELzxEa & R. CUNNLNGHAm,
supra note 22, at 885. For a discussion of the problems associated with drafting
planned unit development ordinances, see Sternlieb, Burchell, Hughes & Listokin,
Planned Unit Development Legislation: A Summary of Necessary Considerations,
7 UnB. L. ANN 71 (1974).
o'0 To the extent that PUDs become laden with detailed requirements, the
mechanism becomes as, or more, inflexible than traditional land use controls under
the existing system. Krasnowiecki, Legal Aspects of Planned Unit Development
in Theory and Practice, in LAmN UsE CO ROLS, supra note 13, at 185, 192.
In fact, the discretion inherent in the PUD concept can be used as a device to
-exclude unwelcome racial or economic groups. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977) (township
directed to remove all cost generating features of the PUD ordinance).
Professor Williams has commented that:
The existence of such a bargaining system [under the PUD concept] may
prove to be a heaven-sent opportunity for a municipality to evade judicial
strictures against exclusionary zoning, and to strike a cooperative pose,
always ready to do something about critical needs-if only the perfect
proposal would come along-but always in fact retaining a veto, and
so always able to avoid any real action.
2 N. WmLrUA s, supra note 2, § 48.02, at 229. Moreover, whether the details added
-on PUD approval have any substantive merit is questionable. Today the lay-
men of the planning commission define the details of development to an extent
never contemplated as part of the zoning function. See B. SIEGAN, supra note
20, at 156.
102 Hagman, The Vesting Issue, supra note 39. Professor Hagman attributes
-much of the uncertainty in the existing system to the late vesting rule. The con-
-cept of vesting refers to the point in the development process when the developer
is immune from a change in land use regulation. In general, a developer is not
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a. Existing Uses and Structures Under Zoning
The existing system attempts to advance the certainty goal
insofar as zoning applies prospectively to existing uses and struc-
tures. For example, most zoning ordinances contain a provision
exempting, either totally or in part, land uses that predate the
ordinance.10 3 Indeed, there was some feeling on the part of the
drafters of the SZEA that any attempt to apply zoning to existing
land uses and structures without compensation would have been
found unconstitutional. 104 Whether or not that opinion was accu-
rate, the protection of pre-existing nonconforming uses and struc-
tures today is not absolute. Generally, ordinances limit the growth
of nonconforming uses by placing limits on the owner's ability to.
extend the nonconforming use to other parcels, to repair or modify
nonconforming structures, or to continue the nonconforming use
after it has been abandoned.10 5 Recognizing that noconforming uses.
have not "withered away," some communities have limited the non-
conforming use even more by enacting amortization provisions that
terminate such uses and structures without compensation after a
given period of time.10 6
b. Uncertain Allocations for Undeveloped Land
Thus far, the analysis has concentrated on the certainty pro-
vided by the zoning system to owners of existing uses and structures.
When the focus shifts to prospective development, the existing sys-
tem provides even less certainty. It has become axiomatic that an
safe until substantial work has been performed, or liabilities incurred, in good
faith reliance upon a building permit. Professor Hagman criticizes this late vesting
rule:
[W]hile the present late vesting rule may eliminate development starts,
such elimination is not without a "chilling" effect on desirable develop-
ment which might otherwise occur and the opportunity for reconsideration
of such matters is costly. Furthermore, starts may not actually be
eliminated, and even if they are, the starts may be more, rather than
less intensive, thus making restoration more difficult while wasting invest-
ment dollars.
Id. 539.
103 1 R. ANDEnSON, supra note 13, § 6.04 & nA3.
104 Thus, the drafters' intent was not to provide certainty, but to insure the
legitimacy of zoning. Indeed, it was expected that nonconforming existing uses
ultimately would disappear, rather than continue. See Young, City Planning and
Restrictions on the Use of Property, 9 Mn.,N. L. lzv. 593, 628 (1925).
105 D. MmmEz=mI & R. CUNN AM, supra note 22, at 292.
10 6 See Katarincic, Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses, Buildings, and
Structures By Amortization-Concept versus Law, 2 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1963);
Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PRoBs. 305 (1955); Wood, Zoning Ordinances Requiring the Termination of a
Nonconforming Use, 1973 INsT. ON PLAN. ZONING & EmmINT Do ixN 65.
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-owner does not have a vested right in the zoning classification exist-
ing at the time of acquisition.'07 Obviously, this axiom runs directly
,counter to the prestated nature of the zoning map and any notion
that the zoning ordinance should be self-executing. Nevertheless,
the axiom has been tolerated in order that zoning officials not be
"chilled" in the exercise of their authority, 08 even if that means the
promulgation of an entirely different or inconsistent policy from
that reflected in the zoning ordinance. The frequency with which
zone amendments, conditional uses, and variances are granted
undermines any notion that zoning officials have been "chilled." 209
In fact, these frequent departures from the zoning ordinance often
are granted improvidently because of the absence of meaningful
standards or a clear understanding of the standards.1'0 As a result,
any certainty believed to be provided to the owner of undeveloped
land by the zoning ordinance is almost always illusory.
Any purchaser who acquires undeveloped land and calculates
its fair market value solely on the basis of its existing zoning is apt
to be very disappointed."' Zoning changes producing staggering
decreases in value consistently have been upheld by the courts. As
107 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 4.27 (citing cases).
1o8 Hagman, The Vesting Issue, supra note 39, at 533.
109 Ellickson, supra note 20, at 694. Professor Ellickson states that "[niation-
ally, about three-quarters of all rezoning applications are approved by governing
bodies, and a slightly greater fraction of variance requests are approved by the
'boards of zoning appeals." Id. (footnote omitted). See also A. MAVELz, supra
note 24, at 23, 31. The National Commission on Urban Problems found that in
the 47 largest cities surveyed, an average of 1,030 rezoning positions were acted
upon per city per year with an approval rate of 72%. Id. 17.
110 One Los Angeles study found:
[Tihe term "zoning" has lost much of its significance in the City of
Los Angeles, for it has come to mean promiscuous changes in the zoning
pattern rather than adherence to consistent, comprehensive zoning. Pro-
cedures in actual practice have frequently become so loose that even the
limited requirements of the City Charter have not been met in numerous
variance cases....
. . . Since [1946] there have been over 300 amendments to the text
of the Code and several thousand changes in the Zoning Map, mainly as
a result of individual requests and specific problems.
-mzus' CoaNOrM= ON ZONING PRACTIcES AND PRocEnrtUEs: A PnocRAm To
IMPROVE PLANNING AND ZONING IN Los ANczrs, FrST REPORT TO TmE MAYOR
AND C=rr COUNCIL, Su/NrnY R PORT 3, 5, 6 (1968), reprinted in B. SiEcA,
-supra note 20, at 12; see also I. NELSoN, supra note 61, at 169; B. SmEAN, supra
note 20, at 16.
1"Neighbors also make a reliance argument wtih respect to zoning, although
with greater success than the landowner. See, e.g., O'Brien v. City of St. Paul,
285 Minn. 378, 387, 173 N.W.2d 462, 467 (1969) (upholding a statute requiring
neighborhood approval of a rezoning because "numberless homeowners have pur-
,chased and improved property relying on the protection of the statute").
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early as Village of Euclid" v. Ambler Realty Co.,1 1 2 the Supreme-
Court validated a zone classification which reduced the value of
property seventy-five percent. Not facetiously, it recently has been
suggested that among the "rights" that a purchaser obtains upon
acquisition of land is the "'right' to have the municipality change
the uses allowed in the existing classification." 113
The loss that may be suffered as a result of a change in zone
classification, or the enactment of a law that overrides the classifica-
tion, is compounded if the landowner has invested more than the
purchase price. If a landowner makes pre-construction expenditures
for architectural drawings, engineering studies, soil tests, subdivision
platting, lot filling, and road widening, he might expect courts to be
wary of sanctioning a zoning change that would render these activities
economically useless. Unfortunately, the landowner's expectations
are likely to be disappointed. For example, in one California
case,114 after the approval of a final subdivision plat and a grading
permit, but before the effective date of the Coastal Zone Con-
servation Act, the landowner spent over $2,000,000 for the con-
struction of streets and drains, and incurred additional liabilities-
in excess of $700,000. The California Supreme Court found that
these expenditures did not provide the landowner with a vested right
to complete the development. While this case may be an extreme
example, it is by no means an isolated one." 5
112 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
113 Delaney & Kominers, supra note 39, at 219.
114 Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comn'n, 17 Cal.
3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 429-
U.S. 1083 (1977).
"15 See, e.g., Strong v. County of Santa Cruz, 15 Cal. 3d 720, 543 P.2d 264, 125
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1975) (en banc) (developer prevented from completing the con-
struction of a mobile home park when the building permit expired, notwithstanding
an estoppel claim based on the county's prior practice of allowing completion pur-
suant to an expired permit so long as the project was diligently carried forward);
Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d
534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) (developer who bad received the use permit, site
plan approval, tentative tract map approval, demolition permit, grading permit,
environmental impact report approval, and building permit for an apartment com-
plex was denied the right to construct a condominium, because the court construed
the developer's strident advocacy for prompt permit action to be in "bad faith,"
and because no actual construction of the condominium itself had begun prior to an
anticondominium change in law); County Council v. District Land Corp., 274 Md.
691, 337 A.2d 712 (1975) (A building permit was issued for a 420 unit apartment
complex but construction could not proceed until sewer permits had been issued
from a separate sanitary commission. When the landowner obtained the sewer
permits via a mandamus action, the zoning body rezoned the landowner's property
to rural residential. No vested right was found, notwithstanding that the landowner
had expended in excess of one million dollars on architectural studies and design
plans for the development).
This is not to suggest that all courts are antideveloper. Both Professor Williams
and Professor Hagman have classified courts with respect to zoning matters. See 1
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In the face of these cases, landowners have argued vigorously
for a vested right to develop. 16 In actuality, the vested right would
amount to an extension of the nonconforming use concept from
existing uses to intended uses. To a very limited extent, courts
have responded by developing a rule that a vested right may be
found if the landowner has completed substantial work in good
faith reliance upon a building permit.
117
The very statement of the rule should illustrate that it confers
little certainty on the development process. For example, there is
considerable disagreement as to what amount or type of work is
substantial. Some courts employ a proportionality test measuring
the amount expended at the time of the zoning change against the
total cost of the project.118 Other courts decide the issue on a case-
by-case basis.119 Still other courts will disregard all expenditures
until there is some manifest construction activity, such as excavation
and foundation work.120 Because all of these formulations involve
ad hoc judicial decisionmaking, the landowner is still left guessing
as to whether his investment is subject to a change in public
regulation.
Given the unpredictable nature of the vested rights concept,
landowners have sought alternative theories for bringing certainty
to the development process. The equitable analogue to the common
N. Wmr.Ams, supra note 2, §§ 6.01-.43; Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting, supra note
39, at 548 & n.5. Joining California in the antideveloper or prozoning category are
New Jersey, Massachusetts, Maryland, Arizona, and North Carolina. A fair number
of states, including Michigan, Florida, and New York, are classified as either "erratic"
or in the "good gray middle." An even larger number merely have "trends."
Finally, a few states are prodeveloper, including Illinois, Rhode Island, and possibly
Montana, Utah, and Puerto Rico.
116 See supra note 39 (citing articles).
117 Hagman, The Vesting Issue, supra note 39, at 522.
118 See, e.g., Gruber v. Mayor and Township Comm. of Rariton, 39 N.J. 1,
186 A.2d 489 (1962); Molino v. Mayor and Council of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super.
195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971); Miller v. Dassler, 155 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
119 See, e.g., Nott v. Wolff, 18 IM. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809 (1960); Smith v.
City of Macomb, 40 Ill. App. 3d 658, 352 N.E.2d 697 (1976).
120 See, e.g., Emerald Home Builders, Inc. v. Kolton, 11 Ill. App. 3d 888, 29&
N.E.2d 275 (1973) (vested right following site excavation and placement of foot-
ings); Glenel Realty Corp. v. Worthington, 4 A.D.2d 702, 164 N.Y.S.2d 635, appeal
dismissed, 3 N.Y.2d 924, 145 N.E.2d 880, 167 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1957) (placement of
concrete foundation affords vested right against adverse zoning ordinance).
What constitutes manifest construction activity will often be diffcult for a
developer to determine. The developer's quandary is obvious. He has been told
often enough that he has no vested right to a permit, and hence, he reduces his
construction activity until all permits are secured. Ironically, reducing the amount
of construction activity directly reduces the developer's chances of claiming a
vested right. Moreover, requiring manifest construction acti6ity ignores the reality
that modem development requires substantial expenditures for planning and design
well in advance of the foundation work.
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law vested right is estoppel.121 While courts are usually reluctant
to apply estoppel principles to the government, 122 there is a growing
body of case law in which the government has been estopped in
zoning matters. 23
The estoppel theory, however, cannot be said to provide any
more certainty than the vested right theory. Indeed, estoppel may
provide even less certainty because courts frequently balance the
harm to the landowner if estoppel is not invoked against the effect
invoking estoppel would have on zoning policy. 2 4 Thus, it has
been asserted that the traditional elements of estoppel are merely a
"threshold inquiry," with the decisive factor being a judicial assess-
ment of the importance of the public policy involved.2 5
The introduction of balancing to the estoppel theory not only
increases uncertainty under the existing system, but also allows the
judiciary to intrude into the substance of land use regulation. It
has been suggested, for example, that a rezoning which has been
"carefully studied" should tip the balance in favor of the govern-
ment. 2 6 How does a court determine whether a matter has been
1
2 1 The traditional elements of equitable estoppel are:
a. The party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts;
b. He must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act
that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so
intended;
c. The other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and
d. He must rely upon the conduct to his injury.
PAucnsnG LAw INsTrruTE, MonaN CONTROL OF L n DmvrxopmN-r 260 (1980).
122 D. MANDELxn & B. CuNNiNGHAM, supra note 22, at 680. For a discussion
of the concept of zoning estoppel, see Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the
Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 4 UrX. L.
ANN. 63 (1971).
1
2 3 See City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 23 (1970) (en banc) (finding a pattern of development as well as local
and state approvals sufficient to invoke estoppel).
124 The California Supreme Court in Mansell stated:
After a thorough review of the many California decisions in this area, as
well as a consideration of various out-of-state decisions, -we have con-
cluded that the proper rule governing equitable estoppel against the
government is the following: The government may be bound by an
equitable estoppel in the same manner as a private party when the elements
requisite to such an estoppel against a private party are present and, in
the considered view of a court of equity, the injustice which would result
from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify
any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the
raising of an estoppel.
Id. at 496-97, 476 P.2d at 448, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
12 5 Holliman, Development Agreements and Vested Rights in California, 13
URB. LAw. 44, 60 (1981)..
126 Heeter, supra note 122, at 94-95.
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carefully studied? The number of hours the zoning people rumi-
nated over the matter? Whether the change reflects the master
plan? Whether the change reflects the court's conception of good
zoning policy? Admittedly, courts in equity matters engage in the
weighing of public and private interest, and in an extraordinary
case, this type of judicial behavior may be singularly appropriate.
But cases of uncertainty in the land development process are not
extraordinary. Often landowners expend funds for planning, engi-
neering, street, and utility work only to face a change in zoning
regulation that prevents the completion of the project. A more
certain and consistent method of resolving these land use disputes,
without the delay of a judicial balancing of the equities in each
case, is necessary. The current handling of these matters is clearly
unsatisfactory. The landowner runs the risk of wrongly predicting
the outcome of complex litigation; the zoning body runs the -risk of
having its latest policy deemed unimportant or ill-conceived by the
judiciary, and the community loses the benefits that otherwise would
have accrued had private and public expenditures been directed at
productive, rather than adaptive, behavior.
Dissatisfaction with the level of certainty provided by the judi-
ciary has led to the enactment of various statutory vesting provisions
which afford some protection to the landowner from a change in
land use regulation.127 For example, savings clauses occasionally
have been included in local ordinance amendments expressly pro-
viding for the completion of any building or use for which a permit
has been lawfully granted prior to the effective date of the amend-
ment.12s These clauses frequently track the language of judicially-
created vesting or estoppel theories, but leave out vague require-
ments calling for substantial work or good faith reliance.' - O9
127 For a detailed analysis of such clauses and their purposes and effects, see
Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1150 (1973).
128 See, e.g., Rockshire Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Rockville, 32
Md. App. 22, 358 A.2d 570 (1976), in which the court upheld a developer's right
to six acres of commercial zoning within a 286-acre planned unit development, not-
withstanding a change in the zoning regulations limiting commercial development
in planned zones to five acres. The zoning regulation change contained a saving
clause which provided that previously approved applications should continue in
full force and effect. Id. 579.
129 See Cunningham & Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land De-
velopment Process, 29 HAsTINGs LJ. 625, 626 (1978); Hagman, Estoppel and
Vesting, supra note 39, at 575.
Cunningham and Kremer's proposed vesting rule is as follows:
The rule of irrevocable commitment protects from new laws any
project to which the developer has made a reasonable and irrevocable
commitment of resources. The scope of the protection granted, however,
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Statutory vesting provisions also may provide protection for the
developer earlier in the development process. 30
Perhaps the most common statutory vesting provision under
the existing system is found not in zoning, but in subdivision regu-
lation. Subdivision regulation is growing in importance, especially
with regard to undeveloped land. It is not uncommon for statutes
and ordinances to provide that once a preliminary plat is approved,
land use officials are precluded from disapproving the final plat if it
is timely submitted and meets the conditions appended to the pre-
liminary plat.131  Unfortunately, this seemingly broad protection
has been undermined by narrow judicial interpretation. 32
is determined by a detailed analysis of the resource commitments, the
planned objectives of the project, and the concerns of the general welfare.
Cunningham & Kremer, supra, at 715. Under this test, not all development con-
templated is necessarily vested. For example, Cunningham and Kremer suggest that
the government permit involved be evaluated on the basis of how much of the
development project detail was approved by the government. If the government
approved the specifics of the project, they are bound by it, so long as such a vested
right is "necessary to recover the investment represented by the reasonable
irrevocable commitments of resources." Id. 726. This rule is also tempered by a
balancing of the general welfare against the interest of the developer.
Professor Hagman's similar, and earlier, proposal also adopts a balancing ap-
proach. Specifically, Hagman would provide a developer with a vested right if
the court finds "(1) substantial construction pursuant to any permit; (2) which
construction would either be wasted, or would not have been undertaken if com-
pletion of the project was known to be precluded; and (3) if compliance with any
changed law is not required in order to protect fundamental public health or
safety." Hagman, The Vesting Issue, supra note 39, at 558. Importantly, Pro-
fessor Hagman's rule recognizes that the modem land use process is dependent upon
multiple permits, and not a single building permit. In addition, the rule implicitly
requires the jurisdiction to justify the change of law with respect to issues of
fundamental public health or safety, rather than merely relying upon "whimsy."
Finally, while Professor Hagman's proposed rule may be characterized as "pro-
developer," it is directed more at avoiding the senseless waste of economic resources
that results from the arbitrary change of land use regulations than at favoring one
party over another. For an interesting comparison of the Cunningham and Kremer
proposal with the Hagman proposal, see Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting, supra note
39, at 582-84.
180 See, e.g., CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §§ 25000-25903 (West 1977). This statute
created a State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, and
gave the commission control to preempt all state and local agencies with respect
to electric transmission lines and thermal power plants. Id. § 25500. Power
plant developers with construction plans "to commence within three years from
the effective date" of the Act do not have to comply with the new law. Id.
§ 25501. This is a much more liberal vested rights provision than the traditional
vested rights rule which would have required compliance with the new law absent
substantial construction pursuant to a building permit.
'31 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T ConE § 66474.1 (West Supp. 1980) (requiring the
approval of a final map if submitted in substantial compliance with an approved
tentative map); N.J. STAT. A.'cN. §40:55D-49 (West Supp. 1981) (providing that
tentative plat approval shall confer upon the applicant assurance for a three year
period that the "general terms and conditions" upon which tentative approval was
granted will not be changed).
1
3 2 See Save El Toro Ass'n v. Days, 74 Cal. App. 3d 64, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282
(1977) (approval of a final map found to be a discretionary act under local law).
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More detrimental to the certainty provided by statutory vesting
provisions in subdivision cases is that the statutes themselves may
provide no assurance that other applicable land use regulations will
not render the subdivision approval valueless. For instance, if a
subdivision is approved with one-half acre lots, such approval may
not prevent zoning officials from rezoning the parcel to two-acre
lots. 138
While statutory vesting mechanisms hold the promise of greater
certainty, they have remained either unenacted, infrequently used,
or frequently overridden by an existing land use allocation system
that has been unsympathetic, if not oblivious, to the waste of eco-
nomic resources.1' 4
But see Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors, 22 Cal. 3d 644, 586 P.2d 556, 150
Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978) (public interest found to require a local government to
exercise its discretion regarding approval of a proposed subdivision when acting
on the tentative map). Thus, while California requires that subdivision maps be
consistent with general plans, if the general plans change after approval of a tenta-
tive map, the subdivider is nevertheless entitled to final map approval. Of course,
the local governing body may still undo the protection given the developer by chang-
ing other applicable land use regulation. See infra note 133. A court may also
strictly interpret the protection afforded the developer by the subdivision control.
See Levin v. Township of Livingston, 35 N.J. 500, 173 A.2d 391 (1961), in
which the court construed a New Jersey statute that protected a developer from
change in the general terms and conditions of tentative approval to mean that a
municipality was nevertheless free to change the specifications for street pavement.
The Levin case appears to have been overruled by a subsequent change in New
Jersey statute. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-49(a) (West Supp. 1981) (defining
"general terms and conditions" to include the "layout and design standards for
streets, curbs and sidewalks").
13 3 This is the fate that befell the developer in the case of Youngblood v.
Board of Supervisors, 22 Cal. 3d 644, 586 P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978).
Thus, although Youngblood held that the developer had a vested right in final
subdivision approval for one acre lots, the zoning change to two acre minimums
meant that "one will have to buy two adjacent lots to build a house in the
subdivision." Hagman, The Metamorphosis of Justices Mosk and Tobriner and
the California Supreme Court, LANo UsE L. & ZONING Di., March 1979, at
10, 11.
134 Professor Hagman's proposal was submitted to the California legislature
for consideration, but it became the bridesmaid to a rival suitor in the form of a
development agreement statute. This statute facially provides more certainty to
developers who successfully enter into agreements with cities and counties that
immunize a development project from any change in general or specific plans,
zoning, subdivision, or building regulation. Compare Cal. Ass. Bill No. 3545,
1977-78 Sess., reprinted in Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting, supra note 39, at
592-96 (Hagman's proposal) with CAL. Gov'T CODE §§65864-65869.5 (West
Supp. 1980) (the enacted development agreement statute).
The certainty provided by the development agreement statute, however, may
be illusory. First, it is not entirely clear that a local government can contract
away its authority to regulate in the future. See infra text accompanying notes
267-303. Second, the statute only provides for certainty with respect to rules and
regulations promulgated by cities and counties. Thus, the agreement may be
partially defeated by an inconsistent rule or regulation promulgated by a special-
ized government agency, such as the California Coastal Zone Commission. Not
being a sore loser, Professor Hagman has thoughtfully analyzed the development
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II. AN ALTERINATrVE FREE ENTERPRS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM
A land use allocation system that is unfair, inefficient, inflexible,
and uncertain has little to recommend it. What immediately fol-
lows is an outline of an alternative land use allocation system for
undeveloped land that attempts to remedy the multiple shortcom-
ings of the existing system. The alternative system reduces public
control through the repeal of existing zoning and subdivision en-
abling legislation as applied to undeveloped land. New enabling
legislation would be drafted to authorize limited public control,
principally in the areas of development intensity and public im-
provements, while at the same time maximizing individual freedom
and private decisionmaking in the land development process. After
outlining the alternative system, the discussion will focus upon the
primary elements of the alternative system and the legal and policy
issues raised by its implementation.
A. An Outline of the Alternative System
1. Defining Land Use Intensity
First, all undeveloped land would be reclassified agricultural
open space.13 Second, local legislative bodies and their planning
staffs or consultants, together with interested citizens, would then
define the land use intensity (LUI) policy 131 for a specified period
of time 137 for the undeveloped land within the entire community.
agreement statute. See Hagman, Development Agreements, 3 ZoNING & PLAN.
L. REP. 65, 73 (1980).
15 Given the initial urban orientation of zoning, there was some uncertainty
as to the ability to zone agricultural or undeveloped land. See Reps, The Zoning
of Undeveloped Areas, 3 SYRACUSE L. Rzv. 292 (1952); Warp, The Legal Status
of Rural Zoning, 36 ILL. L. BEv. 153 (1941); Comment, Colorado Cases on
Zoning-Validity of Zoning Undeveloped Areas, 29 Roc MT. L. Rav. 202
(1957). For the most part, doubts about the applicability of zoning to rural
areas have been removed, see, e.g., Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497,
234 P. 388 (1925), aff'd, 274 U.S. 325 (1927), and there never was any real
question that the SZEA was intended to extend to both developed and undeveloped
land, SZEA, supra note 25, at § 1.
136 See infra text accompanying notes 232-49.
137 Comprehensive amendment of zoning ordinances under the existing sys-
tem is rare. The ordinances are not so amended because of the practical and
political difficulty inherent in redefining the exact uses permitted for each par-
ticular parcel within a sizable community. Because the alternative system avoids
the pre-set nature of the- existing system, and any specific policy application, it
should be easier to revise the LUI schedule on a more frequent basis. Revision
of LUI schedules on a fairly frequent basis would coincide well with the planning
profession's notions of "strategic incrementalism." See supra note 88. Of course,
revisions should not be made so frequently that they undermine the certainty pro-
vided by the system itself. Thus, it may be wise for a community to establish a.
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Third, the LUI would be expressed in four separate schedules for
residential, commercial, industrial, and mixed-use projects. Each
schedule would disclose the maximum density permitted for each
type of development. To preserve absolute procedural fairness,
however, the legislative body would not specify which land could
be developed at any given intensity. Moreover, to prevent the
legislature from misusing the LUI schedules in the same manner
as the holding zones under the existing system, the legislative body
would not be enabled to allocate any specified portion of the com-
munity's undeveloped land to a particular use schedule.. Thus, the
legislative body can indirectly control the growth of the community
by setting appropriate limits on project density and by periodically
revising those limits, but not directly through the predetermined
allocation of land into specific use categories.
2. Selecting LUI Ratings for Specific Parcels
Prior to development, any landowner would be able to select
the intensity desired, up to but not exceeding the maximum allowed
under any of the use schedules, by filing written notice with an
administrative body, the Land Use Control Agency (LUCA). Once
made, an LUI rating selection would be valid for 180 days, after
which time it would lapse, unless the landowner entered into a
Public Improvement Contract with LUCA within that period. If
the LUI rating selection lapses, the landowner, or anyone else hav-
ing an interest in the property for which the lapsed LUI rating was
selected, would be disqualified from seeking the same LUI rating
for the same property for one year. It should be noted that after
the selection and the successful negotiation of a Public Improvement
Contract, 138 the LUI rating could not be changed-or altered uni-
minimum period of time during which an LUI schedule will be effective, such as
one year.
In devising the LUI schedules, it is most important that the local legislative
body have at its command every piece of information concerning the community
that it can assemble. With this information, the members of the legislative body
will be able to make projections as to the future development of the community-
If the projections meet with legislative and public approval, existing LUI schedules
can be continued. If the projections prove to be unsatisfactory, however, the
legislative body, with citizen and planner advice, can revise LUI schedules in a
manner that it believes will produce a more satisfactory result. Thus, initial
definition and revision of LUI schedules resembles, to a certain extent, Professor
Hagman's conception of what planning can legitimately hope to be. In this
regard, Professor Hagman's suggestion that planning engage in projections of no
longer than 20 months should be borne in mind when the period for revising
LUI schedules under the alternative system is determined. See D. HAGMAm, supra
note 19, at 209-12.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 262-65.
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laterally by either LUCA or the landowner; the LUI could only be
changed or altered by mutual agreement pursuant to an Intensity
Modification Contract, 3 9 privately negotiated by and between
LUCA and the landowner.
Just as the selection of the LUI rating would be determined
solely by the landowner, the use of a specific parcel of land, or the
development of private improvements, would be essentially a private
decision. The landowner would be free to develop his land for any
residential, commercial, or industrial use, or any combination
thereof, permitted by the selected LUI range. Neither LUCA nor
any other local 140 legislative or administrative body could dictate
permitted use, structural height, or design. These matters of pri-
vate improvement would be determined solely by the landowner in
response to market demand. Of course, the landowner would re-
main subject to the common law of nuisance and certain other
public laws, such as building, health, and sanitation codes, which
would be administered by LUCA in order to promote a unified
land use policy.
139 See infra text accompanying notes 266-67.
140 Regional, state, interstate, and federal land use control is largely a product
of the environmental decade and what has come to be known as the "quiet revo-
lution" in land use controls. See F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALuis, TBE QUIET REVO-
LUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1972). The underlying notion for this type of
land use control is that local entities are too parochial to consider the impact of
large dimensional projects, certain types of specialized development (such as
shopping centers, airports, and hospitals), and what have become known as areas
of "critical state concern," such as areas of particular scenic value. Frequently,
the advent of state involvement in land use matters has meant the development
of a "double-veto system"; that is, a system requiring that a developer obtain
permits not only from the local community, but also from a state or regional com-
mission. For an opinion favorable to the increase in state, regional, and federal
involvement in land use matters, see R. HEALY, LAND USE ANo =- STATES 6-13
(1976).
While a detailed examination of regional, state, and federal land use controls
is beyond the scope of this Article, the alternative system disfavors such controls.
The underlying premise of the alternative system is that land use decisions gen-
erally should be made individually in the marketplace and only minimally con-
trolled in those cases where the market has not demonstrated an ability to produce
an optimal decision-for example, with respect to density and public improve-
ment. Only minimal public control should exist on a local level in order to avoid
the unnecessary lengthening of the development process and the elimination of
diversity which generally results from state and federal involvement in land use
matters. This is not to suggest that the state or federal government may not have
a legitimate. interest in protecting specific areas, such as wetlands, shorelines, and
floodplains; it does suggest, however, that such protection should be accomplished,
not by positive regulation, but by the outright public purchase of property inter-
ests (whether of a fee, scenic easement, or development rights nature), subsidiza-
tion, or direct public development It is an incidental advantage of the alternative
system that the cost of such purchases would be within the realm of possible
government expenditure, because all speculative use value is conceded to belong
to the public in the first place. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. Pur-





While the alternative system acknowledges that private im-
provement decisions are best made privately, it also rtcognizes that
public improvement decisions are best handled publicly. In this
regard, LUCA is given complete authority over the location, quan-
tity, and quality of public improvements such as streets, sewers,
parks, and schools. In most cases, the landowner will propose a
public improvement plan, but in all cases LUCA's decision on these
matters will prevail. The final decision will be embodied in the
Public Improvement Contract.
Under existing law, it is decidedly unclear what public control
bodies can require of a landowner in the way of infrastructure and
on-site and off-site public improvements.141  The alternative sys-
tem eliminates this lack of clarity with a clear rule: as a condition
of development at the selected LUI rating, the landowner shall
undertake all on-site and off-site public improvements required by
LUCA so long as the cost of these improvements do not exceed an
agreed amount.
What amount will the landowner and LUCA treat as the public
improvement "agreed amount"? Under the alternative system, the
"agreed amount for public improvement" shall be equal to the dif-
ference between the fair market value of the property at the land-
owner-selected LUI rating and the fair market value of the property
in its agricultural/open space use-that is, fair market value after
LUI selection minus fair market value before. It is no accident
that the agreed amount equals what Henry George defined as the
unearned increment of land value-the value a given parcel of land
has because of adjacent beneficial improvements not attributable to
the landowner, be they private or public in origin.
142
The direct relationship between the unearned increment avail-
able for public improvement and other community purposes and
the selected LUI rating should ensure that LUI ratings are ration-
ally established by the local legislative body. The existing system
is often permeated by a "no growth" attitude, largely because de-
141 See infra text accompanying notes 306-17.
142 H. GEORGE, PaoonEss AND PovERTy 358-67 (1962). Essentially, George
advocated the recoupment of economic rents associated with unimproved land-
that is, the amount in excess of the amount necessary to induce a factor's par-
ticipation in the production process. Thus, because virtually everything paid to
the owner of unimproved land, except perhaps the cost of negotiating and signing a
lease, is unnecessary to keep the owner invested, increasing a land value tax (which
decreases land value) will not induce the owner to withdraw his land from a
competitive market.
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velopment is viewed as imposing economic costs on the community
and economic benefits on the private landowner. Thus, the exist-
ing system provides little incentive to the community to permit any
development. In contrast, the alternative system offers the com-
munity the economic value of the unearned increment for public
improvement or general revenue, but the community must establish
a rational set of possible LUI ratings (and hence a reasonable level
of development) in order to obtain it.
4. Changing Regulation by Contract
While the alternative system has incentives that favor reason-
able levels of development, there may be occasions when either the
landowner or LUCA will wish to depart from the selected LUI
rating for a specific property. Under the existing system, such de-
partures would be treated as zone amendments, variances, or special
exceptions; however, because of the abuses and inadequacies asso-
ciated with these mechanisms, they would be abandoned under the
alternative system.
Under the alternative system, if the landowner and LUCA
want to alter the LUI rating selected for a given parcel, they must
bargain with each other for such a change. For example, if the
landowner desires to develop at a higher intensity than the one
actually chosen or available on the LUI schedule, the landowner
may offer LUCA greater control over various aspects of the private
improvements in exchange for the increase in intensity. Similarly,
if LUCA desires to assert greater public control over the private
improvements, it may offer the landowner a return of part of the
unearned increment or the prospect of less public improvement.
In either case, neither LUCA nor the landowner is bound to the
change unless an Intensity Modification Contract is entered into and
placed of record. Such contracts would be as enforceable as any
other private agreement, subject only to "reasonable and necessary"
impairment to accommodate the police power.
143
B. An Examination of the Primary Elements of the
Alternative System
Having outlined the whole of the alternative system, what fol-
lows is a closer look at some of its parts. In particular, the proposal
to reclassify all undeveloped land to agricultural/open space will be
evaluated in light of recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with
'43 See infra text accompanying notes 281-90.
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land use regulation and the constitutional requirement that prop-
erty not be taken for public use without the payment of just com-
pensation.' 44 Second, the role of the neighbor under the existing
system will be explored.145 Suggestions will be made for redirecting
neighbor participation toward policymaking, rather than policy ap-
plication. Possible constitutional objections to such redirection are
evaluated. Third, the scope of public land use control is narrowed
to issues of land use intensity.146 Fourth, the treatment of, and
objections to, contractual land use agreements under both the exist-
ing and alternative systems are examined14T Recent Supreme Court
and state court decisions dealing with the contract clause and the
reserved power doctrine are construed to permit the Public Im-
provement and Intensity Modification Contracts envisioned under
the alternative system. Finally, methods of financing public im-
provements under the existing system are examined in relation to
the alternative system's proposal to recapture the unearned incre-
ment and apply it to the cost of public improvement.148 The
similarities and differences to previous land value taxation theories
are also discussed.
1. Reclassification of Undeveloped Land to
Agricultural/Open Space
No land use controversy has been more unresolvable than the
"taking issue." 149 The fifth amendment commands that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion" 110 but recitation of this fundamental constitutional principle
merely begs the question of when, in fact, property is taken.
Numerous scholarly attempts to "draw the line" between takings
and police power regulations have been made,'' and little will be
said here as to their individual success or failure. It is worth ob-
serving, however, that the scholarly preoccupation with the taking
14 4 See infra text accompanying notes 149-73.
145 See infra text accompanying notes 174-231.
146 See infra text accompanying notes 232-49.
147 See infra text accompanying notes 250-303.
148 See infra text accompanying notes 304-47.
149 See, e.g., B. AcxRmAN, supra note 40; F. BossxtAN, D. CAI_.uS & J.
BANTA, supra note 41; Berger, supra note 41; Dunham, A Legal and Economic
Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLum. L. R.Ev. 650 (1958); Michelman, supra note 40;
Sax, Takings, Private Property, supra note 40; Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
supra note 40.
150 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
151 See supra note 149.
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issue may have diverted needed attention from the deficiencies in
the existing land use allocation system.
Judicial challenges to land use regulation based on the just
compensation clause have had little success. Although the Court,
speaking through Justice Holmes, warned in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon 152 that "[t]he general rule at least is, that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking," 153 the compensatory limit on land
use regulation has been diluted to the point where the Constitution
provides little, if any, protection to the landowner. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of California has held that even a regulation which
destroys "substantially all reasonable use" of a property cannot con-
stitute a compensable taking, but at most will be invalidated as an
improper exercise of the police power.154
152 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
153 Id. 415.
154 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979) (en bane), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
Whether compensation must be paid for a taking recently was argued before
the U.S. Supreme Court in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 101
S. Ct. 1287 (1981). In San Diego Gas, the city rezoned some of the plaintiff's
industrial property to agricultural use, while also establishing an open-space plan
that included much of the property. The plaintiff alleged a taking and sought
damages, as well as mandamus and declaratory relief. A trial resulted in a damage
award in excess of $3 million; ultimately, however, the California Court of Appeal
reversed in light of the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins. Speaking
for the U.S. Supreme Court after certiorari had been granted, Justice Blackmun
held that the California state court decision, which equivocated on the issue whether
any taking had in fact occurred, was not reviewable because of the absence of a
"final judgment" pursuant to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). There
also was some dispute over what the California courts had decided in Agins, and
refusing to reach the merits allowed the Court a prudential way of deferring de-
cision on the issue. In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the lower court's decision
was a final judgment within the meaning of the jurisdictional statute and thus
expressed an opinion on the merits of the taking issue. Specifically, he believed that
"[p]olice power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-use restrictions
can destroy the use and enjoyment of property" and thus may qualify as a taking
within the meaning of the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment. 101
S. Ct. at 1304. He cited with approval language from Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), suggesting that "[t]he application of a general zoning
law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests . . . or [if it] denies an owner economically viable
use of his land." 101 S. Ct. at 1301. Once it is established that a taking has
occurred, "the Constitution demands that the government entity pay just com-
pensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the
'taking,' and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or other-
wise amend the regulation." Id. 1304 (footnotes omitted). As to the chilling effect
that requiring payment of compensation may have on the freedom of land use
officials, Justice Brennan simply noted that "the applicability of express constitutional
guarantees is not a matter to be determined on the basis of policy judgments .... "
Id. 1308. Because Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell joined in the dissent, id.
1296, and Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in the judgment of the Court noted
that he "would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of" the dissenting
[Vol. 130:29
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Nonetheless, a proposal to classify all undeveloped land to
agricultural/open space under the alternative system warrants some
examination of the minimum standard necessary to avoid a finding-
that a taking has occurred. Moreover, the examination serves to
highlight the property interests left unprotected by the just com-
pensation clause, and why these interests are protected under the
alternative system.
The Supreme Court presented a comprehensive restatement of
the taking issue in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.155 At issue was the denial by the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Commission of approval for a fifty-three story building
to be constructed above Grand Central Station. The station, pur-
suant to a city act, had been designated a historic landmark, impos-
ing on the owner (Penn Central) certain maintenance duties, and
requiring Commission approval for any modification of the existing
structure. A designated landmark was subject to these restrictions
in addition to all existing zoning regulations. Following denial of
two office building proposals, Penn Central brought suit in state
court, claiming that its property had been taken without just com-
pensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the New York Court of
Appeals in deciding that there had been no taking.
The Court's analysis indicates that if an owner is left with an
"economically viable" use, there is no compensable taking.156 The
Court noted that "the 'taking' issue in [land use regulation] contexts
is resolved by focusing on the uses the regulations permit" 157 rather
than on the diminution in value related to uses precluded. Penn
Central failed to establish that there had been a taking because its
present use of Grand Central Station was not abridged. In the
words of the Court, "the law does not interfere with what must be
regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use
of the parcel." 158
Although not stated expressly, the Court made it clear that an
investment based on speculative uses alone would not provide the
opinion, id. 1294, it is quite likely that a majority of the Court agrees with Justice
Brennan's interpretation of the taking issue. Indeed, the Court's opinion itself noted
that "the federal constitutional aspects of that issue are not to be cast aside
lightly .... ." Id. 1294. Thus, preliminary indications are that limiting a land-
owner's taking remedy to invalidation may ultimately be found unconstitutional.
See Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San Diego,
57 Im. L.J. - (forthcoming 1982).
155 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
156 Id. 138 n.36; see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
15 438 U.S. at 131.
158 Id. 136.
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baseline for determining a loss of "economic viability" unless the
existing use itself is destroyed. The Court noted, and Penn Central
conceded, that prior decisions "uniformly reject the proposition
that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a
'taking.' "159 The Court cited cases supporting the proposition
that value attributable to development rights is held subject to the
police power, and loss of an investment reflecting that value does
not constitute a taking.160 Thus, in most cases, the just compensa-
tion clause protects expectations based on the existing use of the
land, or what the Court termed "distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions." 161 A number of cases cited with approval by the Court,
however, reduce that protection still further.162 For example, in
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, the plaintiff owned a gravel quarry whose
existing use was destroyed by regulation, yet no taking was found.
163
Thus, it would seem that even when an existing use is destroyed, if
some theoretically possible use remains to the plaintiff allowing a
return comparable to the return of the destroyed existing use, the
land remains "'economically viable" and there is no taking.
Because the reclassification to agricultural/open space under
the alternative system applies only to undeveloped land, the only
possible value loss is speculative value. Under Penn Central, the
loss of this value is clearly not a taking. Further, because under
the alternative system speculative value is subject to recapture by
LUCA at the point of development, 1' that value is conceded in
advance to belong to the community, and hence cannot be "taken."
From the point of view of the landowner who wishes to use his land
as farmland, the recapture provisions, coupled with requirements
that the property's taxation be based upon its existing use,'65 relieve
some of the pressure to sell for development and suggest that farm-
ing will remain an economically viable use so long as market de-
mand dictates.
Although not constitutionally mandated, the alternative system
permits the development of contemplated uses of undeveloped land
in addition to the economically viable agricultural/open space clas-
sification. A number of reasons favor affording more development





163 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
164 See infra notes 304-47 and accompanying text.
165 See infra notes 341-44 and accompanying text.
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a. Removal of Hidden Growth Impediments
The alternative system accommodates contemplated uses to en-
sure that the regulatory process itself is not used as an impediment
to rational development, as it often is under the existing system.
This does not mean that a community cannot decide to slow its
growth. It does mean that any such policy must be either explicitly
reflected in the LUI schedule or bargained for under an Intensity
Modification Contract, both of which are radical departures from
the existing system. Under the existing system, a no-growth attitude
is often hidden in numerous and expensive requirements, such as
minimum lot and dwelling sizes. 160 Similarily, a landowner is
seldom compensated under the existing system for the decrease in
land value associated with growth regulation, whereas the possibility
of compensation exists for a landowner if it is successfully negotiated
for under an Intensity Modification Contract.167
136 See Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning:
Death Knell for Home Rule? 1 U. TOL. L. REv. 65, 74-80 (1969); Bigham &
Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination of the Current Controversy,
25 VArD. L. lEv. 1111 (1972); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. 11Ev. 767 (1968). Compare Simon
v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942) (upholding one acre
zoning) with National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965)
(invalidating four acre zoning). Justice Roberts in National Land explicitly recog-
nized the relationship between minimum lot size and a no-growth attitude:
Four acre zoning represents Easttown's position that it does not desire to
accommodate those who are pressing for admittance to the township unless
such admittance will not create any additional burdens upon governmental
functions and services. The question posed is whether the township can
stand in the way of the natural forces which send our growing population
into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live.
We have concluded not. A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to
prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens,
economic and otherwise, upon the administration of public services and
facilities can not be held valid.
Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
For decisions upholding minimum dwelling size requirements, see, for example,
De Mars v. Zoning Comm'n, 142 Conn. 580, 115 A.2d 653 (1955); Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dis-
missed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). For comments on the Lionshead Lake decision, see
Hear, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HAv. L.
REv. 1051 (1952); Nolan & Horack, How Small a House?-Zoning for Minimum
Space Requirements, 67 HAIv. L. Rzv. 967 (1953); Haar, Wayne Township: Zon-
ing for WhomP-In Brief Reply, 67 Hav. L. REv. 986 (1953); Williams & Wacks,
Segregation of Residential Areas Along Economic Lines: Lionshead Lake Revisited,
1969 Wis. L. 11Ev. 827.
Professor Williams has noted that "[i]n some counties in northern New Jersey,
of the vacant land which is zoned for residence and readily developable for that
purpose, about 75 percent is zoned to require houses of not less than 1,200 square
feet, and substantial areas are zoned for houses of at least 1,600 square feet."
Williams, The Three Systems of Land Use Control, 25 RUTrcIS L. EYv. 80, 93
(1970) (footnote omitted); see also 2 N. WIr.Ams, supra note 2, § 63.12.
167 See supra text accompanying note 143.
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b. Increasing Individual Freedom
The accommodation of contemplated uses also increases the
role of private decisionmaking in the land use process. While the
application of the Penn Central standard mandates only minimum
economic viability, land is frequently economically viable in a range
of uses, some more highly demanded than others. The alternative
system assumes that public policy should extend sufficient freedom
to the landowner to respond to the market with a use that the owner
believes would be the most economically viable and personally
satisfying.
c. Historical Equity
Finally, the alternative system allows for the development of
contemplated uses in order to uphold, at least partially, subjective
investment expectations of individuals who purchased undeveloped
land prior to the enactment of the alternative system. Upholding
these subjective expectations seems especially appropriate in view
of the confusion surrounding the taking issue before, and even after,
the Court's decision in Penn Central.168
d. Additional Benefits of Reclassification
Reclassifying all undeveloped land as agricultural/open space
also may prevent the premature conversion of viable agricultural
168 To some extent, this confusion was reflected by the Court itself in San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981). See supra
note 154.
Implicitly, by leaving the terms "reasonable investment expectations" and
"economic viability" undefined, the Court's opinion leaves landowners uncertain
as to the extent of their property rights. Moreover, the treatment of these con-
cepts in Penn Central is confusing and somewhat at odds with traditional due
process analysis. Specifically, because the Court characterized the landmark preser-
vation ordinance in Penn Central as an exercise of the police, rather than the
eminent domain, power, it is not entirely clear why the Court required not only
that the landmark ordinance meet the traditional rationality test, but also that
it satisfy notions of reasonable beneficial use such as investment expectations and
economic viability. Previous Court decisions had suggested that a consideration
of the reasonable beneficial use remaining after regulation was relevant only to
the threshold categorization of the governmental regulation as either based on
the eminent domain or police power. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962). Penn Central, however, uses the reasonable beneficial use
or economic viability concept as an independent criterion under the police power
analysis. Whether this signals an attempt by the Court to engage in more rigorous
substantive economic due process analysis, or oppositely, a retreat from consti-
tutional protections of property interests by placing a consideration of the "nature
and extent of the interference" with property interests at a point at which it will
seldom benefit landowners, is open to question. For a good discussion of Penn
Centrals ambiguity, see Blumstein, A Prolegomenon to Growth Management and




land to homesites. As urban areas expand, adjacent farmland often
.dramatically increases in value, a fact that does not go unnoticed by
local property tax assessors. The corresponding dramatic increase
in the property tax, together with the lure of a windfall profit, may
-result in the development of farmland earlier than may be justified
by market demand.
Numerous schemes have been proposed to reduce the value and
property tax pressure faced by farm owners.169 Generally, these
schemes call for a permanent or temporary reduction in the taxable
-value of farmland or a separate agricultural tax classification 7 0
One way of reducing the taxable value of farmland is through the
use of public land use restrictions, such as exclusive farm or large-lot
zoning or other more detailed growth management plans. Tax
.assessors may disregard such public restrictions in calculating tax
-value,1 1 because the restrictions are often temporary holding zones
not truly reflective of market value.
7 2
The solution seems obvious: mandate that local assessors value
.agriculturally classified property in that use until such time as de-
-velopment actually occurs. 73 The reclassification of all undeveloped
land to agricultural/open space, combined with the unearned in-
crement recapture provisions, should sufficiently convince tax as-
;sessors to reduce the tax value of such property. Some tax assessors
may remain unconvinced, and insist on factoring in the value of
.hypothetical developed uses under hypothetically-selected LUI rat-
ings. If this occurs, such recalcitrant assessors may be convinced
by appropriate legislation.
169 See generally PnoPERv TAX PREFmNcEs FOR AcmUc r AL LASD (N.
Roberts and H. Brown eds. 1980); Dawson, Compassionate Taxation of Undevel-
.oped Private Land, 3 ZoNmG & Pi.Ax. L. Rn'. 49, 57 (1980).
170 See, e.g., BARmows, WIscoNsN's F rMuLAD PRESERVATION PRoGAM (Wis-
consin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, Pub. No.
G2890, May 1978); Ellingson, Differential Assessment and Local Governmental
.Controls to Preserve Agricultural Lands, 20 S.D.L. REV. 548 (1975); Henke,
Preferential Property Tax Treatment for Farmland, 53 OR. L. REv. 117 (1974);
Lapping, Bevins & Herbers, Differential Assessment and Other Techniques to Pre-
.serve Missouri's Farmlands, 42 Mo. L. REv. 369 (1977); Note, Preferential Prop-
-erty Tax Treatment of Farmland and Open Space Under Michigan Law, 8 U.
MIcH. J.L. REF. 428 (1975).
171 See, e.g., CAL. REv. & TAX CoDE § 422 (West Supp. 1980) (providing
that zoning will not be considered an "enforceable restriction" under terms of
the California Constitution, CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 8, allowing for reduced assess-
-ment of "enforceably restricted" property).
' 72 See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
173 Oregon has authorized exclusive farm use zones by statute, OR. REv. STAT.
§§197.230, 215.243 (1979), and California has judicially approved of them,
'-Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974).
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2. Redirecting Public Participation Toward Land Use Policy Issues
Surprisingly little thought has been given to the role and scope
of public participation in the land use process.174 Since the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act provided that "any person aggrieved"
could appeal to, and any person aggrieved or any taxpayer could
appeal from, the administrative determinations of the board of ad-
justment,175 while also according significant deference to the views.
of neighbors, and occasionally all taxpayers, with respect to local
legislative action, 76 the role of the neighbor has been assumed to be
indispensable. Moreover, to the extent that land use decisions may
be the subject of initiatives or referenda, the neighbor's role in
policy application under the existing system is superior to that of
the legislative body.
177
a. Misuse of Zoning for Private Purposes
Generally, a neighbor threatened with a substantial and un-
reasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of his property
may look to the common law of nuisance for relief. 178 A successful
plaintiff was traditionally entitled to injunctive relief, thereby pre-
cipitating an unnecessary conflict between a highly valued, but
nuisance-creating development and a quantitatively less-injured
174Krasnowiecki, PUD, supra note 78, at 55.
175 SZEA, supra note 25, § 7.
276 For example, section five of the SZEA requires a three-quarters majority
vote of the legislative body to pass a zoning amendment if a protest is filed by
owners of 20% or more either of the area of the lots included in the proposed
change, or of those immediately adjacent to the rear thereof, or of those directly
opposite thereto. Id. § 5.
Professor Krasnowiecki notes that most enabling statutes are silent about neigh-
bor review of local legislative action, "yet the neighbor has been accorded stand-
ing." Krasnowiecki, PUD, supra note 78, at 56. Neighbors often are allowed to
test the propriety of zoning action by means of an action for declaratory judg-
ment or injunction. Id. 56 n.23. Professor Krasnowiecki points out that the risk
of frivolous lawsuits also falls on the developer: "[e]ven a slight possibility that
the challenger might win will stop the developer from proceeding with the con-
struction." Id. 55. Among other things, construction lenders will commonly have
provided that litigation over the development relieves them of any obligation to pay
out on the loan. See, e.g., 4A P. RoHAN, supra note 15, § 3.09[2], at 3-411 to
-420 (borrower's representations and warranties as well as conditions precedent
to making advances in construction loan and project agreement forms).
177 See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976)
(upholding provision of the city charter requiring referendum approval of any
change in existing land uses by a 55% margin).
178 See generally J. CRBBET, PaxNci'LEs or Tkm LAw OF PRoTar 362 (2d
ed. 1975); C. DONAHUE, T. KAupmz & P. MA.,Tnq CASES Aim MAEIrA.s ON
PROPERTY-AN INTaODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND H INsTITu-ON 978-1026
(1974); C. SmirH & R. Boxyn, SunvEy OF mm LAw OF PROPERTY 209 (1971).
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plaintiff.179 Not surprisingly, the plaintiff often lost. Thus, zoning
took on the role of protecting individual property interests. Re-
grettably, the use of zoning as a tool to protect individual property
interests limits the capability of the existing system to formulate a
rational land use policy for the public at large.
To protect their interests, individual property owners use zon-
ing and zoning litigation to stop development or slow the develop-
ment process.180 Individual property owners know all too well that
inhibiting development constricts supply and enhances the market
-value of their property. In this regard, zoning ordinances impose
.minimum lot or building sizes or restrict apartment 181 and manu-
factured home developments,18 2 not because they are legitimate
179 See, e.g., Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258
N.Y.S. 229 (1932) (court strained to avoid the awarding of an injunction to the
plaintiff because of the high utility of the defendant manufacturer); see also
Ellickson, supra note 20, at 720.
18 0 In striking down the zoning referendum provision that was ultimately
-validated by the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), the concurring opinion of Ohio Justice Stem
xecognized the predominant interest of the neighbors:
There can be little doubt of the true purpose of Eastlake's charter
provision-it is to obstruct change in land use, by rendering such change
so burdensome as to be prohibitive. The charter provision was apparently
adopted specifically, to prevent multi-family housing, and indeed was
adopted while Forest City's application for rezoning to permit a multi-
family housing project was pending before the City Planning Commis-
sion and City Council. The restrictive purpose of the provision is crudely
apparent on its face. . . . The proposed change must receive, rather
than a simple majority, at least a 55 percent affirmative vote. Finally,
the owner of the property affected is required to pay the cost of the elec-
tion, although the provision gives no hint as to exactly which costs would
be billed to a property owner.
There is no subtlety to this; it is simply an attempt to render change
difficult and expensive under the guise of popular democracy.
,City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 199-200,
.324 N.E.2d 740, 748 (1975) (Stem, J., concurring), rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
181 See, e.g., Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). Much of
-the opposition to apartments is based on erroneous and emotional appeals that
treat modem apartment developments as equivalent to the worst big city tene-
,ments of the 1920's. Very little evidence exists to suggest that apartments "do
not pay their own way," create fire hazards, become slums, lower property values,
.attract transients and low class individuals, or destroy the character of the com-
munity. If anything, existing evidence is to the contrary. See Babcock & Bossel-
man, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040,
1062-72 (1963); Cou=ru & MUNIci'AL GovEaNu:mr STuDY CoMMwssioN, STATE
-ov Nxw JmEsEY, HousiNG & SuBuRBs; FiscAL & Socr.L IMPAcT oF Mu rm-sIy
DEvELoPMENT 1-12 (9th Rep. 1974).
182See, e.g., Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 NJ. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962)
(upholding a rezoning which prevented the development of a trailer camp or
-mobile honie community even though the rezoning effectively barred such use
from the entire municipality and plaintiff's proposed development was shown not
to be detrimental to the immediate neighborhood as it then existed), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 233 (1963). While the case law is not uniformly against mobile homes,
-see, e.g., Town of Clocester v. Olivo's Mobile Home Court, Inc., 111 R.I. 120,
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nuisances, but because these protect neighbor expectations of prop-
erty appreciation-expectations premised upon restricting the en-
trance and competition of comparable land uses in the market.
One recent study by Professor Nelson concluded that despite zon-
ing's contrived nuisance-protection justification, it is really a tool
employed by some property owners to control the property of
others. 83  Professor Nelson further argued that zoning is incon-
sistent with basic American beliefs and individual freedom. 84
The courts, in contrast, refused for a considerable period to
acknowledge that individual property interests, and not public
policy, was the basis of many zoning decisions. A court would find
itself in the awkward position of articulating, and accepting in view
of the presumed validity of legislative acts, patently ridiculous justi-
fications for zoning enactments. Time and again, one and two acre
minimum lot sizes are deemed necessary to prevent the spread of
fire and disease,'5 notwithstanding that millions of individuals in
both urban and suburban areas live on much smaller lots free from
immolation or the plague.
In recent years, courts have become less tolerant of contrived
justifications for upholding zoning enactments. This has been es-
pecially the case when individual property owners have used zoning
not only to serve their superior economic positions, but also to keep
the community free of certain racial, ethnic, or economic classes.' 8
The Supreme Court has held that zoning decisions resulting from a
demonstrated racial intent constitute an equal protection viola-
tion.187  Moreover, a zoning decision that has a racial effect, even
300 A.2d 465 (1973) (invalidating a zoning ordinance that prohibited the use of
land for a mobile home park in excess of 30 units), it is generally true that mobile
homes have been excluded from residential districts and relegated to commercial
and industrial areas. D. MANDErkER & R. CuNNiNcHAM, supra note 22, at 368.
183 R. NELsoN, supra note 61, at 16.
184 Id. 119-20.
185 In Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942),
the court upheld one acre lots because, inter alia, "the danger from fire from out-
side sources might be reduced." Id. at 563, 42 N.E.2d at 518. Other rationaliza-
tions for large lot zoning include the inducement to the cultivation of flowers,
id.; preservation of a rural appearance, Gignoux v. Village of Kings Point, 199
Misc. 485, 491-92, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280, 286 (Sup. Ct. 1950); preservation of the
capacity of the soil to absorb rainfall, Bogert v. Township of Washington, 25 N.J.
57, 64, 135 A.2d 1, 5 (1957); creating an elementary school of the ideal size,
Padover v. Township of Farmington, 374 Mich. 622, 636, 132 N.W.2d 687, 694
(1965); the preservation of the water supply, Zygmont v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 152 Conn. 550, 210 A.2d 172 (1965), and providing for some "high
class" residential areas, Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 41 N.J. Super. 47, 124
A.2d 54 (1956).
186 Blumstein, supra note 168, at 48.
187 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265 (1977). A showing that a discriminatory purpose motivated the land
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apart from a racial intent, may constitute a violation of the Fair
Housing Act. s8  Some state courts, notably New Jersey, have relied
upon state concepts of due process and equal protection to invali-
date zoning ordinances that fail to provide for the community's fair
share of low and moderate income housing' 9 or that contain re-
use decision, however, does not complete the court's analysis. The local com-
munity still has the opportunity to establish that the "same decision would have
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered." Id. 270 n.21.
188 Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); accord Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-48 & n.31 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); United States v. City of Blackjack, Mo., 508 F.2d
1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
Although the circuit courts uniformly agree that evidence of racial effect may
constitute a prima facie case under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1976 & Supp. I1 1979), the circuits are not in agreement with respect to the
analytical approach adopted for evaluating whether a plaintiff has proven a
violation. For example, in City of Blackjack, the Eighth Circuit found that after
a racial effect is shown by the plaintiff, the burden shifts to the government to
show that its conduct promotes a compelling state interest. 508 F.2d at 1185.
In contrast, the Third Circuit has sought to avoid placing this heavy burden
upon the government and instead requires that the government demonstrate "that
no alternative course of action could be adopted that would enable that interest to
be served with less discriminatory impact." Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149.
The Seventh Circuit has adopted an even more elaborate analytical scheme
balancing four factors: the strength of the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory
effect; whether there is some evidence of discriminatory intent; the interest of the
defendant in taking the action that causes the discriminatory effect, and the
nature of the relief sought-that is, whether the plaintiff seeks to compel the
defendant to construct integrated housing or whether the plaintiff is merely at-
tempting to prevent the defendant from interfering with the construction of in-
tegrated housing on his own land. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290-93.
189 In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67
N.J. 1.51, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), the court stated:
[W]hen it is shown that a developing municipality in its land use regula-
tions has not made realistically possible a variety and choice of hous-
ing, including adequate provision to afford the opportunity for low and
moderate income housing or has expressly prescribed requirements or re-
strictions which preclude or substantially hinder it, a facial showing of
violation of substantive due process or equal protection under the state
constitution has been made out and the burden, and it is a heavy one,
shifts to the municipality to establish a valid basis for its action or non-
action.
Id. at 180-81, 336 A.2d at 728. Once the burden is shifted to the municipality, it
cannot be satisfied, as it can in the federal court, see supra note 187, merely by
showing a permissible motivation or legitimate policy objective. Rather, the
municipality must demonstrate an overriding governmental interest and specific
means aimed at achieving that overriding interest. 67 N.J. at 174 & n.10, 336 A.2d
at 724-25 & n.10. The Mt. Laurel decision triggered an avalanche of commentary.
See, e.g., Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of
Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1; Mallach, Do Lawsuits Build Housing?: The
Implications of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 6 Rtrr.-CAm. LJ. 653 (1975);
Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law: The Case of
Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RTrr. L. REv. 803 (1976); Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and
Managed Growth: Some Unresolved Issues, 6 RuT.-C~m. LJ. 689 (1975); Note,
Exclusionary Zoning and Timed Growth: Resolving the Issue After Mount Laurel,
30 RuT. L. REv. 1237 (1977). Much of the commentary criticizes the notion of
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strictions that impede the production of least cost housing.19°
These substantive due process and equal protection decisions
are both welcome and regrettable. Because such decisions highlight
the misuse of zoning for the protection of individual property in-
terests, the decisions are well-founded. To the extent that they
represent the substitution of judicial for legislative policymaking,
however, they augur badly. Courts are poorly equipped to under-
take the factfinding and analysis necessary to evaluate and accom-
modate the conflicting demands on a community's property re-
sources. For example, after a brief and frustrating experience with
judicial activism, the New Jersey Supreme Court appears to have
recognized the limits of judicial capability by agreeing to hear, on a
consolidated basis, more than a dozen cases seeking clarification of
its earlier decisions. 191
b. Piercing the Zoning Charade
If one accepts the argument that neighbors have used zoning
to foster their individual interests rather than public policy, two
alternatives present themselves: either expressly authorize neighbor
control or expressly eliminate it. Professor Nelson has chosen the
first alternative;9 2 the second is adopted here.
"fair share," 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724, for its ambiguity. In particular, after
Mt. Laurel, the government was left to ponder the extent of its duty to provide
housing for underserved population groups. See Blumstein, supra note 168, at 26.
190 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 495 &
n.3, 512, 371 A.2d 1192, 1198 & n.3, 1209 (1977). In adopting the notion that
municipalities should be under an obligation to adjust their zoning regulations to,
render the production of least-cost housing feasible, the New Jersey court recognized
that developing municipalities do not have an affirmative obligation actually to
construct or to sponsor housing projects for low and moderate income individuals.
The court viewed its role as one of promoting the concept of "filtering," which
suggests that an overall increase in housing stock will ultimately work to the benefit
of lower income groups as higher income families move to new units, reducing the
demand for, and thus the price of, older units. See W. GMasBy, HoUsING MAsc-rs
AND PUBLIC PoLacY 84-130 (1963); C. HAcrMAN, HOUSING AND SOCIAL POLICY
62-63 (1975); J. LANsING, C. CLIFTON & J. MORGAN, NEw HoMms AND PooR
PEoPr: A STUDY OF CHms OF MovEs (1969); Fisher & Winnick, A Reformulation
of the "Filtering" Concept, 7 J. Soc. ISSUEs 47 (1951).
191 Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor and Council, 142 N.J.
Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 170 N.J. Super. 461, 406
A.2d 1322 (1979), cert. granted, 82 N.J. 283, 412 A.2d 789 (1980). The court
apparently will clarify its earlier decisions in Mount Laurel, see supra note 189,
and in Oakwood, see supra note 190. The latter decision itself represented a
narrowing of the judicial role and something of an admission of its limitations in
the land use area. As the court stated: "[T]he govemmental-sociological-economic
enterprise of seeing to the provision and allocation throughout appropriate regions
of adequate and suitable housing for all categories of the population is much more
appropriately a legislative and administrative function rather than a judicial function
to be exercised in the disposition of isolated cases." Oakwood, 72 N.J. at 534, 371
A.2d at 1218 (footnote omitted).
192 R. NELSON, supra note 61.
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Nelson declares the public policy nature of zoning to be a
sham,198 and neighbors, rather than the legislature or zoning board,
are expressly given control over the property of adjacent landowners.
Characterizing the zoning power as a collective property right,
Nelson would transfer that right to a neighborhood association in
which all of the individual owners in the neighborhood have
"'shares." 194 If the owner of undeveloped land within association
boundaries wanted to develop, the owner could buy the necessary
collective property rights from the association if a substantial major-
ity of the association members approved.
Nelson's proposal validly exposes the artificial public image of
zoning and would permit greater land use flexibility, because the
sale of collective rights would more likely coincide with the market-
place than with zoning. The proposal, however, perpetuates the
existing system's infringement of individual freedom.19 5 The indi-
vidual is sacrificed to a neighborhood association instead of being
sacrificed to the legislature.
The alternative system is predicated upon the antithesis of
Professor Nelson's prediction that "in future social systems personal
rights may be increasingly superseded by collective rights." 196 In
the words of John Rawls, the alternative system seeks to create an
allocation device free of "the effects of specific contingencies which
put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural cir-
cumstances to their own advantage." 197 To do this, public partici-
pants in the legislative process and the legislators themselves are
urged to evaluate various land use policies on the basis of general
considerations, rather than on how they will affect their own par-
ticular situation. Specifically, the alternative system allows public
participation at the policymaking stage only,198 and does away with
neighbor involvement in policy application altogether. All regis-
19 3 In Professor Nelson's words, "[zioning [is] supported by fictions, evasions,
contrived arguments, and other dodging of the fundamental issues." Id. 121.
194 Id. 213.
105 See Kmiec, Private Control of Collective Property Rights (Book Review),
13 VAL. U.L. REv. 589, 594 (1979).
196 R. NErLSO, supra note 61, at 119.
197 J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUsTicE 136 (1971).
198 Public participation is important at the policymaking stage. It allows indi-
vidual citizens and developers the opportunity to evaluate the planner's conception
of how, where, when, and to what intensity the community should expand. Here,
the public can directly contribute their thoughts concerning the public improvement
needs of the community. Once members of the public have communicated their
interests to their elected representatives, however, the alternative system looks to
those representatives to translate community sentiment into public policy.
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tered voters within the jurisdiction would be invited by mailed
notice to participate in a series of legislative hearings on the formu-
lation of the community's intensity policy. On the basis of these-
hearings and the advice of the community's planning consultants,
the legislative body would then publish the LUI rating schedules.
If neighbors are dissatisfied with the formulated policy, they are-
encouraged to use their traditional ballot box remedy.
With regard to policy application, unlike zoning and other
existing land use controls, the alternative system does not apply
public policy to individual landowners. Rather, land use policy
under the alternative system is voluntarily accepted. The alterna-
tive system neither prescribes permitted uses nor mandates an in--
tensity level for any specific parcel; instead, it allows the individual
landowner to select an intensity level from an available range of
possibilities. Thus, actual land use itself is a function of individuaL
choice and market demand.
c. Residual Neighbor Protection
Although it is recognized that a landowner may select a type of
development inimical to surrounding existing development, market
forces, the general deterrence of the common law of nuisance, and
public control over public improvements 199 are relied upon to,
minimize the chances of a substantial conflict. As indicated earlier,
strong evidence suggests that the locational land use patterns estab-
lished by the market differ little from those imposed by the existing
system. Few, if any, developers desire to create nuisances; however,
imperfect information or inadequate moral or economic incentives
may result in externalities or spillovers being imposed upon neigh-
boring properties. Where externalities do exist, modern nuisance
law theories provide a reasonable remedy. Whereas nuisance law
was at one time characterized as an "impenetrable jungle," 200 many
of its imperfections are easily remediable by a deemphasis of in-
junctive relief.201 Through the use of permanent damages, com-
pensated injunctions, and injunctions dissolvable upon the payment
of damages, courts would be better able, and more willing, to pro-
vide relief that is capable of both determining fault and efficiently
resolving the conflict.
202
199 See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
200 W. PNossln, THE LAw OF ToaTs § 86, at 571 (4th ed. 1971).
201 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
202 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). For an elaborate reformulation of nuisance law to
promote efficiency, see Ellickson, supra note 20, at 719-61. See generally Calabresi
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Frequently, many of the complaints articulated by neighbors at
zoning hearings relate to such public improvement matters as water
run-off, sewage disposal, traffic patterns, and school overcrowding.20 3
Under the alternative system, all of these matters are directly con-
trolled by LUCA. To the extent of the unearned increment, a
landowner can be mandated to construct public facilities that should
alleviate any identified problem. Moreover, because these matters&
demand some professional training or experience for evaluation,
LUCA-rather than the neighbor-is given the responsibility. Neigh-
bors have strong incentives to misuse the public improvement issue
in order to mask anticompetitive "no growth" attitudes or to object
to housing units that might attract the "wrong element" to the
community; 204 thus, LUCA is made responsible for these decisions.
d. Protection of the Housing Consumer
Some questions may be raised concerning the protection of
housing consumers under the alternative system. Certainly, one of
the assumptions made by stringent subdivision plat review under
the existing system is that housing consumers are incapable of
& Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fun-
damental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REv. 1299 (1977).
203A recent book intended to advise laymen on zoning skills recommended
that oppnents of a zoning amendment always raise the effect of the proposed lancl
use on public facilities. The authors note:
Members of the civic club have files of current information on the
capacity of water lines, sewer lines, storm drainage, schools, and streets.
After learning the details of any new zoning proposal, they descend on
city hall to ask the professionals there pointed questions about the impact
that the proposal is likely to have. The answers given them are used to
develop arguments against the proposal.
D. HINDs, N. CAu. & 0. ORDWAY, WnNnGc AT ZONING 139 (1979).
204 These public facility arguments frequently are made by homeowners of a
high socioeconomic status, and one often can question the substantive validity of
the articulated concerns. It has been noted, for example, that:
Current land use control policies-or the lack thereof-did not arise
from happenstance. They persist because they serve the interests of
politically active citizens. Local zoning ordinances, building codes, sub-
division controls, and statutes on annexation and municipal incorporation
have apparently served certain values and interests of citizens of above
average [socioeconomic status] well. The "quality" of their neighborhoods
has been protected from invasion by undesirable citizens, land uses, and
low-cost or multiple-dwelling units. Property values have not only been
protected but have risen. Variance procedures have been sufficiently re-
sponsive to block undesired developments in their neighborhoods but
permit higher [socioeconomic status] citizens to profit from speculation and
development.
D. ERViN, J. FncE, K. GoDwiN & W. SHEPARD, LAND USE CONTROL 33 (1977),
reprinted in D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, at 225; see also R. BABcoCK, supra note 27,
at 148-50.
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making proper housing choices. With regard to design and use
questions, the alternative system eschews this paternalistic assump-
tion. For example, if there is a market demand for modern, high-
rise condominiums, the alternative system would expect to see
condominiums in a variety of architectural styles voluntarily pro-
duced by landowners. From the supply of units produced, the
housing consumer is best qualified to address his own design and
use preferences.
In contrast, housing consumers are not generally knowledgable
on the safety, durability, and comparative advantages of various
-construction materials or techniques. The consumer, however, has
not lacked protection. A majority of jurisdictions has enacted some
type of building code.205 These codes typically regulate structural,
electrical, heating, plumbing, mechanical, energy, fire safety, and
gas installations. In addition, most states statutorily require the
licensing of architects, construction contractors, electricians, engi-
neers, plumbers, and others involved in the building trade.20 6 Sepa-
Tate health codes often deal with sewage, drainage, light, and venti-
lation. These codes are more than adequate to protect the safety
of the housing consumer and to redress the knowledge imbalance
between consumer and developer. If anything, evidence suggests
that "increasing regulation is slowing down the building process
and making the adoption of current and new potentially cost-saving
ideas more difficult and expensive." 207
New housing consumers are also protected by implied war-
ranties of quality, which are now applicable in approximately thirty
states.2 0 8 These implied warranties have their origin in both con-
tract and tort law. To the extent that the implied warranty is
viewed as a contract remedy, it has displaced the doctrine of caveat
2 05 See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FINAL REPORT OF
mms TASK FORCE ON HOUSING COSTS 35 (1978) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON
HOUSING CosTs].206 See ADWvsony ComM'N ON INTrRGOvERNmENTAL RELATIONS, BUILDING
CoDES: A PocAm FoR INTEnovERNmENTALREFoim 12 (1966).
2 07 See REPORT ON HOUSING COSTS, supra note 205, at 35.
208 Comment, Home Sales: A Crack in the Caveat Emptor Shield, 29 MERcER L.
1,Ev. 323, 330 n.43 (1977). On implied housing warranties in general, see Bear-
Inan, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND.
L. REv. 541 (1961); Bixby, Let the Seller Beware: Remedies for the Purchase of a
Defective Home, 49 J. URB. L. 533 (1971); Haskell, The Case for an Implied
Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. LJ. 633 (1965); McNamara,
The Implied Warranty in New-House Construction Revisited, 3 REAL EST. L.J.
136 (1974); McNamara, The Implied Warranty in New-House Construction: Has
the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor Been Abolished?, 1 REAL EST. L.J. 43 (1972);
Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52
CoRNm.L L. REv. 835 (1967).
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emptor for new housing consumers and, in some cases, second pur-
chasers as well. 20 9 Tort law extends similar protection to purchasers
of used housing under a strict liability theory.210 Courts have not
demonstrated any willingness to permit builders either to disclaim
the implied warranty or to substitute a more limited express war-
ranty.211 Builders have been found liable for construction defects,
soil problems, and resultant personal injuries. Although few states
have codified the requirements for home warranties, 2 market com-
petition and the judicial implication of these remedies have drama-
tically extended the warranty's availability.
e. Due Process Objections to Reducing the Neighbor's Role
It may be argued that redirecting the neighbor toward policy
and away from individual application violates constitutional due
process. Clearly, the alternative system runs directly contrary to
current interpretations of existing enabling legislation.21 3  The
alternative system, however, assumes the repeal of existing zoning
and subdivision enabling acts and the substitution of more com-
patible legislation. Nevertheless, compatible enabling legislation
may be inadequate support for the alternative system if constitu-
tional due process requires extensive public participation.
The requirements of constitutional due process in the land use
context are unclear and unsettled. It is a fair statement of the case
law, however, that the neighbor is to be afforded notice and a reason-
able opportunity to be heard when the land use decision is made in
a quasi-judicial, rather than a legislative, proceeding and when the
209 See Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
But see Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974). See generally
Note, Builders' Liability for Latent Defects in Used Homes, 32 STr .L. Rnv. 607
(1980).
21oSee, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965)
(imposing strict liability on a mass production home developer for the failure to
install a mixing valve to moderate water temperatures, resulting in the scalding of
a 16-month-old boy); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74
Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (imposing strict liability on a home developer in favor of a
second purchaser when a faulty radiant heating system reduced the valve of the
house by more than $5000). Thus, strict liability has been found for both personal
and property injuries.
211 See, e.g., Smith v. Berwin Builders, Inc., 287 A.2d 693 (Del. Super. Ct.
1972); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1972>
(en banc); Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup.
Ct. 1965).
212A few states have done so. See, e.g., MD. REAL PoP. CODE ANx. §§ 10-
201 to -205 (West Supp. 1980); NJ. REv. STAT. §§46:3B-:3B12 (1977). Fed-
eral warranty law also may apply to consumer products intended to be attached
or installed in real property. See generally Peters, How the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act Affects the Builder/Seller of New Housing, 5 REAL EsT. L.J. 338 (1977).
2 13 See Krasnowiecki, PUD, supra note 78, at 55-56 nn.22-24.
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decision might constitute a substantial or significant deprivation of
a property right.214 It is not entirely certain, however, when a pro-
,ceeding is "legislative" and when "judicial," or what constitutes a
"substantial" deprivation of property.
(i) The Type of Government Proceeding
That the nature of the government function will dictate the
procedure required by due process has long been settled by the
Supreme Court.215  When a government proceeding requires de-
terminations of fact and the issuance of orders premised upon evi-
dentiary findings, the proceeding is judicial or quasi-judicial in
nature and requires notice, a hearing, and perhaps a wide range of
-other rights guaranteed by due process.216 In contrast, when a pro-
ceeding is for promulgating policy-type rules or standards, the pro-
ceeding is legislative or quasi-legislative in character, and absent a
statutory mandate to the contrary, the notice and hearing require-
ments of due process do not apply.217
These basic distinctions have been muddled by federal and state
,court decisions. For example, in South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,
218
the First Circuit found that an implementation plan under the
Clean Air Act which would apply to one particular polluter was
nevertheless a legislative act not requiring a hearing because the
result of the administrative process was a general policy that would
.apply prospectively. The court's characterization is somewhat dis-
ingenuous, however, because it imposed substantial liability on only
-one entity. Similarly in state courts, small tract zone amendments
214 See Cunningham, Due Process Safeguards Mandated for Land Use Hear-
ings, 2 CAL. REAL Pnop. L. RPmR. 129, 130 (No. 8, 1979) (discussing Horn v.
County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979),
in which the California Supreme Court held that a neighbor plaintiff who pur-
,chased property after a tentative subdivision map had been approved for adja-
cent property was entitled to notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard
prior to the final approval of the subdivision). Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (no right of hearing exists in
-connection with an overall assessment increase applicable to all properties) with
Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (property owner has a con-
stitutional right to be heard in reference to an assessment levied against his par-
ticular property).
215 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
216 See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
217 In United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), the Court
stated that "[t]he term 'hearing' in its legal context undoubtedly has a host of
meanings. Its meaning undoubtedly will vary, depending on whether it is used
in the context of a rulemaking-type proceeding or in the context of a proceeding
devoted to the adjudication of particular disputed facts." Id. 239 (footnote
omitted).
218 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
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and subdivision approvals are often treated as legislative acts, even
though ultimate determination in these cases depends upon the
application of general policy to specific parcels. 219 Some states have
recently reappraised the legislative/quasi-judicial distinction, find-
ing governmental proceedings that result in the discretionary appli-
cation of general standards to particular parcels of property to be
quasi-judicial, even if the decision was reached in a legislative
forum.
2 20
Given that it may be difficult to know when a proceeding is
legislative or quasi-judicial, one needs to know whether the distinc-
tion is of constitutional dimensions. Again, however, the courts
appear divided. Whereas a majority of state courts regard a statu-
tory characterization or the absence of notice and hearing provisions
in enabling acts to be conclusive, 221 some courts have found the
,quasi-judicial label and the procedural protections that flow there-
from to be mandated by constitutional principle.
222
219 See Cunningham, supra note 214, at 130-31. The characterization of zoning
matters as legislative acts has traditionally prevented a court from mandating a
-particular use after a finding that the existing zoning classification is unreasonable,
arbitrary, and confiscatory. In Stilbell Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 54
A.D.2d 962, 3-o N.Y.S.2ud 64 (1976), the cot noted that a confiscatory zoning
ordinance should he replaced by an appropriate zoning classification determined by
the legislative body rather than the court. Accord Guhl v. Holcomb Bridge Rd.
Corp., 238 Ga. 322, 232 S.E.2d 830 (1977); Brunette v. County of McHenry,
-48 Ill. App. 3d 396, 363 N.E.2d 122 (1977). Contra Dade County v. Beau-
champ, 348 So. 2d 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). See generally 4 R. AN=EsoN,
-supra note 13, §28.10; Rosenzweig, From Euclid to Eastlake: Toward a Unified
Approach to Zoning Change Requests, 82 DicK. L. Rv. 59 (1977).
220 See, e.g., Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371
(1975) (en bane); Sabo v. Monroe Township, 394 Mich. 531, 232 N.W.2d 584
(1975); West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); Fasano
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973) (en bane);
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972) (en bane);
cf. Maricopa County Bd. of Supervisors v. Bell 51st Investors, 108 Ariz. 261,
495 P.2d 1315 (1972) (en bane) (Planning and Zoning Commission must hold
public hearings prior to recommending zoning changes). See generally Freilich,
Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County: Is Rezoning an
Administrative or Legislative Function?, 6 Urb. Law. vii (1974); Land Use,
Planning and Zoning, 8 UnB. LAw. 747, 780-83 (1976); Comment, supra note 57.
221 See Cunningham, supra note 214, at 131.
222 See, e.g., Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134,
156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979). One commentator has stated absolutely that "whether
rezoning a specific parcel of land is'an administrative decision which therefore re-
quires due process standards . . . is a matter of constitutional, not state, law."
Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HAnv. L. BEv. 1427, 1540 (1978) (footnote
omitted). In light of City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S.
668 (1976), this would appear to be an overstatement. The Court in Eastlake
relied on the Ohio Supreme Court's earlier discussion of the rezoning process to
determine that "the City Council's action in rezoning respondents eight acres ...
-was legislative in nature." Id. 673 (footnote omitted). The Court further sug-
gested that it was bound by this finding as an interpretation of state law. Id.
-674 n.9.
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(ii) The Nature of the Interest Threatened
Procedural due process requirements are often triggered when
the governmental proceeding threatens a substantial deprivation of
significant property rights. Knowing what deprivations are substan-
tial and what property rights are significant, however, is even more
difficult than determining the difference between a legislative and
quasi-judicial proceeding. As might be expected, the state courts
are again divided. California decisions appear to presume the
significance of property interests that are alleged to be deprived in
land use pleadings. 223 Other state courts have refused to afford no-
tice and hearing protections to neighbors when only aesthetic sensi-
bilities are offended or when the property deprivation is insubstan-
tial-that is, less than a taking.22
4
(iii) Judicial Evaluation of Neighbor Property Interests Under the
Existing System
The significance of the neighbor's property interest has always
troubled American courts in land use controversies, although courts
have seldom assessed the difficulty directly. Typically, courts face
one of two types of land use cases: those brought by landowners
challenging denials of development permission and those brought by
neighbors challenging grants of development permission. Court
review in the landowner-initiated case presents little problem: the
court balances the well-defined landowner interest against the com-
munity's interest in the public law or regulation, and the landowner
generally loses. 225  Court review in the neighbor-initiated case is
more problematic. The neighbor's interest is not well-defined;
hence, it is difficult for the court to know what to weigh against the
public law or regulation, which in this case favors, rather than
opposes, development. Consistency would seem to require that,
just as the landowner's individual property interest must give way to
the public policy against development in the landowner-initiated
2 23 See Horn, 24 Cal. 3d at 615, 596 P.2d at 1139, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
224 E.g., MeGrady v. Callaghan, 244 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 1978) (adjoining
landowners are not entitled to notice and hearing on the basis of an allegation of
aesthetic loss and possible damage to their land and wells resulting from the drill-
ing of a new surface mine on an adjoining property). See Cunningham, supra
note 214, at 131. English land use practice agrees with this view, limiting neigh-
bor challenges to a limited group of particularly unneighborly uses, such as.
slaughter houses and landfills. See Town and Country Planning Act, 1962, cl. 38,
§ 15.
2 See Krasnowiecki, PUD, supra note 78, at 66-69. On the Court's attempt-
to balance public and private interests generally in the area of zoning, see 1 R-
ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 3.23.
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cases, the neighbor's individual property interest must give way to
the expressed-public policy in favor of development in the neighbor-
initiated case.
The courts, however, have not been consistent. They show a
,definite proclivity for striking down prodevelopment public law and
regulation in the face of a neighbor challenge.2 26 Instead of seriously
evaluating the neighbor's interests when they conflict with com-
munity policy, the courts have chosen to test the validity of the
suspicious "antineighbor" public law or regulation against a few
simple litmus tests. Courts inquire, for example, whether the pro-
development public law or regulation constitutes spot zoning4 7 or
whether it carries out the community's comprehensive plan.28  Be-
cause these litmus tests assume that the only "good" development is
that which extends existing uses-that is, those currently made by
the neighbors-the courts are ultimately able to uphold the neigh-
bors' property interests without appearing totally to disregard the
public law or regulation. Regrettably, the litmus test application
fails to consider the significance of the neighbors' property interest.
<iv) Applying Due Process Concepts to the Alternative System
Within the context of the alternative system, the individual
property interests of neighbors are dealt with in a policymaking,
rather than a policy-applying, process. Specifically, the neighbor
is afforded an opportunity to advocate public policy that coincides
with his individual interests at legislative hearings held periodically
=s Professor Krasnowiecki comments:
[I]n the typical case, if the neighbor suffers loss, it will be . . . (1)
because his home is worth less if there is any residential development
next door; and (2) because in this development there are homes on smaller
lots or garden apartments bringing with them perhaps a different kind
of people. . . . [Ulnder our system of zoning, the competition in hous-
ing matters is weighted heavily in favor of the existing resident and
against the newcomer. What we are dealing with is an existing resident
who is seeking the help of the courts against the intrusion of additional
housing approved by his elected offcials.
Krasnowiecki, PUD, supra note 78, at 73.
Professor Anderson suggests that the burden of justifying a rezoning is on
the developer only in those jurisdictions that literally insist upon a proof of
change or mistake in support of a zoning amendment. 1 B. ANDmsox, supra
note 13, § 5.07. The cases cited by Anderson in which prodevelopment rezoning
is judicially reversed on the basis of a spot zoning theory or a claim that the zoning
is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan indicate, however, that in reality the
burden of justifying a prodevelopment rezoning is often on the developer. See,
e.g., Kuelne v. Town Council, 136 Conn. 452, 72 A.2d 474 (1950); Green v.
County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 340 A.2d 852 (De. Ch. 1974); Manley v.
4City of Maysville, 528 S.W.2d (Ky. 1975).
227 See generally 1 R. ANDERsoN, supra note 13, § 5.08.
228 See Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23
4 1973) (en bane).
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to determine the community's LUI policy. Because that LUI policy
is legislatively determined, constitutional doctrine premised on the
type of proceeding involved would not appear to mandate proce-
dural due process. 229 Nevertheless, because neighbor input at this
stage is considered important, notice and an opportunity to be heard
would be afforded neighbors expressely under the alternative sys-
tem's enabling legislation.
The alternative system does not encompass any governmental
proceeding of the traditional quasi-judicial type; thus, it might seem
as if the structure of the alternative system avoids this constitutional
issue. The negotiation of Public Improvement and Intensity Modi-
fication Contracts, however, involves the exercise of judgment and-
the careful balancing of conflicting interests, which are the hall-
marks of adjudication. These contractual negotiations may affect
individual property interests, and if the interests are significant and
substantially threatened, constitutional objections can be anticipated
if notice and an opportunity to be heard are not provided.
Because the landowner is a party to both negotiations, his inter-
ests are adequately protected. The alternative system, however,
excludes the neighbor from this part of the land use process on the
assumption that his interests will be well protected by market forces,
nuisance remedies, and LUCA's pervasive control of the public
improvements to be provided.
23 0
The question still remaining is whether the neighbors' indi-
vidual property interest may be constitutionally excluded from the
alternative system's analogue to the adjudicatory process. In those
jurisdictions that have presumed the significance of the neighbor's
property interest and the substantiality of the threatened invasion,
the answer is probably no. Most jurisdictions, however, have not
made this presumption, but have attempted to measure the signifi-
cance and degree to which the neighbor's interest may be harmed.
Some courts have found no due process implications when the neigh-
bor's aesthetic or more subjective values were offended or when
the threatened harm amounted to something less than a taking.
Using the taking standard as the point at which a neighbor is
entitled to constitutional procedural due process seems particularly
fair. Just as the landowner has no constitutional right to a con-
templated use so long as the existing use is economically viable, so-
too the neighbor should not be afforded constitutional relief, except
when the neighbor can demonstrate that the proposed development
229 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
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would make his property economically nonviable as that concept
has been defined in the Supreme Court's taking jurisprudence. 23'
Using the words of the existing system, a landowner generally has no
constitutionally vested right to anything more than the existing use
so long as that use is economically viable. The neighbor has no
greater vested right with regard to his own property interest, and no
vested right whatsoever with regard to the property rights of an
adjacent landowner, unless the adjacent landowner's proposed use
would deprive the neighbor of an economically viable use of his
land. Thus, because most neighbor claims are less signficant than
a taking and because the protection provided by the alternative sys-
tem should prevent substantial harms from occurring, the occasions
when neighbors are constitutionally required to have notice and an
opportunity to be heard would be rare.
3. Regulating Land Use Intensity
a. Limiting the Scope of Public Regulation
Zoning, and to a lesser extent subdivision regulation, finds its
basic justification in the police power. The criteria for valid police
power regulation are whether it promotes the health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of the community. Under the vague general
welfare banner, zoning has been used to stabilize property values,
promote homogeneity of development, control competition, pre-
serve landmarks and natural settings, refine a community's moral
and aesthetic values, control population density, and maintain a
community's tax base. This Article has contended that many of
these matters either should not, or need not, be the subject of public
regulation. Thus, the alternative system reflects a belief that it is
improper to regulate competition or to impose aesthetic or social
preferences, and that public regulation distorts, rather than stabi-
lizes, values.
b. Retaining Public Control of Overall Density
Fundamentally, the alternative system assumes that public
regulation should not define how land is to be used specifically, but
should instead articulate general standards which ensure that land
will be used-without regard to its specific use-in a manner that is
safe and healthful. From the land development standpoint, safety
and health issues relate to matters of population density and the
231 See supra notes 153-68 and accompanying text.
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,quantity and quality of public improvements. 2 2  The alternative
system articulates safety and health standards through the determi-
nation of the LUI schedule and the supervision and specification of
public improvements. Thus, the alternative system establishes a
general framework for guiding private development and a mechan-
ism for supplying complementary public improvement.
(i) Density Regulation Under the Existing System
Under the existing system, density is controlled in a multiplicity
of ways.283  For example, restrictions defining the minimum size of
lots, structures, height, and floor space are common.2 Density may
also be subtly regulated by restrictive definitions in zoning regula-
tions.235 An alternative measure of density that allows the developer
considerable freedom to design his structure is the Floor-Area Ratio
(FAR). FAR expresses the mathematical relationship between the
floor space permitted and the lot area. Thus, a FAR of 1 would
permit a one-story building on the entire lot, a two-story building
on one-half of the lot, a four-story building on a quarter of the lot,
and so forth.236
The FAR has been a favored device primarily because it ac-
curately predicts the intensity of use or traffic generated by a given
amount of floor space. Public improvement planning is greatly
aided so long as the actual physical development justified by
market conditions approximates the FAR permitted. Private de-
velopment is also more amenable to the FAR concept than to a
minimum lot size regulation. Minimum lot size is a crude, preset
control that applies without regard to the particular features of the
site. This produces a rather predictable and monotonous site plan.
2 32 See generally Deutsch, Capital Improvement Controls as Land Use Control
Devices, 9 ENvTL. L. 61 (1978).
2 3 3 D. MANDELR & R. CuNNcNHAm, supra note 22, at 653.
234 See generally 2 R. ANDFroN, supra note 13, §§ 8.05-.07; D. HAcMAN, supra
note 17, § 59.
235 The area of most dispute has concerned the definition of "family" in zoning
ordinances. Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) with
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Although the Supreme
Court has allowed restrictive definitions to affect the rights of unrelated individuals,
Ft has upheld the sanctity of the related (blood, marriage, or adoption) family.
In addition, by relying upon state constitutional guarantees of privacy, some state
courts have invalidated restrictive definitions of "family" that affect unrelated
individuals as well. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610
P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980). For a critical commentary of restrictive
zoning definitions in this area, see Note, "Burning the House to Roast the Pig":
Unrelated Individuals and Single Family Zoning's Blood Relation Criterion, 58
ConrLL L. Izv. 138 (1972).
236 1 N. Wxums, supra note 2, § 37.01, at 683.
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In contrast, a FAR control allows a landowner the freedom to de-
sign structures having features that are individually suited for the
site. Because the FAR concept states a more precise relationship
between floor space and lot area than a minimum lot size regulation,
a landowner is better able to maximize the number of units pro-
duced.237 This distinction between FAR and a minimum lot size
regulation is especially significant when the planned units are
moderately sized and intended for individuals of low or moderate
income.
(ii) The LUI System
Density would be regulated under the alternative system by the
land use intensity (LUI) system originally devised by the Federal
Housing Administration. 238 Under the LUI system, the FAR is
related to five other ratios, each expressing a ratio of some open
space use to total floor area. The open space ratio (OSR) is the
relationship between total floor space on a parcel and the total area
left open, including parking. The OSR is then divided into four
subtypes of open space: living space (open space other than parking),
recreational space (living space improved for recreation), total car
space (open space less living space), and occupant car space (total
car space less parking for nonresidents). For each of the four land
use schedules, the ratio of each of these open space ratios to FAR
can be fixed, and all six of the ratios expressed as a single number
or LUI rating. It is important to realize that the fixing of this
"ratio of ratios" is an expression of public policy-a decision, for
example, that a given floor area of residential use calls for a given
area of occupant parking, a given area of recreational use, and so
forth. The LUI rating will differ among uses simply because a
given FAR will generate different use densities in commercial and
residential use and, further, the different uses mandate different
23 7 For example, under a minimum lot area regulation, two lots of significantly
different size may net the same number of units because one lot just had the
minimum lot area required and the other was just a few square feet of lot area
short of an additional unit. This disparity would not exist under the FAR concept
because the number of units permitted with X square feet of lot area would be
either the same or just slightly more than the units permitted with a lot size of X-1
square feet.
2 38 FEDERAL HousiNG ADNumTsrxoN, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEvELOPmENT, FHA No. 2600, MNIMum PROPERTr STANDARWS FOR MuLrI-FAMU[y
Housmc 33-65, 477-85 (1963); FEDmAL HousiNg ADMINISTRATiON, LAND PLAN-
NING BurLzn No. 7, LAND-UsE INTENsrTy (1965); see also Bair, How to
Regulate Planned Unit Developments for Housing-Summary of a Regulatory Ap-
proach, 17 Zotzmc Die. 185, 221 (1965); Hanke, Planned Unit Development and
Land Use Intensity, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (1965).
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allocations of open space.239 In addition, a community may decide
that certain of the ratios are inapplicable to commercial and in-
dustrial projects. For example, the occupant car and recreational
space ratios would likely be excluded for commercial and industrial
projects without residential elements. It can be assumed that the
LUI ratings will reflect successful existing projects as well as the
community's conception of normal or adequate development.
(iii) Application of the LUI System to the Alternative System
Under the alternative system, the local legislative body, with
extensive public participation, will devise periodically four separate
schedules of available LUI ratings.240  These schedules will apply
to residential, commercial, industrial, or mixed-use projects. The
LUI schedules will not apply to a limited number of uses that his-
torically have been treated as special exceptions because of their
unusual character-for example, airports and churches. These uses
will continue to be treated as special exceptions. 241
Within the context of the mixed-use schedule, a community
may desire to set some limit on the quantity of land available for
commercial or industrial development in relation to the proposed
239 The necessity for adjusting the FAR across uses is noted in 1 N. Wa.m s,
supra note 2, § 37.01, at 685 & n.3.
-240The legislative body of the community will also determine a minimum
parcel or project size for LUI selection. For example, a community may decide
that only landowners with parcels of 10 acres or more may make selections. Once
the selection is made, of course, the landowner may subdivide the land into smaller
parcels or lots for sale rather than development. In that event, the buyers of the
smaller lots subsequently would be able to develop the property in any manner
consistent with both the original LUI selection and the public improvements in-
stalled by the original landowner at the time of LUI selection.
A minimum parcel size for LUI selection parallels similar restrictions placed
upon the Planned Unit Development under the existing system. See supra notes
95-101 and accompanying text. The minimum parcel size should encourage
"project" rather than lot-by-lot development, thereby benefiting the community in
terms of utility and public service planning and the developer by reason of the
marketing advantages and economies of scale inherent in the larger project. In
addition, establishing a minimum should reduce administrative costs.
The administrative costs of the alternative system can also be reduced by
exempting auxiliary residential construction associated with the agricultural/open
space classification from the rating selection process. See, e.g., Co-N. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-18 (Supp. 1981) (the subdivision control enabling statute, which excludes
"development for municipal, conservation or agricultural purposes" from the defini-
tion of "subdivision").
241 Included within this special exception category would be particularly noxious
or unneighborly uses, such as landfills and slaughter houses. See supra note 224 and
accompanying text. The special exception mechanism would not be used to permit
the location of "convenience" commercial uses in residentially zoned areas, as is
done under conventional zoning. Thus there would be no public control of the
location of gas stations, convenience markets, or laundromats. For a discussion of




residential development and the overall size of the site.242  For
example, if a mixed residential-commercial development contains in
excess of one hundred dwellings, then 25,000 square feet of com-
mercial space may be provided, either separate from, or as part of,
the residential structures. Presumably, the exact quantity of each
use permitted within the context of a mixed use project will reflect
the community's assessment of its relative need for housing or em-
ployment or both. The quantity will also reveal how vigorously it
desires to pursue a land use policy that forgoes the sanctity of the
zoning district in favor of a land use policy that recognizes that
separating the work force from its place of residence is not only
poor energy planning, but also in many cases unnecessary from a
health or safety standpoint.
As previously mentioned, the LUI schedules form the basis of
the community's land use policy. From any of these schedules, a
landowner may select an LUI rating just prior to development.
Thus, a private decision, not public control, determines what type
of use will be made and where the use will be located. Based upon
Professor Siegan's extensive studies of Houston, the only major
nonzoned city in the United States, it appears that private decision-
makers, motivated by market forces, will make type and location
decisions quite rationally. Indeed, Siegan's work tends to confirm
what one might have suspected: the separation induced by zoning
merely mirrors market choices.2 3 In this regard, heavy industry
tends to locate near water and transportation resources because they
are essential to its productive capacity, not because the zoning map
has placed that location within the industrial classification. 244
This is not meant to suggest that private decisions will always
result in the "correct" choice or location of use. Imperfect knowl-
edge or incentives may result in harmful externalities if land use
decisions are made on a totally laissez faire basis. 245 Harmful ex-
242 See, e.g., ZoNeN On ion.c oF F mDmucx COUNTY, M'Ai.L § 40-23
(d)(3) (adopted 1964), reprinted in Hanke, supra note 238, at 31-34.
2 4 3 See B. SrrG=A, supra note 20, at 75.
244 If the zoning map fails to correspond with market factors, one of two re-
sponses can be expected: if the cost of amending the community's public controls
is perceived by developers as less than the cost of locating at other suitably zoned
property in another community, the amendment will be pursued; if the cost of
amendment exceeds the cost of relocation, relocation will be pursued. Either way,
economic resources have not been maximized, because public control has siphoned
resources from productive to adaptive behavior.
245 Economists refer to this as the divergence between social and private cost.
'These costs may diverge "when firms use resources they do not regard as scarce,
when the best alternative use of a resource is not the same for a firm and for
society, and when there is no market by which the firm can be reimbursed for
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ternalities would be most likely to surface where land is not clearly
suitable for any particular use-that is, where land is equally suitable
for any one or more of a number of uses. This possibility, however,
does not justify highly-collectivized public control.2 48
The alternative system recognizes that some private decisions,
may result in harmful externalities, and that some public control
may therefore be justified. It must, however, be carefully structured
to protect individual liberty and to create greater economic effi-
ciency by minimizing needless prevention and administrative costs.
The LUI system meets these requirements. What constitutes a
harmful externality is largely defined by a community's conception
of normalcy. The alternative system assumes that the community
will translate its normalcy standard into the LUI rating schedules.
247
Because normalcy standards may change over time, as community
demographics change or housing and employment needs are ful-
filled, the alternative system provides for the revision of the LUI
rating schedule periodically.
(iv) Landowner Freedom and Influences Thereon
Beyond the initial collectivized statement of normalcy (in the
form of an overall limit on density), the alternative system favors
individual freedom and less collectivized methods of control. For
example, the individual landowner selects the type and location of
use. In addition, the landowner determines, in reference to market
demand, unit size and building and site design. This freedom opens
up possibilities for architectural competition and supplies flexibility
to meet changing consumer preferences for units of different sizes.
benefits a different policy might yield." R. LIPSEY & P. STEimN, ECONOMICS 220
(2d ed. 1969).
246 Highly collectivized public control also may fail to maximize economic re-
sources. This is especially true when the public control is premised upon rigid
zone segregation and the unrealistic desire to eliminate every conceivable harmful
externality, a desire which disregards the basic economic principle of diminishing
returns. Moreover, a highly collectivized public control is antithetical to individual
freedom and the concept of property which historically has been used to uphold
personal liberty. See generally B. AcxEnmR, supra note 40; A. JoNxs, L=rx,
LmImTy AND PROPERTY: A STny OF CONrsUCT AND A MEASUREMsNr OF CO.-
rucmr, Racmrs" (1964); Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property, 51 S.
CAL. L. BEy. 355 (1978); Henely, Property Rights and First Amendment Rights:
Balance and Conflict, 62 A.B.AJ. 77 (1976); Horwitz, The Transformation in the
Conception of Property in American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 248
(1973); Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15
HAsmINs LJ. 135 (1963); Stone, Law, Property, and Liberty: A Polemic That
Fails, 42 Am. J. OnRmopsycH. 627 (1972).
247These schedules will express the community norms as to desired density
and rate of growth of the community. The community's conception of normalcy
will also enter into adjudications of nuisance suits between neighboring landowners.
See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 130:28
DEREGULATING LAND USE
Overarching existing market forces are three other major in-
fluences on a landowner's "free" choice of use, location, and design.
In their order of increasing collectivity, the three major influences
are: nuisance law, development contracts, and the public control
over public improvements. The general deterrence of common law
nuisance standards has already been discussed in reference to neigh-
bor participation. 248 Public control over public improvements will
be considered later in conjunction with the unearned increment/
revenue device that will be used to fund public improvementsY.4
Thus, our next concern will focus on the nature, influence, and
constitutionality of development contracts.
4. Public Improvement and Intensity Modification Contracts
a. Judicial Hostility to Bargaining Under the Existing System
Although private-public bargaining has always been an implicit
part of the land use process, 250 it has been treated with some dis-
taste.251 This dislike of bargaining can be traced to the fear that
2 4 8 See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
249 See infra notes 30447 and accompanying text.
2 50 One commentator has remarked:
[Mlany jurisdictions use techniques which make development "as of right"
a rare event. Almost every development comes under the specific review
and approval of the local agency. We already have, in effect, an ad hoe
development-permission system. This de facto permit system provides
"the discrete institutional acts onto which a system of selling development
permission can be grafted." Furthermore, . . .in "exchange" for these
permits, government is now imposing substantial exactions, fees in lieu
thereof and taxes, suggesting that we may already be selling development
permission.
Glickfeld, Sale of Development Permission: Zoning on the Auction Block, in
WhmDFALrs FOrt WnEotrrs 376, 377 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Wexler, Betterment Recovery: A Financial Proposal for
Sounder Land Use Planning, 3 YAI.L REv. L. & Soc. AcnoN 192 (1973)). In this
regard, the real debate is no longer whether land use decisions should be the subject
of bargaining, but whether the bargaining should go on overtly or under the guise
of mechanisms that appear to preserve the self-administering nature of the zoning
ordinance. For a proposal to sell zoning overtly, see Clawson,. Why Not Sell Zoning
and Rezoning? (legally, that is), Cay CAL., Winter 1966-67, at 9.
251 The English have been more adroit in developing bargaining mechanisms
that allow public and private parties to enter into an agreement with respect to
the use and development of land, and that often contain other provisions requiring
the private party to confer some benefit upon either the public authority or the
community-at-large. See English Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, ch. 78,
§ 52(1); Grant, Developers' Contributions and Planning Gains: Ethics and Le-
galities, 1978 J. PLAN. & ENvTh. L. 8; JowL, The Limits of Law in Urban
Planning, 30 CumumT LEGAL PNoBs. 63 (1977).
California has recently passed a statute governing development agreements,
CAL. o'T CoDE § 65864-65869.5 (West Supp. 1980), which is at least partially
intended as a means for exacting infrastructure and other public improvements
from a private developer which might, under the conventional zoning and sub-
division control, be impossible to obtain. For a discussion of the California devel-
19811
100 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
encouraging the practice would heighten the possibility of corrup-
tion, thereby adding credence to the commonly held belief that a
favorable zoning decision results more from who you know than the
merits of a given proposal.
Judicial wariness of bargaining under the existing system has
surfaced most frequently in the context of agreements that accom-
pany zone amendments. Courts may invalidate an amendment by
denominating the practice as impermissible contract zoning.25 2  In
this regard, some courts have held that contract zoning is invalid
per se on the grounds that it contracts away the police power, lacks
uniformity, constitutes spot zoning, or violates a community's com-
prehensive plan.253 Other courts find this categorical condemnation
to be unwarranted, suggesting instead that contract zoning be re-
viewed for these infirmities like any other rezoning petition. 5 4 Of
course, when there is clear evidence that the rezoning was "bought,"
it will be struck down as an abuse of the police power in derogation
of the existing enabling legislation.
25 5
opment agreement, see Holliman, Development Agreements and Vested Rights in
California, 13 URn. LAw. 44 (1981).
It has been noted:
An auction or negotiated sale of development permission is unlikely
to be acceptable in the U.S. in the near future. This is due to the
combination of . . . high transition costs, the problems of combining a
revenue-raising device and a regulatory device into one, the problems of
valuation, the potential special problems of inequity between large and
small developers, poor and rich cities, and, finally, problems of planning
and quality control. However, perhaps the biggest constraint to acceptance
of such a system is the change in philosophy which it requires. For
as much as one can demonstrate how similar sale of development per-
mission is to current practice, it is still different and somewhat repugnant
philosophically, especially to planners and courts.
Clickfeld, supra note 250, at 393.
252 See generally Note, Contract and Conditional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning
Flexibility, 23 HAsT NGs L.J. 825 (1972).
20 See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956) (en bane); Baylis
v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959); Houston Petroleum
Co. v. Automotive Products Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319 (1952).
254 See, e.g., Cross v. Hall County, 238 Ca. 709, 235 S.E.2d 379 (1977).
Even in a per se jurisdiction, a court will sometimes characterize the agreement-
as something other than contract zoning and examine it under a less severe stand-
ard. See, e.g., Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79
Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969) (conditional zoning imposed for benefit of neighboring
community is valid); Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. City of Newton, 344
Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962) ("voluntary" adoption of restrictions by
landowner induced "willingness" of city to amend zoning ordinance); State ex-
rel. Zupancie v. Sclimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970) (contract be-
tween homeowners and developer, to which city is a third party beneficiary, is
valid).
255 See Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 112 Ill. App. 2d 68, 250 N.E.2d 791
(1969) (developer, in exchange for a rezoning, optioned land for a golf course,
found a bond purchaser, and made certain donations to the government); see also-
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In contrast, a number of courts have been more sympathetic to
zoning-related bargains. These courts use the more favorable term
"conditional zoning" to describe the transaction.25G It is often diffi-
cult to discern what accounts for the more favorable treatment
accorded the bargained-for elements by these courts. It is sometimes
stated that conditional zoning is valid because under such zoning
only the landowner is bound, whereas under contract zoning both
the community and landowner are subject to an agreement. This
statement, however, is more conclusory than analytical. 257  Never-
theless, the existence of an agreement, if it is a contract, may bind
the legislature only to approve the initial zoning amendment; it
may not bind the legislature not to change its mind, at least until
certain other events occur such as substantial landowner reliance
in good faith upon a valid building permit 258 or binding prelimi-
nary site plan approval.259
In part, the greater acceptability of conditional zoning may
result from the express or implied authority of enabling legisla-
tion.260 In other cases, however, the difference in treatment appears
more substantive insofar as the bargained-for element is upheld
because it is directly related to the fulfillment of public needs that
will be generated by the rezoning.261 For example, where a large
Andres v. Village of Flossmoor, 15 Iil. App. 3d 655, 304 N.E.2d 700 (1973)
(condition on rezoning requiring developer to pay $1000 per building for general
village purposes held invalid).
256 See, e.g., Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass.
428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962); Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d
680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
2 57 See M. MESHENBERG, THE AnMImNSTnA-nON oF FL=rB ZoNnG T=cH-
NIQUES 36 (American Society of Planning Officials, Planning Advisory Service Re-
port No. 318, 1975).
258 See, e.g., Andgar Assoc., Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 30 A.D.2d 672,
291 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1968).
259 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-49 (West Supp. 1981). But see
supra note 133 (citing sources). See generally Krasnowieeki, Abolish Zoning, 31
SYRmcusE L. REv. 719, 738 (1980).
260 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-24-4.1 (1980), which provides:
Tihe town or city council may in approving a zone change limit such
change to one (1) of the permitted uses in the zone to which the sub-
ject land is rezoned, and impose such limitations and conditions upon
the use of land as it deems necessary. The responsible town or city
official shall cause the limitations and conditions so imposed to be clearly
noted on the zoning map.
This provision was upheld in Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 117 R.I. 134,
364 A.2d 1277 (1976).
2 6 1 In Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 872 (1969), the California Court of Appeal stated:
[Clonditions imposed on the grant of land use applications are valid if
reasonably conceived to fulfill public needs emanating from the land-
owner's proposed use.
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shopping center project requires that an arterial road be redesigned,
widened, or signaled, such burdens appropriately may be placed on
the developer rather than the public at large.
b. Bargained-For Land Use Control Under the Alternative System
The alternative system involves bargaining at two junctures:
first, the public improvements to be provided by the developer will
be incorporated into a Public Improvement Contract; second, an
increase or decrease from the LUI selected by the landowner can
only be accomplished pursuant to an Intensity Modification
Contract.
262
For the most part, the arguments made against contract zoning
seem inapposite to the contract devices of the alternative system.
Because zoning itself has been eliminated, neither contract can con-
stitute spot zoning. Similarly, because the comprehensive planning
requirement found in existing enabling legislation will not be in-
corporated into the enabling legislation for the alternative system,
this objection also becomes irrelevant.
(i) Corrupt Behavior
The bargaining envisioned under the alternative system should
not encourage corrupt behavior. The alternative system obligates
the developer to provide all public improvements up to the objec-
tively determined value of the unearned increment,26 3 and any part
of the unearned increment not used for public improvement is re-
tained by the community. Thus, the landowner has little reason to
"bribe" members of the LUCA staff for favorable treatment. Ef-
fectively, the Public Improvement Contract merely confirms the
landowner's statutory obligation and translates that obligation into
The California decisions illustrate two kinds of need: the com-
munity's protection against potentially deleterious effects of the land-
owner's proposal . . . and the community's need for facilities to meet
public service demands created by the proposal . . . While decisions
invalidating the exaction rely upon theories of constitutional invasion, their
springboard is the lack of relationship between the exaction and the pro-
posed use ....
Id. at 421-22, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (citations omitted).
262 Se supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
263 Of course, it is possible that the cost of the public improvements required
will exceed the value of the unearned increment. In that event, the community
would fund the excess public improvement cost from the general property tax,
unless it could demonstrate that the excess was due to improvements historically
financed by special assessment. This should promote historical equity among land-
owners. See infra note 310. In addition, placing an absolute limitation on the
developer's obligation provides certainty and encourages the community to be




the specific public improvements required with respect to the land-
owner's project. Moreover, because the unearned increment is
determined separately and in advance of the Public Improvement
Contract,26 it is unlikely that any corrupt motivations of either the
landowner or the LUCA staff would infect the valuation of the un-
earned increment or the extent of the landowner's public improve-
ment obligation.
Intensity Modification Contracts, as the analogue to the amend-
ment or variance device under the existing system, may provide an
opportunity for corrupt behavior. In most cases, however, the land-
owner initially will have selected the LUI rating most advantageous
to his project and will not need any modification. If LUCA initiates
the negotiations, a corrupt official could offer to reduce the land-
owner's public improvement obligation in exchange for nominal
control over building design and a personal "kickback." To this
extent, the alternative system, like any system that provides for
official discretion, is subject to possible corruption. Eliminating the
discretion will substantially eliminate the opportunity for corrupt
behavior, but will also eliminate the system's flexibility.
The alternative system has limited the chances of corrupt
activity, not by reducing flexibility, but by giving the flexibility to
the landowner. Use, location, and design are now within the land-
owner's-not a government official's-discretion. Some official dis-
cretion does remain in the negotiation of Public Improvement and
Intensity Modification Contracts. Theoretically, this discretion also
could be eliminated either by making the development process
totally laissez faire or by mandating in advance public improvement
requirements for all projects and providing no mechanism for
modification of an intensity level once it has been selected by a
landowner. Neither of these choices is acceptable. If neighbor
participation is to be reduced, some mechanism for ensuring that
harmful externalities are generally prevented-before they become
a nuisance or endanger health and safety-must exist. Public con-
trol of public improvements is that preventive device. Preestab-
lished requirements for public improvements would be unaccepta-
2 64 The amount available for public improvement from the developer is a
function of the land use intensity rating voluntarily chosen by the developer. The
LUI rating is chosen in advance of any public determination of the public im-
provements required by the developer's project. Thus, unlike the existing system
in which public officials may require dedications and exactions as a condition
precedent to the desired rezoning, the alternative system immunizes the zoning
(intensity) decision from public abuse of discretion by making it a totally private
decision. Moreover, because the total unearned increment is paid to the com-
munity whether it is spent on public improvement or not, public officials should
have no incentive to increase the public improvement expense arbitrarily..
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ble, and very likely inefficient, by imposing either too much or too
little control on any given project.26 5
Whether or not an intensity modification device must be part
of the alternative system is a closer question. One might want to
impress upon the local legislative body the significance of the in-
tensity schedules by not providing for changes except at regular
intervals. Because of the flexibility afforded to the landowner by
the alternative system, few landowners would likely object to the
omission of the intensity modification device. Omission of the de-
vice, however, effectively would eliminate any possibility of ongoing
public control over private improvements. Such an omission would
stand in stark contrast to the increasing level of public control under
the existing system 266 and would eliminate flexibility on LUCA's
part to deal with the special public needs that a particular project
might generate. Moreover, the omission arguably is unjustified on
more general policy grounds. Although this Article has demon-
strated that prestated public controls tend to be unfair, inefficient,
and inflexible, there is some reason to believe, based upon the PUD
experience under the existing system, that sensitive public input or
control of individual projects would be valuable. Because the
public control contemplated by the alternative system could only
occur pursuant to a bargained-for contract with the landowner, the
chances of public control being wielded arbitrarily or insensitively
are remote. In addition, the Intensity Modification Contract affords
public decisionmakers a method of directly influencing private de-
velopment without public purchase of the fee or other interest.
For all of the above reasons, both contract devices are incorpo-
rated into the alternative system, notwithstanding the fact that the
discretion inherent in contract negotiation may be abused by an
improperly motivated official or landowner. An attempt has been
made to limit the number of opportunities for corrupt behavior by
requiring that both contracts be made matters of public record.
Beyond this, it is hoped that LUCA's internal monitoring and
2 6 5 For a discussion of specification standards, see supra note 71.
266 The increasing level of public control is exemplified not only by the in-
creased number of specialized land use or environmental regulations, but also by
the type of regulation. The increased use of special exceptions, floating zones,
conditional zoning, and site plan review all illustrate the trend toward particular-
ized land use restrictions. The site plan provisions of the existing system gener-
ally require a developer to illustrate the proposed layout of buildings and open
space, including parking areas, and the provisions for access to and from the
public street system. "[Miany zoning ordinances require site plan reviews as a
prerequisite to most forms of new land development except the construction of
one- or two-family houses on single lots." D. MANDEL=E & R. CtsuNmcAm, supra
note 22, at 738.
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management control, together with the criminal process, would
adequately deter corruption.
(ii) Improper Contracting Away of the Police Power
Perhaps the most serious objection to contractual land use
agreements is that they constitute the improper contracting away of
the police power. This objection concerns the limitations placed on
a state's exercise of its police power by the federal contract clause
prohibiting the impairment of obligations,2 67 or what has become
known as the reserved power doctrine.
268
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
utilized the contract clause to invalidate legislation that impaired
private property rights.&2 69 The contract clause was used to restrict a
state's ability to modify or repeal public, as well as private, contracts.
Beginning with the term of Chief Justice Taney, however, the Court
began narrowing the applicability of the clause. With reference to
public obligations in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,270 for
example, the Court refused to find that the public charter of the
Charles River Bridge Company was impaired by a later charter to
the Warren Bridge Company. Effectively, the Court was able to
avoid finding an impairment by narrowly construing the first charter
as nonexclusive and by strictly construing the public contract in
favor of the government's freedom to act. Similarly, it was the
Taney Court that first enunciated the reserved power principle-
that certain powers, such as the police power or the power of emi-
nent domain, could not be made the subject of contract. The Court
267 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, el. 1 provides in relevant part: "No State shall
... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ... -
266The reserved power doctrine can be traced to a decision of the New York
Supreme Court in 1826. Corporation of the Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor
of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826). In Brick Presbyterian, the plain-
tiffs had entered into a lease with the city in 1766 providing that certain property
could be used as a cemetery. Subsequently in 1823, the city passed an ordinance
prohibiting the use of the premises as a cemetery, and the plaintiff brought suit
alleging a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment under the lease. In finding
for the city, the court stated that the legislative body had no authority to enter into
a contract "which should control or embarrass their legislative powers and duties."
Id. 540. The principle enunciated in Brick Presbyterian became known as the
reserved power doctrine when it was adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848), in which the
court found a legislative promise in a corporate charter not to exercise the power
of eminent domain to be unenforceable because the legislature never had the power
to convey away the power of eminent domain.
2 69 See J. NowAx, R. ROToNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 80, at 424. For an
insightful discussion of the importance of the contract clause, see B. SmGAN,
EcoNo uc LIBERTIES AND T CONSTrUTON (1980).
270 36 U.S. ( IIPet.) 420 (1837).
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reiterated this opinion thirty years later in Stone v. Mississippi.27'
That decision upheld the state repeal of a previously granted public
charter to establish a lottery business with the terse statement that
"the legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a State." 272
Ultimately in 1965, the Supreme Court upheld legislation which
abrogated a state's obligation under certain land contracts, simply
noting that the land purchaser's rights or expectations under the
contract were matters left unprotected by the Constitution.273
In the context of a state exercise of police powers affecting
private contracts, the Court in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell,274  fashioned a reasonableness analysis, focusing on
"whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the
measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end." 275
The Blaisdell Court upheld a Minnesota law, enacted during the
depression, which gave state courts the authority to extend the re-
demption period after a foreclosure sale. In light of the national
economic emergency and the fact that the legislation protected the
residual value of the mortgagee's claim, the Court found the law and
the resulting contractual impairment to be reasonably related to a
valid public purpose. Although Blaisdell can be seen as part of the
Supreme Court's narrowing of the contract clause generally, its
private' contract context must be borne in mind. Decisions con-
temporaneous with Blaisdell,2 76 as well as the Court's recent treat-
ment of the contract clause, reveal that the absence of the state's
self-interest invites less judicial scrutiny of state legislation.
With legislative impairments of both public and private con-
tracts being readily sustained, it certainly seemed as if the contract
clause retained little, if any, viability. The state could always de-
fend itself against an impairment claim by asserting either (1) that
the contract was itself invalid as an improper delegation of the
police power or (2) that the impairment, even assuming the con-
tract's validity, was reasonable and rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. Under the alternative system, these defenses might
be urged upon a state by neighbors seeking to intervene in the
271 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
272 Id. 817.
273 City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 509 (1965).
274 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
275 Id. 438.
276 See W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935) (statutes dimin-
ishing the remedies available on municipal bonds held invalid under contract clause);
W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (statute exempting insurance
funds from judicial process held invalid under contract clause).
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policy application associated with Public Improvement and Inten-
sity Modification Contracts.
At least that was the situation when the Court decided United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey 277 in 1977. In U.S. Trust, the con-
tract consisted of a covenant between the States of New York and.
New Jersey and bondholders of the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey which restricted the use of Port Authority revenue.
The New Jersey and New York legislatures repealed the covenant in
order to subsidize a failing metropolitan commuter rail system. The
Court invalidated the repeal as an unconstitutional impairment of
contract.
The Court did not ignore the reserved power doctrine in U.S.
Trust; however, the Court refused to be as categorical as its earlier
opinions seemed to be. Specifically, the Court appears to state that
a contract is not invalid ab initio merely because its subject is that
of the police power.278  Rather, the relevant inquiry becomes
whether the agreement results in the contracting away of an essential
attribute of sovereignty.
Two elements of the U.S. Trust decision require that any
analysis of the decision be tentative. As might be expected, the
Court left for another day the determination of what attributes of
sovereignty are essential. Thus, if it turns out that the police power
is always essential and the taxing or spending powers are not, the
Court's language merely disguises, but does not alter, the previous
formalism. Equally ambiguous is the fact that the Court's entire
discussion of the reserved power question as it relates to the police
power was dicta insofar as the dispute at issue presented an exercise
of the spending power, 279 which has long been held to be a permissi-
ble subject of contract.280
277 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
278 Speaking for the Court in U.S. Trust, Justice Blackmun states:
In deciding whether a State's contract was invalid ab initio under the
reserved-powers doctrine, earlier decisions relied on distinctions among
the various powers of the State. Thus, the police power and the power
of eminent domain were among those that could not be "contracted away,"
but the State could bind itself in the future exercise of the taxing and
spending powers. Such formalistic distinctions perhaps cannot be dis-
positive, but they contain an important element of truth.
1& 23-24 (footnote omitted).
2 79 In the words of the Court, "Etihe instant case involves a financial obligation
and thus as a threshold matter may not be said automatically to fall within the
reserved powers that cannot be contracted away." Id. 24-25 (footnote omitted).
280New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); see also W.B.
Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278
(1882).
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Arguably, U.S. Trust should be read as applying to the police
power. This should be the case if for no other reason than to carry
out the Court's desire to eliminate the formalism that the Court im-
plied may have been dispositive in some of the Court's earlier deci-
sions. Formalism should be avoided because, in an appropriate
,case, either the spending or police power could constitute an essential
attribute of sovereignty. For example, in the U.S. Trust case, the
ability or inability of the state to apply Port Authority revenue to
the deficit-ridden rail system certainly had great bearing on the
ability of the state to solve the area's mass transit problems. To
obscure that fact by categorizing the contract as being financial or
police power in nature seems highly artificial and detrimental to a
clear determination of what is, in fact, essential to sovereignty.
Thus, it can be argued that no classification of state power need be
undertaken and that essential attributes of sovereignty are ade-
quately preserved by the test the Court applied to determine when
the state should be allowed to impair a contract.
The test enunciated by the Court in U.S. Trust preserves essen-
tial attributes of sovereignty not by invalidating contracts with re-
spect to certain state powers, but rather by allowing such contracts,
subject to impairment when reasonable and necessary.28 1 It is sug-
gested here that adding the requirement that impairments be not
only reasonable, as earlier established under Blaisdell, but also neces-
sary ("reasonableness-plus") is the device chosen by the Court to
avoid formalistic distinctions between state powers. The Court's
opinion provides little guidance on how deferential the judiciary
should be to the legislative judgment under the reasonableness-plus
standard. Nevertheless, the opinion does suggest that "complete
deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness" is inappropri-
ate, especially when the impairment affects a public contract and
"the State's self-interest is at stake." 282
Based upon this analysis, a court should require that an impair-
ment meet the reasonableness-plus standard whenever a state seeks
2 8 1 The Court in U.S. Trust states: "We can only sustain the repeal of the 1962
covenant if the impairment was both reasonable and necessary to serve the ad-
mittedly important purposes claimed by the State." 431 U.S. at 29. Whether this
is the test the court will apply to all governmental powers, or just the state's financial
powers, is left somewhat unclear by the Court's opinion. See supra note 278 and
accompanying text.
282 431 U.S. at 26.
The Court does go on to discuss the reasonableness of the legislative repeal
of the covenant "in light of the surrounding circumstances." Id. 31. That dis-
cussion focuses on the foreseeability of the need for improved mass transit services
at the time that the original covenant was entered into, id. 31-32; see id. 32
(Burger, C.J., concurring), so that foreseeability is at least one factor to be con-
sidered when determining the reasonableness of a legislative action.
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to modify or repeal its own obligations,283 regardless of the powers to
which they relate. That the heightened judicial scrutiny of the
reasonableness-plus standard is intended to extend to all state obliga-
tions and all state powers is revealed by the Court's discussion of
how the necessity element of that standard may be fulfilled. Speci-
fically, the state must show that the impairment is "necessary" to
serve an important public purpose or to secure an essential attribute
*of sovereignty. Thus, the purpose or value of the reasonableness-
plus standard enunciated in U.S. Trust to private parties is twofold:
it provides greater assurance to those contracting with the state by
defining the circumstances when an impairment is justified and it
-enlarges the scope of permissible state obligations to include police
power subjects.
284
In applying the reasonableness-plus standard, the Court will
scrutinize the legislative action to determine whether it is the least
intrusive alternative. In U.S. Trust, the Court determined that less
drastic alternatives to the repeal of the bond covenant would have
.advanced the state's interest in "[m]ass transportation, energy con-
servation, and environmental protection." 285 Moreover, the Court
distinguished the repeal of the covenant in U.S. Trust from previous
-decisions of the Court in which the surrounding circumstances sug-
.gested that the state did not foresee certain events at the time it
entered into the contract. 2 6 In this regard, the Court observed that
the need for mass transportation was well-known at the time the
,covenant was entered into by the state and that "[i]ndeed, the coven-
ant was specifically intended to protect the pledged revenues . . .
283 As the Court later commented in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,
438 U.S. 234 (1978) (invalidating a state pension reform law that impaired the
-pre-existing pension plan obligations of a private employer): "[I]mpairments of a
..State's own contracts would face more stringent examination under the Contract
Clause than would laws regulating contractual relationships between private
-parties . . . .' Id. 244 n.15 (citation omitted). When legislation impairs the
rights and responsibilities of two private contracting parties, the Court analyzes the
impairment from the standpoint of reasonableness.
284 Of course, the ambiguity surrounding the Court's disavowal of the formal-
istic categorization of state powers tempers this conclusion. If the Court continues
the formalism of earlier decisions, then presumably the necessity element relates
,-only to the state's burden in justifying the impairment.
285 431 U.S. at 28-30.
286 The Court stated:
[I]n the instant case the need for mass transportation in the New York
metropolitan area was not a new development, and the likelihood that
publicly owned commuter railroads would produce substantial deficits was
well known. As early as 1922, over a half century ago, there were pres-
sures to involve the Port Authority in mass transit. It was with full
knowledge of these concerns that the 1962 covenant was adopted.
3d. 31-32.
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against the possibility that such concerns would lead the Port Au-
thority into greater involvement in deficit mass transit." 287
Significantly, the Court has not confined the U.S. Trust analysis
to public contracts. In Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,288
decided during the Term following U.S. Trust, the Court invali-
dated a Minnesota statute which required employers of more than
100 employees, at least one of whom lived in Minnesota, to pay a
"pension funding charge" if they provided certain pension benefits
to their employees, and if they either closed an office or plant in
Minnesota or discontinued their pension plan. The charge was in
an amount sufficient to provide full pensions for all employees cut
off from pension benefits who had accumulated ten years of service
with the company; periods prior to the passage of the act were to be
counted towards the ten year period. The Court found an impair-
ment of the contract between employer and employee and, applying
the U.S. Trust analysis, held it to violate the contract clause.
Spannaus is noteworthy because it seems to blur any distinction
between public and private contracts for purposes of contract clause
analysis. The absence of the state's self-interest may ultimately lead
the court to defer to legislative judgment with regard to the issues
of reasonableness and necessity when the state seeks to impair a
private-rather than a public-contract; 289 nevertheless, Spannaus
suggests that the regulatory powers of the state will be limited by
the contract clause whether or not a financial obligation of the state
is involved. In the Court's words, "[i]f the Contract Clause is to
retain any meaning at all, . . . it must be understood to impose
some limits upon the power of a State to abridge existing contractual
relationships, even in the exercise of its otherwise legitimate police
power.290  Thus, recent Supreme Court decisions appear to lend
support to the contractual regulation implicit in the alternative
system.
The contractual basis of the alternative system also finds sup-
port in state case law. For example, the contract involved in Sonoma
County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma 29 1
was a wage agreement between various cities and counties and a
labor organization representing public employees. The alleged im-
pairment occurred when the state legislature, as part of its distribu-
287 Id. 32.
288 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
2 89 This argument was made by Justice Brennan in dissent. Id. 251.
290 Id. 242 (emphasis in original).
20123 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979) (en bane).
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tion of state surplus funds to local government bodies, invalidated
any wage agreement that called for a cost of living increase in excess
,of that allowed for state employees. While admittedly the initial
-wage agreement may be characterized as an exercise of the spending
-power, the California Supreme Court engaged in none of the formal-
ism implicitly disfavored by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. Trust.
Instead, the California court, expressly looking to U.S. Trust for
-guidance, first determined the severity of the impairment; finding it
severe, the court then considered whether the impairment was
reasonable and necessary to an important public purpose. Recog-
nizing that complete deference to the legislative assessment of
reasonableness and necessity was not appropriate when the govern-
ment's self-interest was at stake, the court determined that the fiscal
conditions alleged to justify the impairment had been mitigated by
other legislation; hence, the contract impairment was impermissible
under the contract clause.
(iii) The Reserved Power Doctrine and the Existing System
Very few cases specifically in the land use context contain any
significant analysis of the tension between the contract clause and
the reserved power doctrine. As noted earlier, courts unfavorable
to contract zoning tend to focus on the statutory requirements of
uniformity and the potential for official abuse presented by de-
parture from uniform application. A few decisions seemingly add
as an afterthought that a public body cannot surrender its legislative
functions; 292 these decisions add little in the way of substantive
analysis. Similarly, decisions approving contract or conditional
zoning tend to be equally unenlightening.293
Nonetheless, the land use area is not without precedent up-
holding the ability of a government entity to enter into contracts
with private parties that to some degree restrict the government's
ability to exercise its police power in the future. For example, in
Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton,294 the Cailfornia Court
of Appeal upheld a number of annexation agreements under which
the developer agreed to pay an annexation fee and make certain site
improvements in exchange for the city's promise to annex, zone, and
292See, e.g., Harnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956) (en banc);
Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automative Products Credit Ass'n, 9 NJ. 122, 130, 87
A.2d 319, 322 (1952).
293 See, e.g., Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203
N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960); State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174
N.W.2d 533 (1970).
294 58 Cal. App. 3d 724, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1976).
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provide adequate capacity in the city's sewage facility. All went
well until a regional water quality board issued an order preventing
further sewer hook-ups. When the developer brought an action for
specific performance and damages, the city argued that it was not
liable because annexation was a police power function which could
not be "contracted away." The court disagreed, finding that the
agreements did not amount to a total surrender of municipal control
but rather, insofar as the annexation agreements coincided with the
master plan and zoning ordinance, they carried out municipal
policy. Thus, the Morrison opinion recognized that a municipality
can contract with reference to its police power and that such con-
tracts are not void ab initio. In addition, the opinion can be read
as finding that the city's reasons for failing to honor the agreement
were unreasonable and unnecessary to the carrying out of an im-
portant public purpose. With reference to this last point, Morrison
can perhaps be criticized for failing to discuss adequately the possi-
bility that public health standards might at some point justify an
impairment of the agreement under the U.S. Trust standard.
Other state court decisions support the general contours of the
Morrison opinion. For example, a city's contract to install sub-
division improvements has been enforced against a successor city
council, 295 and a city has been estopped from applying a zoning
ordinance that undermines a previous guarantee of a specified
density given in exchange for a land dedication. 296  In still another
case, a court has held a municipality to a contract that bound the
municipality to cooperate with the state-created housing authority.297
The recent enactment of a California statute authorizing so-
called development agreements lends credence to the belief that a
government entity can contract with respect to its police power.29
The statute is an attempt to bring some certainty to the state's land
development process, which has been characterized by frequent
change in government regulation and a correspondingly inadequate
and late judicial vesting rule.299 Recognizing that this lack of cer-
tainty has wasted economic resources and escalated the cost of hous-
295 Carruth v. City of Madera, 233 Cal. App. 2d 688, 43 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1965).
296 Mayor of Baltimore v. Crane, 277 Md. 198, 352 A.2d 786 (1976).
297 Housing Authority v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. 2d 853, 243 P.2d 515
(en banc), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952). This decision partially relies upon
a state statute that authorizes cooperation between the authority and city as support
for the position that the agreement was not an unauthorized attempt to contract
away the police power.
2 9
3CL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864-65869.5 (West Supp. 1980); see Holliman,
supra note 251.
299 See supra notes 107-34 and accompanying text.
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ing, the development agreement mechanism ostensibly allows a
private developer and a government entity to agree in advance as
to such matters as permitted use, density, height, and size; such
advance agreement shall govern "notwithstanding any change in
any applicable general or specific plan, zoning, subdivision, or build-
ing regulation." 300 Thus, unlike the proposed alternative system
-which reduces the level of public control, the California statute
retains extensive public control over land use, while trying to pro-
vide assurance that the nature of the control will not be altered
substantially during construction.3 1 The fact that the California
legislature passed the statute, with the concurrence of the League of
California Cities, tends to indicate that both believe that contracts
which restrict the future exercise of the police power are possible,
at least with express statutory authority.
(iv) The Reserved Power Doctrine and the Alternative System
At last, we are in a position to speculate as to the effect of the
reserved power doctrine on the alternative system. Our speculation
is aided by distinguishing Public Improvement from Intensity
Modification Contracts. Public Improvement Contracts should not
run afoul of any conception of the reserved power doctrine. Because
the Public Improvement Contract merely defines the quantity and
quality of the public improvement to be constructed with public
money, the contract can be characterized as an exercise of the spend-
ing power. Thus, if past formalism survives U.S. Trust, contrary
to the analysis suggested earlier, the Public Improvement Contract
should survive an initial determination of validity. Whether or not
LUCA or the local legislative body subsequently could modify or
repeal a Public Improvement Contract would depend upon the
impairment's reasonableness and necessity. While there may be
cases in which necessity might justify impairment, the burden of
that justification would be with the community, as it was in U.S.
Trust.30 2
300 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65865.4 (West Supp. 1980).
3o Whether the development agreements authorized by the California statute
will provide the needed certainty is an open question insofar as it may leave intact
a battery of discretionary actions, as well as the possibility that a city, through
some cooperating governmental entity or related body of regulation not subject to
agreement, may frustrate the agreement's entire purpose. See Hagman, supra note
134, at 70.
80 2 An argument can be made that the community's burden for justifying cer-
tain impairments of a Public Improvement Contract should be less because of the
inherent nature of the alternative system. Specifically, it can be argued that ask-
ing the landowner to increase the quantity or quality of public improvements is
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Intensity Modification Contracts clearly run contrary to the-
formalistic application of the reserved power doctrine. The subject
matter of such a contract, as its name indicates, may relate to the-
intensity of development and the public's role, if any, in defining,
permitted uses, height, size, and overall design of the private im-
provements. Under the existing system, all of these matters are-
traditional police power concerns; hence, a court which insists on
confining U.S. Trust to its spending power facts would likely find an
Intensity Modification Contract to be void ab initio and the state
would be free to modify unilaterally any agreement entered into,
with a developer. This analysis would be unfortunate, not only
because it would be an impediment to the alternative system, but
also because it would represent the substitution of simple-minded
categories for substantive analysis to determine whether a given
Intensity Modification Contract preserves the essential attributes of
sovereignty.
In the context of the alternative system, it is possible to argue
that Intensity Modification Contracts not only preserve but also
promote a community's sovereignty. Because the landowner, and
not a public entity, retains discretion over substantially all land use
issues, the motivation for entering into an Intensity Modification
Contract is most likely to originate with LUCA. If LUCA desires
public control over aspects of a particular private development, it
can endeavor to obtain that control through the Intensity Modifica-
tion Contract mechanism. Thus, the contract would likely increase,
rather than decrease, sovereign control over the land development
process.
Even if U.S. Trust is construed narrowly, the passage of the
alternative system's enabling legislation should enhance the accepta-
bility of the Intensity Modification Contract. By authorizing such
contracts, the legislature is presumably indicating that the contracts
not asking him to do any more than what LUCA could have required as a maxi-
mum obligation in the first place-that is, improvement up to the value of the
unearned increment. This argument is valid to the extent that a court balances
the police power against the landowner burden created by the improvement as
part of its determination of necessity. The premise underlying the argument, how-
ever (that a landowner is always liable for public improvement up to the value
of the unearned increment even after the Public Improvement Contract is nego-
tiated), should not be made into a general principle. Doing so would ignore
the extent to which the landowner has relied upon the Public Improvement Con-
tract in making private improvements. If the -landowner has relied substantially
on the originally accepted public improvement plan, the community's justification
of any impairment should be more, not less, rigorous. This latter statement is
entirely consistent with U.S. Trust, which suggested that a sliding scale approach
be adopted. 431 U.S. at 29-31. Thus, not only is the impairment of a public
contract more strictly reviewed than an infringement of a private contract, but
also the severity of the impairment itself will dictate the level of review.
[Vol. 130:28-
DEREGULATING LAND USE
are not inherently inconsistent with the exercise of sovereign power.
Moreover, it has long been held that a state can define the extent of
local governing power and even, under some circumstances, withdraw
that power at will.303 In this regard, the alternative system's en-
abling legislation will contain a withdrawal of the preestablished,
pervasive local power over land use and a substitution of the nego-
tiated public control embodied by the Intensity Modification Con-
tract. The alternative system represents a fundamental change in
perspective from a pervasive government to one of limited control.
5. The Unearned Increment: Its Recapture and Use for
Public Improvements and General Revenue
In any decision to purchase undeveloped land, land value will
be calculated not only in reference to the land's current use, but also
with respect to any possible future use. The value of agricultural
land will be the present value of the agricultural production as well
as the discounted present value of the land's future developed use.
Thus, the price of agricultural land is equal to the sum of the capi-
talized value of the current use plus the capitalized value of any
future use discounted to the present. The value of any future use
will depend upon the intensity of future development, the time of
development, and the property's holding costs-principally interest
and taxes.
The alternative system recaptures the difference between the
future use value, represented by the voluntarily-selected LUI rating,
and the value of the land's current agricultural/open space use.
The recaptured amount is termed the unearned increment, and it
will be used primarily to fund any public improvements required
by the Public Improvement Contract. Any portion of the unearned
increment not used by the developer for public improvements will
be paid to the community as general revenue. Following current
practice, public improvements will be required to be completed, or
an adequate bond supplied, in advance of subdivision recordation
and the sale of lots.aM4 Mechanically, the payment of surplus un-
303 One treatise notes that "[tihe cases reinforcing the right of a state to
alter or retract at will the terms of its agreement with a smaller governmental en-
tity are legion." J. Now.x, I. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 80, at 425 n.47
(citing cases).
304 See generally Green, Land Subdivision, in PAmcnrns AND PRscTicE OF
URBAN PLAN-2,NING 443, 449-54 (W. Goodman & E. Freund eds. 1968). For a dis-
cussion of performance bonds, see supra note 37. It should also be noted that
subdivision recordation does not mean subdivision control as it is presently con-
stituted. The alternative system utilizes subdivision recordation as a procedural
device to ensure accurate land titles, not as a substantive control. Thus, if the
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earned increment will be secured by a lien of first priority on the
subject property. Payment of the surplus itself will occur over the
life of the development project in accordance with a schedule in-
corporated into the Public Improvement Contract.
a. The Property Tax and Public Improvement
Historically, considerable public improvement was financed by
means of the general property tax.305 Property tax and expenditure
limitations,3 00 as well as competing community needs such as educa-
tion, increasingly have made the property tax an inadequate source
of revenue for infrastructure purposes,30 7 especially the infrastruc-
ture associated with a heightened housing demand. Even without
statutory limits on the property tax, few communities are willing to
finance the infrastructure needed for new development preceived as
benefiting only "outsiders." In addition, most communities recog-
nize that controlling the supply of new housing drives up the price
of existing housing, thereby benefiting "insiders"; hence, as Pro-
fessor Hagman has noted, "it would hardly be financially astute for
an existing community of homeowners to use funds raised from
them by property taxes ... to put in the infrastructure necessary for
new development." -30 Thus, if infrastructure is to be provided at-
developer fulfills the terms of his Public Improvement Contract and does not exceed
the land use intensity voluntarily selected by him, subdivision recordation is auto-
matic.
305 See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 465.
306 Perhaps the best known of these limitations is California's Proposition 13,
CAL. CoNsT. art. XIIIA, § 1, which limits the ad valorem tax on real property to
one per cent of the full cash value of such property. California, however, has not
been alone in its efforts to control property taxes. For example, long before
California enacted Proposition 13, Indiana froze its property taxes at 1973 levels.
hIN. REV. CODE § 6-1.1-18-2 (Supp. 1980). Professor Hagman suggests that
property tax limits can be traced as far back as 1870 to Rhode Island. D. HAc-
mm,, supra note 19, at 867.
307 Professor Hagman notes:
The consequences of Proposition 13 on land use and the develop-
ment of land were substantial. Consider them. Since general revenues
were reduced substantially, to the extent provision of infrastructure was re-
garded as the "fat" rather than the "bone" of governmental expendi-
ture, eliminate provision of infrastructure from general funds [sic].
Since general obligation bonds were no longer issuable because an un-
limited property tax rate to pay them could no longer be assured, in-
frastructure became difficult to finance by bonding. So-called limited
obligation excise-tax bonds, e.g., pledging revenues from such as sales
taxes, and revenue bonds, could still be used to finance some infrastruc-
ture. Interest rates likely rose because the security of such bonds was
lower.




all, most communities have sought ways of placing its cost with the
developer.
b. Impact Fees and Construction Taxes
Under the existing system, two principal methods exist for
passing on the cost of the public improvements to developers: im-
pact fees or exactions, and general taxes on the construction process.
As mentioned earlier, no satisfactory rationale has emerged for de-
termining when impact fees are appropriate . 0 9 Some courts require
that the particular fee or public improvement be "specifically and
uniquely attributable" to the development, others demand some "ra-
tional nexus," and still others find that the fees are justified so long as
the community uses the funds reasonably. All these rationales have
been criticized elsewhere,31 0 and for present purposes, it is enough
to note that they are imprecise 3 11 and generally poor tests of the
fairness of any particular exaction.
The general tax alternative under the existing system is neither
precise nor fair. For this reason, courts have been reluctant to
allow communities to impose a general tax on development without
express statutory authority.312 Thus, a community is generally pro-
30 9 See supra note 34.
810 See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 450-75. Professor Ellickson has argued
that the judicial rationales are deficient because they fail to address the issue of
horizontal fairness among landowners. Specifically, he states that "if a municipal-
ity mixes special and general revenues in financing a service, the portion financed
by general revenues should presumptively be distributed equally per dwelling
unit" Id. 460 (footnote omitted).
In addition to problems of horizontal fairness among landowners, it is important
to realize that new development may impose a number of different types of costs
on a community, and that courts may not treat all such costs as equally valid
reasons to exact special fees. For example, much case law restricts the use of
subdivision exactions as a device to exclude housing of a lower aesthetic quality
than currently exists in the community. In contrast, courts are more receptive
to subdivision exactions that address the congestion and fiscal costs of new devel-
opment. See Blumstein, supra note 168, at 36-38; see also M. BRoos, MANDATORY
DEDICATION OF LAND on FEEs ni Lx oF LAND FOR PARKs AND SCHOOLS (Ameri-
can Society of Planning Officials, Planning Advisory Service Report No. 266,
1971); Adelstein & Edelson, Subdivision Exactions and Congestion Externalities,
5 J. LEGAL STvu. 147 (1976); Johnston, supra note 33; Note, Subdivision Land
Dedication: Objectives and Objections, 27 STAN. L. REv. 419 (1975).
311Even the most stringent exaction requirement may be evaded in prac-
tice. See Platt & Moloney-Merkle, Municipal Improvisation: Open Space Exac-
tions in the Land of Pioneer Trust, 5 UnB. LAW. 706 (1973).
312 Dean McCarthy notes:
Fees are customarily exacted for the award or renewal of licenses and
permits [by a local government]. While one might conceptually dem-
onstrate that the costs of regulation are expenses of government like all
others and that methods of obtaining revenues to pay government ex-
penses constitute taxation, the power to exact license and permit fees
has been considered to be within the penumbra of the police, not the
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hibited from raising revenue from fees charged for development
permits. When a community has the express power to tax or levy
user fees, however, courts will sustain such fees, except when the
tax or user fee is confiscatory or when it contains classifications not
rationally related to the carrying out of a legitimate legislative
goal.m13 Because taxes seldom constitute a substantial percentage of
the sale price of each dwelling unit, they are rarely found to be
confiscatory. Moreover, because tax classifications are presumed
rational until proven otherwise, fine distinctions between residential
developers and commercial builders,314 and between the construc-
tion of new dwellings and additions to existing dwellings, have
been easily sustained.315 The primary danger of the general tax
alternative stems from the fact that the taxing power, once granted,
is construed broadly without meaningful legal constraints or limits.
Recognizing that "the power to tax is the power to destroy," 316
taxing, power. As a result, such fee exactions cannot be intended to
be revenue producing vehicles, and licensing for revenue must be dis-
tinguished from licensing for regulation. . . . [I]n order to license for
revenue, the municipality must be empowered by state delegation of
such taxing authority, and such regulations will be evaluated under the
rubrics applicable to local taxation.
D. McCARr=, LocAL Go N Tsr LAw 120-21 (1975). For a case in the land
use area acknowledging this general principle, see Contractors & Builders Ass'n v.
City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
See also Merrelli v. City of St. Claire Shores, 355 Mich. 575, 96 N.W.2d 144
(1959) (en bane); Strahan v. City of Aurora, 38 Ohio Misc. 37, 311 NXE.2d
.876 (1973).
313 See, e.g., Westfield-Palos Verdes Co. v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 73
Cal. App. 3d 486, 141 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977) (upholding an environmental ex-
cise tax of $500 per dwelling unit); Hartman v. Aurora Sanitary Dist., 23 IIL
2d 109, 177 N.E.2d 214 (1961) (deferring to the legislature and upholding a
$160 charge for connection to the city's sewer line).
314 See Associated Home Builders v. City of Newark, 18 Cal. App. 3d 107,
95 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1971) (upholding a larger bedroom tax on residential devel-
opment than commercial and industrial development, because the former could
-conceivably require greater fire and police protection).
315 The California Court of Appeal has stated:
[W]e can conceive of a valid distinction between residential developers
and contractors sufficient to sustain the instant [bedroom tax] ordinance
against an equal protection attack. Thus, there are significant differences
both in business function and in the scope of development which justify
the developer-contractor classification. That is, a developer normally
plans an entire subdivision and then mass produces the homes within a
somewhat expensive tract . . . [Tihe contractor usually custom designs
homes pursuant to individual contracts with the owners. Given such dis-
tinctions, the fact that the burden of the license tax may be borne unequally
among the different classifications is of no constitutional significance.
Westfield-Palos Verdes Co. v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 73 Cal. App. 3d 486,
-496, 141 Cal. Rptr. 36, 43 (1977) (citations omitted).
316 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
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some communities have employed the tax not to raise the revenue
necessary for public improvement but to halt or substantially im-
pede housing construction of all types. The fact that a permanent
no-growth attitude may exceed the community's police power may
be of little consequence when a local governing body may achieve
social and economic ends by the manner in which a tax is imposed,
even if such objectives might otherwise exceed the governing body's,
regulatory power.
317
That existing nonproperty tax methods for imposing the public
improvement cost on developers may be unworkable, uncontrol-
lable, or undemocratic does not mean that it is improper to impose
such costs pursuant to a mechanism that fairly represents the bene-
fits received. A compelling case can be made that if prior public
and private activity has made a community a desirable place to live,
developers should not be free to impose unexpected and uninternal-
ized costs on a community at will. Certainly, it is unrealistic for
developers to refuse to bear their own costs and then assume that a
community will not adopt some antigrowth measure that will make
the infrastructure cost issue academic.
The recapture of the unearned increment and its application to.
public improvement under the alternative system is a workable and
fair method for imposing infrastructure costs on the developer.
Unlike impact fees or exactions, which are justified on the basis of
vague judicial standards, the unearned increment could be objec-
tively determined by an appraiser mutually acceptable to the com-
munity and the developer. Unlike the construction or business
license taxes which have been imposed without legal limitation, the
amount of unearned increment recoverable from any given land-
owner under the alternative system will be expressly limited to the
amount determined by the appraiser.318
317 See, e.g., Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860 (1974) (uphold--
ing Vermont's land gains tax). For a discussion of land value taxation, see infra
notes 322-36 and accompanying text
818 The alternative system both simplifies and complicates land appraisal. As
previously indicated, land value is a function of present and discounted future value.
Future value under the existing system is difficult to assess because of the un-
predictability of future uses. Nevertheless, valuation practice requires that value
be determined in reference to all potentially available-though not merely specula-
tive-uses. See 1 L. OnGE, VALUATION uiER =E LAw oF EMMNET Dor..w
§ 30 (2d ed. 1953). Because under the alternative system appraisal is conducted
at a time when the future use has been defined by the LUI selection of the land-
owner, future value can be determined with reference to that particular use. While
Orgel suggests that valuing property in its "best use," rather than with respect to
"all available uses," leads to the undervaluation of property, id. § 30, at 149, his
remarks are properly confined to the condemnation process where the object is the-
determination of a purchase price, rather than an unearned increment related to,
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,c. Arguments Against Unearned Increment Recapture
Landowners may make two arguments against unearned incre-
ment recapture under the alternative system. As a matter of his-
torical equity, landowners may point out that to the extent the
infrastructure in the existing community was financed with the
property tax, which they (or a predecessor in title) paid, the un-
earned increment recapture constitutes double taxation.319 While
such an argument is historically accurate, and theoretically valid, it
loses sight of the present-day reality that inflation and the general
cost of money have made today's infrastructure more costly than
yesterday's, and that statutory limits and political pressure have
kept the property tax from keeping pace. Nevertheless, the argu-
ment has current validity to the extent the property tax is still being
used to finance the capital construction of new or replacement
public improvements which benefit the existing community.
Clearly, there would be an inequity, as some courts have recognized
with regard to school facilities, "if new construction alone were to
bear the capital cost of new schools while also being charged
[through property taxes] with the capital costs of schools serving
other portions of the school district." 320
The alternative system proposes to eliminate this potential in-
equity, not by refusing to recapture the unearned increment from
the developer, but by also recapturing it from landowners in the
existing community. Specifically, when a landowner in the existing
community is specially benefited by capital construction, that un-
earned increment will be recaptured by means of a special assess-
the recoupment of windfall gain for public facility purposes. Thus, part of the
valuation guesswork is eliminated by the alternative system.
The alternative system, however, also complicates appraisal by removing the
viability of one of the appraiser's easiest valuation techniques: comparable sales of
similar property proximate to the time of valuation. Such evidence is unhelpful
under the alternative system because sale prices should no longer reflect the
prospective land value windfall or unearned increment which is being recaptured.
While appraisers might look to sales of comparably developed property or un-
developed property prior to the implementation of the alternative system (adjusted
for inflation), such evidence may be tainted by the existing system's artificial
scarcity of certain use classifications. In this regard, Orgel cites numerous cases in
which temporary depressions, id. § 24, periods of "boom prices," id. § 25, and
certain government regulation, id. § 26, have been excluded from the value deter-
mination. Nevertheless, the case law is clearly divided, and an appraiser might be
-well-advised to avoid the difficulty altogether by using an alternative valuation
technique, such as anticipated income or business profits, id. §§ 155-175, or
,estimated rental value, id. §§ 176-187.
319 See generally Ellickson, supra note 3, at 450-89.




-ment. In this way, the developer's property tax should be reduced
-because that source of revenue will no longer bear the liability of
capital construction for the existing community-and the alleged
inequity of prospective double taxation will be eliminated.
The second argument a landowner may make against unearned
increment recapture relates, not to its application to the cost of
public improvement, but to its retention beyond that cost as a source
of general revenue. Specifically, the developer may argue that such
recapture will inevitably make the high cost of housing even higher
and that it unjustifiably deprives the landowner of land value to
which he is entitled as an incident of ownership. Whether or not
housing costs will rise is a debatable proposition. To the extent
that housing demand is elastic, the landowner-developer will find
passing on the cost to the housing consumer to be difficult.
3 21
This is not to suggest that the recapture cost is merely written
off, at least not by the developer. Up to this point, we have been
treating the original landowner and developer as having the same
or related interests; however, allocating the recapture cost may cause
those interests to diverge. A developer purchasing land knows his
material and labor costs as well as his expected margin of profit.
One can be fairly certain that to the extent the developer is unable
to pass the recapture cost forward he will pass the cost backward to
other participants in the construction process. If the recapture cost
cannot be made up in this manner, the cost will be borne by the
original landowner insofar as he will find it necessary to sell to the
developer at a lower price.
3 2 1 1n discussing the incidence of a land gain tax, Dean Misczynski states:
[T]he "Simply Pass It On" theory, . . . enjoys remarkable popular
credibility despite almost universal denegration (sic] by tax experts. The
notion is that if a landowner, houseowner, or builder must pay a gains
tax, he will simply raise the price of his property by enough to cover the
tax ... There are a number of problems with this view. An initial
one is, if the owner could easily sell his property at a price higher by
the amount of the tax, why would he not do so even if there were no tax?
Surely sellers are anxious to sell for the highest price they can get. A
more sophisticated version of this theory is that if all sellers expect to be
able to pass the tax on, and if they all hold out for higher prices, they
will effectively shift up the short-run supply curve, raising the short-run
price. This proposal raises some relatively complicated issues, but a
simple critique is that if the shift in supply leads to higher housing
prices, then fewer properties will be sold (unless the demand for housing
is such that quantity demanded does not change at all with price, and
there is considerable evidence that this is not the case). Hence, some
owners will be frustrated in their effort to sell property, and will eventually
drop their pribe.
Misczynski, The Question of Incidence, in WxnmFALs FoR WIPEoTs 112, 127-28
(D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978).
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d. Henry George and the Land Value Tax
Is a landowner entitled to a return of the unearned increment
not necessary for public improvement (the surplus unearned incre-
ment)? A strong argument was made by nineteenth-century philoso-
pher Henry George that a landowner has no justifiable claim to any
land value, much less the surplus unearned increment.3 2. George's
position was premised on the fact that land as a commodity is totally
inelastic; hence, increasing the tax on land will not reduce its supply
in a competitive market. In this regard, everything a landowner
earns from the land itself-as distinguished from any improvement
to the land-constitutes economic rent. The amount a landowner
earns from land is a function of its location and physical features
and not of individual landowner effort. Thus, any tax on such land-
related value merely recaptures value that has been generated by
nature or other public and private activity of the community; value
which the individual landowner did not earn and hence to which
he has no entitlement.
George's theory has been heralded as a source of municipal
wealth, an incentive for rational development and urban renewal,
and a disincentive to land speculation.323 There is some evidence
that the land value tax has the capacity to do all those things. For
example, rational development may be fostered because a land value
tax would be heaviest on the land in central cities with the most
value, which from a planning standpoint of lowering utility exten-
sion and energy costs ought to be developed before hinterland.
Similarly, the land value tax may encourage urban renewal because
any new improvement would be exempt from tax and existing im-
provements would be well-maintained in order to generate sufficient
income to pay the land value tax. Finally, land speculation may be
reduced because of the dramatic increase in holding costs precipi-
tated by the land value tax.
A pure land value tax, however, may also have its drawbacks.
For example, land value assessments tend to be very crude.324 All
2 2 H. GEORGE, PoGasSS Awn PovERsT 358-67 (1962).
323 See Hagman, The Single Tax and Land-Use Planning: Henry George Up-
dated, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 762 (1965).
324 Professor Hagman notes:
The assessors were having . .. practical difficulty with the tax. They
were, of course, to assess the land at market value. But when an area
was developed so that the only sales were of developed sites, the sales
prices were no longer the best evidence of the actual value of the land.
Moreover, the original purchase price of the site became irrelevant as
evidence in a few years because of the rapid rise in values.
Id. 774 (footnote omitted).
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land situated near a particularly desirable public improvement
would likely be assessed at a very high land value despite the fact
that, because of limited demand, only a few parcels close to the
improvement could attract a use that would justify the tax. In
addition, assessing land in core areas at a high land value requires
high density improvements to pay the tax. Absent any other density
control, the densities generated would likely be intolerably high.
Moreover, a land value tax might lower land prices to such an ex-
tent that development would inevitably replace a disproportionate
amount of agricultural land.
Despite these drawbacks, variations of the land value -tax have
been continuously experimented with to the present day. Perhaps
this experimentation continues because of George's inherently sound
position that the community, rather than the landowner, has the
just claim to land value. Professor Hagman's "windfall recapture/
wipeout mitigation" proposal impliedly carries forward George's
ideas. 25 Under Hagman's proposal, any increase in land value not
caused by inflation or the owner is recaptured and, at least in part,
used to mitigate wipeouts or certain decreases in land value. While
using windfalls to mitigate wipeouts appears to be pure Hagman,3 26
the salutory by-products of recapturing the windfall land value is
essentially George. Like George, Hagman cites fairness, the reduc-
tion in land speculation, and better planning-not biased by wind-
fallers supporting plans for the wrong reasons or by potential wind-
fallers distorting plans through bribery and other inveiglement-
as reasons supporting his proposal.327
Henry George's ideas have been of more than academic inter-
est. Land value taxation schemes have been enacted in England, S28
32 See Hagman, supra note 54.
3-2 The idea itself, as Professor Hagman notes, can be traced to the English
Housing, Town Planning, &c. Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, ch. 44, § 58, reprinted in D.
HAG N, supra note 19, at 950, which provided until the mid-1940's as follows:
Where, by the making of any town planning scheme, any property
is increased in value, the responsible autthority shall be entitled to recover
from any person whose property is so increased in value one-half of the
amount of that increase. Any person whose property is injuriously
affected by the making of a town planning scheme shall be entitled to
obtain compensation in respect thereof from the responsible authority.
317 Hagman, supra note 54.
32s The Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910, 10 Edw. 7 & 1 Geo. 5, ch. 8. The tax
levied a duty of 20% on the value of land, and was collected on sale, lease in
excess of 14 years, death, and periodically in the case of corporations and un-
incorporated associations. The administrative costs of collecting the tax far ex-
ceeded the revenue produced and the Finance Act was repealed in 1920. See R.
YA uLzy, LANm V. u TAXATION ,-ro .A'rN 260-73 (1929).
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Canada, 29 New Zealand,330 and Australia.s3  In this country,
variations of his ideas appear in the statues of California, 3
329 Unearned Increment Tax Act, ch. 10, 2d Sess., 1913 Alta. Stat. 46. 2d
Sess., ch. 10. The tax applied to the "increased value of . . . land over and
above the value thereof according to the last . . . value for the purposes of this
Act, excluding in all cases the cost of improvements or of development work
actually made or done upon or in connection with the ... land." Id. § 3. The tax
was collected on sale and was required to be paid prior to land registration. The
tax was continued at various rates until its repeal in 1956. Act of Mar. 29, 1956,
ch. 57, 1956 Alta. Stat. 377. In June 1974, the province of Ontario enacted the
Land Speculation Tax Act which taxed certain speculative gains in land value at
the rate of 50%. Act of June 3, 1974, ch. 17, 1974 Ont. Stat. 83; see Glickfeld
& Hagman, Special Capital and Real Estate Windfalls Taxes (SCREWTS), in
WsnmFAL.s FOR WipEouTs 437, 463-69 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978).
330 Originally, New Zealand followed the 1909 English model of betterment
recapture. As of August 1973, however, New Zealand is operating under the
Property Speculation Tax Act of 1973 which is aimed at land speculators who
force up the sale of land value without contributing anything in the way of de-
velopment value. See Glickfeld & Hagman, supra note 329, at 459-62. In addition,
New Zealand has amended its Land and Income Tax Act of 1954 by adding
§88AA(1)(ca). This amendment taxes profits which arise from the increase in
value attributable to the
rezoning of land, from the likelihood of rezoning, because of development
of a particular industry or project in an area or even the gradual encroach-
ment of a town or a city. In these circumstances, as the community has,
in a sense, increased the profits of the landowner when he sells, it was
considered proper that he in turn should pay income tax back to the
community on those profits.
Id. 463.
331 The state of New South Wales, Australia adopted an unearned increment
tax in April 1970. Land Development Contribution Act, No. 24, 1970 Stat. N.S.W.
487; Land Development Contribution Management Act, No. 22, 1970 Stat. N.S.W.
334. The tax applied to land in defined areas laying between urbanized Sydney
and rural areas. The tax was designed to recapture the unearned increment asso-
ciated with rezoning. The Minister for Local Government of New South Wales
who proposed the betterment levy stated: "those lands which will derive a very
considerable benefit in increased value from rezoning, and will require massive
public investment in the provision of essential services, should contribute some
proportion of this gain towards the public expenditure necessary for their de-
velopment." Glickfeld & Hagman, supra note 329, at 454 (quoting parliamentary
debates). The tax proved politically unpopular and was repealed after a change
of the party in power on December 20, 1973. Id. 458-59.
332 Notions of land value taxation are implicit in California's rural special dis-
tricts, which have raised substantial tax revenues based solely on land. Special
districts are authorized in California under 193 separate statutory provisions. The
California controller classifies these districts into 54 types, and 16 of them have
land only as their tax base. These "land only" taxes produced in excess of $40
million in revenue in 1972-73; that money was used to finance a variety of services,
"including water utility, drainage and drainage maintenance, flood control and
water conservation, reclamation, streets, levee management and maintenance, soil
conservation, water conservation, waste disposal, recreation and park, electric
utility, and pest control." Hagman, Land-Value Taxation, in WDnm,Ir.Ls FOR
W pEOUTS 399, 419 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978); see id. 415-21.
In addition, California has considered, but not adopted, two other Georgist pro-
posals. One bill tied an unearned land value tax to a fund to provide grants to,
local agencies for open space/recreational land acquisition, and a second proposal
would enact a similar tax to fund compensation for landowners precluded from
developing their land by reason of governmental laws or regulations. See Glick-
feld & Hagman, supra note 329, at 475-76.
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Hawaii, 333 and Vermont.83 4 England appears to have had the most
statutory varieties, although most British efforts have had a history
of nonenforcement and repeal, reflective of the swings in political
power and philosophy from liberal to conservative.33 5
33 From 1963 to 1977, Hawaii had a graded property tax which reflected
Georgist ideas. Act 142, 1963 Hawaii Sess. Laws 174 (repealed 1977). While
administratively complicated, the tax was basically designed to have improve-
ment taxed at a lesser rate than land. See Hagman, supra note 332, at 411-12.
334 Vermont has enacted a land gains tax both to create a fund for property
tax relief as well as to deter land speculation. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10001
(1973). The rate of the Vermont tax is directly proportional to the percentage
of gain and inversely proportional to the holding period. For example, the maxi-
mum rate of 60% is imposed on land held less than one year and sold at a gain
of 200% or more. The minimum rate of 5% is imposed on land held between
5 and 6 years and sold at a gain of 99% or less. In Andrews v. Lathrop, 132
Vt. 265, 315 A.2d 860 (1974), the Supreme Court of Vermont upheld the consti-
tutionality of the tax against an equal protection claim that the classifications
providing for no tax after six years were without reasonable basis and that the
stated purpose of the tax (property tax relief) was unrelated to the real purpose
(the curbing of land speculation). The Vermont Supreme Court found that re-
gardless of the stated purpose, it was a legitimate legislative interest to deter
speculation which netted a high gain over a relatively short holding period. Con-
sequently, the holding periods specified by the Act were deemed reasonable. The
court also found that the plaintiffs, three land developers and a large land holder,
failed to introduce sufficient evidence establishing discrimination between rural
and city sellers or between residents and nonresidents.
Because the stated and implied purposes of the Vermont Act are in conflict-
that is, taxes which discourage sales will not raise tax revenues if, in fact, sales
are reduced in number-it was inevitable that only one of the Act's purposes
would be fulfilled. Preliminary indications suggest that the tax has had some ef-
fect on reducing the overall rate of lan& speculation. See Glickfeld & Hagman,
supra note 329, at 470-75.
Professors Glickfeld and Hagman note that the District of Columbia, Vir-
ginia, Montana, Oregon, Washington, and California have all considered imposing
land gains taxes based, at least partially, on the Vermont model. For the most
part, these proposals are ostensibly designed to lower the rate of land conversion
or speculation. Thus, most of the bills focus on short-term gains. id. 475-76.
Disregarding the concern with land speculation, there is no particular reason to
limit the recapture of the unearned increment to merely short-term gains.
335 While both the Labor and Conservative Parties accepted the idea of recap-
ture in principle, they differed as to its administration: the Labor Party wanted
it to be a betterment levy administered separately by a land commission, while
the Conservatives wanted it to be incorporated into the capital gains tax. See
Glickfeld & Hagman, supra note 329, at 449.
Currently, England is experimenting with the Development Land Tax Act of
1976 which includes a betterment levy recapturing upward of 80% of the develop-
ment or land value. The Act is reprinted in D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, at
1275-77.
While the taxation of undeveloped land under the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) is beyond the scope of this article, some thought obviously must be given
to how the recapture of the unearned increment under the alternative system
affects, if at all, the existing tax structure. Undeveloped land under the IRC
ma- be taxed in various ways depending upon its characterization as property held
solely for "investment" or for "use in a trade or business" or "primarily for sale
to customers." Compare I.R.C. § 1221 (1976) with id. § 1231. Thus, while
gains and losses realized on the sale or exchange of investment property are taxed
as capital transactions, short- or long-term as the case may be, the gain on property
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. The land value taxation scheme most analogous to the alterna-
tive *system was Australia's Land Development Contribution Act of
1970.33 6 Like the alternative system, the Act applied to essentially
undeveloped, but developing, areas. In addition, the tax was calcu-
lated on the basis of the difference between a parcel's appraised
undeveloped value and its value at such time as the planning
scheme (rezoning) was designated for the property. The primary
purpose of the tax was to finance the cost of infrastructure, but
the tax proved to be politically unpopular and was repealed three
and one-half years later.
(i) Recapturing Windfalls and Eliminating Wipeouts
While changes in political ideology may partially explain the
ups and downs of land value tax programs, much of the their un-
popularity can be traced to the fact that the tax has been imposed
to recapture the land value windfall without providing any cor-
responding benefit to the landowner. Specifically, the landowner
has been asked to forfeit all, or most, of the land value while being
left to face a system of public land use control that has been vari-
ously described as "byzantine" 337 or a "bubbling cacophony of
held primarily for sale to customers (the typical dealer/developer situation) is
treated as ordinary income.
It is anticipated that normally a developer will pay the unearned increment
under the alternative system, although there is nothing in theory preventing the
developer from shifting this cost back to either a farmer or passive investor from
whom he purchased the property. Whether or not the developer should be al-
lowed to deduct the amount of unearned increment paid from his federal tax lia-
bility is a question related to the underlying purpose of unearned increment
recapture. Specifically, if the recapture of unearned increment is directed pri-
marily at a reduction in land speculation, then the developer should not be
allowed to deduct the amount of unearned increment from his federal tax lia-
bility, for diminishing the latter will tend to negate the dampening effect of the
former on land speculation. In contrast, if the unearned increment is being re-
captured primarily as a mechanism of recouping community-conferred value, the
issue of deductibility comes down to a policy choice reflecting one's attitude to-
ward whether federal revenues should be increased or decreased. If one factors
in the additional mystery of tax incidence (who the tax ultimately falls on), the
deductibility issue becomes even more complicated. Without addressing these sig-
nificant issues, the author's predisposition is to allow deductibility.
836New South Wales Land Development Contribution Management Act and
Land Development Contribution Act, Nos. 22, 24 1970 Stat. N.S.W. 334, 487
(re pealed 1973). Despite its similarity to the alternative system, there are sig-
nificant differences. First, the taxable increment was the difference between a
based value and the value of land under a publicly imposed planning scheme.
Second, taxable property included both land and improvements. Third, the tax
was collected on sale or the final grant of development consent. In comparison,
the alternative system does not publicly impose the developed use, taxes only
land, and the tax is only due upon development.
337Address by F. Bosselman, ALI-ABA Land Planning and Regulation of
Development Course (March 18, 1976); cited in Hagman, supra note 54, at 20.
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multitudinous edicts." a38 In this regard, the tax has provided an
incentive to develop, while public land use control has made de-
velopment difficult, risky, and often economically infeasible. Pro-
fessor Hagman has recognized this inequity by suggesting that wind-
falls be used as a source of compensation for wipeouts, which in
many cases are caused by public regulation.83 9 While one may
question whether the administrative costs of identifying wipeout
victims and monetizing the extent of the wipeout caused by any
given regulation is feasible, one cannot fault Hagman's notion that
fairness requires "minimizing downside losses and socializing up-
side gains." 340
One can seriously question, however, whether a system of pub-
lic regulation that results in extensive downside losses should be
perpetuated. The alternative system suggests that it is better to
eliminate, rather than mitigate, wipeouts. Once wipeouts -are elimi-
nated, the recapture of unearned increment windfalls is highly
equitable.
(ii) Land Value Recapture Under the Alternative System
In recapturing the unearned increment, the alternative system
accepts the principles enunciated by Henry George with a few modi-
fications. First, the entire land value is not recaptured, only that
amount in excess of the property's agricultural/open space value.
The alternative system exempts the agricultural/open space value
from taxation in order to give a tax preference to the agricultural/
open space use.ul
Whether or not agricultural tax preferences under the existing
system are equitable and accomplish their preservation purpose is
much disputed. 42  Some have contended that the preference is
nothing more than a one-time windfall, likely to be enjoyed by a
high-stakes investor as much as a cash-poor farmer. 43 In any event,
say those in opposition to the tax preference, if the farmer has
trouble coming up with the tax money, he can either sell to another
investor or get a loan. Economically, the tax preference is opposed
3 3 8 Hagman, supra note 54, at 20.
3 " Professor Hagman's proposal would also compensate for wipeouts caused
by private activity. The alternative system relies upon nuisance law compensa-
tion in such circumstances.
3 4 0 Hagman, supra note 54, at 24.
341 See generaffy D. H AMA, supra note 17, § 192.
8 42 See supra note 2 (citing materials).
843 Roberts, supra note 2, at 74.
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as an insubstantial subsidy to keep land in agricultural use when
the developed value of the land is five to ten times greater. 4
While some of these arguments may have merit in the context
of the existing system, they are less applicable to the alternative
system. As the previous analysis suggested, one of the drawbacks to
a pure land value tax is that it encourages development indis-
criminately. An agricultural/open space tax preference solves this
problem by exempting the preferred class of property from the
pressure to develop. The unearned increment recapture of the
alternative system should not create the density problems associ-
ated with a pure land value tax because of the alternative system's
overall density control embodied in the periodically-revised LUI
schedules and the density control available to the community pur-
suant to an Intensity Modification Contract. Moreover, from an
economic standpoint, a tax preference under the alternative system
should result in more preservation because the landowner, be he
farmer or investor,3 45 is not entitled to the developed use value.
Thus, the decision to develop will not be based on a comparison of
dramatically different land values but a determination that a market
demand exists which makes development profitable even net of the
unearned increment.
Finally, the recapture of the unearned increment under the
alternative system differs slightly from previous land value recap-
ture programs concerning when the tax is due. Previous schemes
have either called for collecting the tax upon sale or development,
or for collecting it periodically like other general property taxes.- 0
Under the alternative system, the tax is collected only upon develop-
ment. Again, this reflects the belief that so long as the land re-
mains in an agricultural or open space use, it should be taxed
accordingly, regardless of a change in ownership. Under pre-
vious schemes, the tax was collected at the point of sale because of
the liquidity created by sale and because the increase in land value
was determined in reference to publicly imposed development
value. Because the development value is voluntarily selected by
3441Id. 71-72.
345 Recent studies indicate that perhaps as much as 77% of the farmland in
the United States is rented to farmers by land speculators. See Wall St. J., Oct.
6, 1981, at 1, col. 6. Interestingly, the Secretary of Agriculture has suggested a
type of land value recapture to reduce the level of speculation. Specifically, the
Secretary suggests that the favorable capital gains tax rate only apply to that
amount of capital investment required for "the most efficient-sized farm," which he
says is about 1,000 acres. Any gain on the investment not attributable to farming
would be taxed at higher ordinary income rates. Id. 16, col. 4.
346 Hagman, supra note 54, table 20-1.
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the landowner at the time of development, this becomes the only
relevant tax-triggering event. Thus, the sale of undeveloped land
under the alternative system should not result, by itself, in a change
to a developed use. In addition, the unearned increment is recap-
tured only once. This should avoid the problem of annually
applied land value schemes which may force older, perhaps historic,
structures under the bulldozer because of their inability to produce
sufficient income to pay the land value tax.4
7
III. CONCLUSION
The existing land use allocation system for undeveloped land
is unfair, inefficient, inflexible, and uncertain. The alternative free
enterprise development system suggests that deregulating the process
will substantially overcome these shortcomings.
The alternative system promotes procedural fairness by redi-
recting citizen/neighbor participation toward policymaking, rather
than application. Removing the neighbor from policy applica-
tion prevents the misuse of land use controls as devices for preserv-
ing the status quo and excluding newcomers. Distributional fair-
ness is enhanced through the recapture of the unearned increment
traditionally associated with development permission under the
existing system. Correlatively, reducing public discretion over pri-
vate development minimizes the likelihood of being wiped out by
public control and the motivation for corrupt behavior. This is
underscored by linking public control of density and public im-
provement with the amount of unearned increment recaptured.
The efficiency gains of the alternative system relate primarily
to lowering the administrative costs of land use regulation. The
alternative system consolidates control in one agency. With one
exception, that agency is limited to the ministerial administration
of the four density schedules established by the local legislative
body. The one exception relates to the negotiation of Intensity
Modification Contracts. This device has been retained within the
alternative system as a mechanism of public control within, rather
than opposed to, the market. Prevention costs should also be less
under the alternative system because of the substitution of the gen-
eral deterrence of nuisance law for the specific, pre-set regulation
of the existing system. While public improvement is specified
under the alternative system, it is done on a sensitive, case-by-case
basis.
347 Hagman, supra note 323, at 775.
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Because the alternative system is premised upon individual
decisionmaking, it is highly flexible. The location of uses, size
of lots and structures, and building and site design are decisions-
all placed with the landowner. Subject to the restrictions of the
building code and express or implied warranties of fitness, the
selection of construction materials is also an individual matter.
The proposed alternative brings certainty to the land develop-
ment process by replacing the ambiguous and economically waste-
ful vesting rules of the existing system with the automatic vesting
implicit in the landowner's selection of a land use intensity rating.
Moreover, although the specific public facility requirements are
not known in advance of the administrative determination of the
Public Improvement Contract, the maximum cost to the landowner
is known in advance in the form of the unearned increment, which
should be capable of reasonable appraisal.
The alternative system demarcates the appropriate concerns of
public and private decisionmaking. Public land use control is
limited to defining acceptable community standards for population
density and safety in terms of public improvement. Private deci-
sions determine everything else.
Public improvement decisions are best made publicly because
of the natural limits on the information and economic motivations
of private decisionmakers. Clearly acknowledging public control in
this context should eliminate many of the deficiencies associated
with the existing system and should reduce markedly the possibility
of negative externalities from private development.
Private improvement decisions are best made privately. The
deregulation of the land use allocation process represented by the
alternative system requires an abandonment of the strained fictions
and evasions of the existing system that permit wholesale interfer-
ence in the land market motivated by the desire for social, eco-
nomic, and racial segregation and hidden behind a generalized
and often spurious concern with the "public interest." The public
interest is a vacuous concept designed to prevent the disclosure of
the actual private interests being served. Recognizing that the
use of land is essentially a private matter should right the failings
of the existing system and restore the individual freedom that has
been all too frequently sacrificed beneath the vague banner of the
general welfare.
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